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ABSTRACT 
Balancing water demand and supply in South Africa involves high levels of uncertainty. 
The Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) is responsible for making decisions to 
either increase water supply or decrease water demand so as to ensure that sufficient 
water is available, when and where it is needed. However, no retrospective analyses of 
such decisions have been found. One way to assess such decisions is to evaluate the 
associated costs and benefits thereof. Therefore the primary aim of this study is to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of selected water supply options, and of the decision-
making associated with those options. 
 
In order to achieve this purpose, four case studies were analysed within a mixed-methods 
research paradigm, which used both quantitative and qualitative methods, including unit 
reference value (URV) analysis, inter- and intra-case analysis and content analysis to 
examine the success of the decisions made. The four case studies were conducted on the 
Inyaka, Nandoni, Berg and De Hoop dams and their catchments. Firstly, estimated and 
actual project costs were compared using unit reference analysis and inter-case analyses. 
Secondly, the reduction of mean annual runoff (MAR) caused by invasive alien plants 
(IAPs) and the cost of clearing them in the dam catchments were evaluated using inter-
case analyses.  
 
Information thus gathered was used together with data from DWS documentation and the 
results of interviews with ten key specialists, to analyse the decision-making process that 
led to the decision to build De Hoop Dam (the most recent case study). The rational 
decision-making model (RDMM) was used as a framework within which to analyse and 
evaluate this decision-making process. This study has also demonstrated how the RDMM 
can be used to assess decision-making associated with water supply development. 
 
The results of this study show that there is considerable variation of estimated costs (at the 
time that the decision to build the dam was taken) in relation to the actual costs of building 
the dams and that Ministers were not put in a position to understand the full long-term 
costs or the opportunity costs of the proposed dams. Furthermore, the most recent IAP 
data (2008) shows that the impact on water security by IAPs could not offset the water 
security resulting from building each of the four dams. However, if IAP management is not 
continued in these catchments, the projected reduction of MAR by IAPs will compromise 
water security within 45 years. Given the almost exponential spread and densification of 
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IAPs, together with their long-term impact on MAR and increased costs of controlling them, 
it is clear that IAP management should have been factored into water supply decision-
making from the outset. 
 
In the analysis of the decision to build the De Hoop Dam, the results show that while the 
decision-making process that culminated in the decision to build the dam did not follow the 
steps of the RDMM, DWS appears to have followed a somewhat similar approach. It was 
found that while there was a need for the provision of additional water in the Olifants 
catchment, this need was overstated and the resulting overestimation caused the scale 
and size of the dam to be larger than it could and probably should have been. Additionally, 
it appears that DWS‘s decision to build the De Hoop Dam themselves, rather than having it 
built by the private sector, may have been less than optimal.  
 
It is recommended that, in future decision-making, DWS needs to incorporate multiple 
alternative options into the same solution, and to ensure that decision-makers are put into 
a position to make informed decisions, including adequate consideration of externalities. 
Furthermore, DWS needs to employ decision-making models such as the RDMM to 
facilitate retrospective analyses to improve their institutional knowledge. 
 
Keywords: water resources management, dams, invasive alien plants, decision-making, 
unit reference values, rational decision-making model. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
South Africa is a water scarce, developing country (DWA, 2013b; King et al., 2011; 
Ashton, 2002). Its water resources are limited; hence there is a definite supply limit which 
requires the innovative consideration of a broad range of water supply and resource 
management options in addition to dam construction, such as integrated catchment 
management and demand-side management (DSM) (King et al., 2011; DWAF, 2009a).  
 
Awareness of risks such as drought, climate change and deteriorating water quality are 
important, especially in the wake of evidence, that water catchments are degrading (King 
et al., 2011). This evidence can be seen from examples such as pollution and wetland 
degradation (DWA, 2013b), unsustainable farming practices (Currie, 2007), soil erosion 
and sedimentation (Msadala et al., 2010), as well as in other environmental damage from 
land and water abuse caused by under-priced water and lack of incentives to maintain 
catchment health (King et al., 2008; King, 2004). Some of the implications of degrading 
catchments are: decreased water security, decreased water quality, the degradation of 
natural ecosystems such as rivers and wetlands, and a decrease in total useable and 
productive land (King et al., 2011). Degraded catchments can also lead to a decrease in 
social welfare and economic growth, which impacts negatively on human well-being. In 
order to reduce and/or mitigate the degradation of catchments, a process is needed to 
plan and manage water, land and other environmental resources in a harmonised manner 
(De La Harpe & Ramsden, 2002). This is why an integrated water resource management 
(IWRM) approach is imperative in managing water supply in South Africa. 
 
The South African Government has made major commitments to develop new water 
infrastructure such as new and raised dams, inter-basin transfers, bulk distribution 
schemes, and desalination plants (DWA, 2013b; National Treasury, 2013; NPC, 2012; 
Gordhan, 2012; DWAF, 2009a). These commitments have been made through the 
Department of Water and Sanitation (DWA, 2013b; DWAF, 2009a), the Minister of 
Finance‘s budget process (Gordhan, 2012) and the recommendations in the National 
Development Plan: 2030 (National Planning Commission, 2012). 
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Commitment to an infrastructure-led, supply-side approach to water management has 
been criticised for two reasons: firstly, as the result of a perceived lack of historical 
alignment between what decision-makers were told the new water infrastructure would 
cost and the actual cost (Asmal & Hadland, 2011); and secondly, for placing the emphasis 
on infrastructure development rather than careful inclusion of DSM and catchment 
management, where investments should first be made (DEA, 2014d; DWAF, 2009a). In 
light of these criticisms, it should be noted that the continued management, development 
and security of water supply cannot exist without water resource infrastructure (DWA, 
2013b). It must also be pointed out that the Department Water and Sanitation‘s (DWS) has 
evolved to include DSM and catchment management measures such as public awareness 
and education, as well as starting the process of fulfilling the ecological Reserve (DWA, 
2013b). The continued evolution of the Government‘s focus is evident in the laws and 
regulations that have been developed over the last 25 years such as the Environment 
Conservation Act (73 of 1989); The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 36 of 
1996), the Water Services Act (108 of 1997), the National Water Act (36 of 1998), the 
National Water Resource Strategy (DWA, 2004), National Development Plan: 2030 
(National Planning Commission, 2012) and National Water Resource Strategy: Second 
Edition (DWA, 2013b). Through the evolution of these laws and regulations – as well as 
others such as the National Environmental Management Act (107 of 1998) which repealed 
many sections of the Environment Conservation Act (73 of 1989) – a range of 
assessments has been developed to avoid, or at least lessen, harmful effects on the 
environment, that may otherwise have occurred from water supply management and 
development in South Africa. 
 
One way to ensure better informed decision-making is to accumulate knowledge and 
experience into an institutional knowledge base of how past decisions were made. This 
can be done by retrospective analysis of past decisions and decision-making. Ex-post 
analysis reflecting the full costs and benefits of each potential water supply infrastructure 
option, for example a dam, could be used to conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to 
the accuracy of the project costs and benefits, as captured within mainly environmental 
impact assessments.  
 
These ex-post analyses should be done for at least the final dam site that was chosen, 
although prior assessments of all the potential dam sites could also be considered where 
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data is available. If such retrospective analyses were done routinely, they would build an 
invaluable institutional memory and record that would inform future water resource 
decisions and improve the entire decision-making process. Past knowledge could then be 
used to avoid repeating mistakes and to make more equitable and sustainable decisions in 
the future.  
 
Consequently, this study will be a retrospective, management and resource-economic 
evaluation of the costs and benefits of specific water supply options (i.e. dams and 
invasive alien plants management) and the decision-making that occurred in a newly built 
water resource infrastructure development project. This study attempts to fill an important 
gap, as the DWS does not have comprehensive retrospective studies of the costs and 
benefits, and decision-making of past water infrastructure schemes in South Africa (Legge, 
2012). This study synthesises existing information and data, and provides impetus to 
further studies on the costs, benefits and decision-making that should be taken into 
account when faced with choices concerning the management of South Africa‘s finite 
water resources. This study also hopes to provide input to national policy debates, water 
supply development decision-makers and academic dialogue. 
 
1.2 AIM OF THE RESEARCH 
Given the water scarcity in South Africa and the lack of retrospective analysis on water 
supply development decision-making, and in an attempt to retrospectively analyse the 
costs of building selected dams in South Africa, the primary aim of this study is to evaluate 
the costs and benefits of selected water supply options and of the decision-making 
associated with those options. 
 
To achieve the primary aim of this research study, the following objectives have been 
stated:  
 To calculate and evaluate the variation between estimated and actual construction 
unit reference values (URVs) for a selection of water supply infrastructure 
schemes. 
 To analyse the costs and benefits of a water-mix alternative (invasive alien plant 
management) in the context of the catchments of the selected water supply 
infrastructure schemes. 
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 To evaluate the decision-making process behind the building of De Hoop Dam 
using a decision-making framework.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
In this study the mixed methods research (MMR) paradigm incorporates a methodology 
that involves collecting, analysing and combining quantitative and qualitative data in a 
single study (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Within the MMR paradigm a descriptive, 
multiple case study methodology is used to focus on explaining and understanding water 
supply development decision-making in South Africa (Yin, 2014; Collis & Hussey, 2009). 
The selected case studies are four dams (and their catchments) which were chosen from 
across South Africa using a range of criteria as detailed in Chapter Four. The selected 
cases are the Inyaka, Nandoni, Berg River and De Hoop dams and their catchments. Use 
of data and methodological triangulation (multiple data sources and collection methods) 
allows for a more in-depth understanding of the cases (Yin, 2014; Collis & Hussey, 2009).  
 
Data collection methods included semi-structured interviews (Yin, 2014; Collis & Hussey, 
2009), documentation and archival records (Yin, 2014), and data analysis methods 
including URVs (Van Niekerk, 2013), inter- and intra-case analysis and content analysis in 
analysing the decision-making process (Collis & Hussey, 2009). These methods are all 
briefly discussed below.  
 
1.3.1 Unpublished documentation and Government reports 
The documents consulted in this study were mainly from the Department of Water and 
Sanitation (DWS) and in the form of laws, regulations, national strategies, and various 
planning reports. Document analyses were particularly relevant to Chapters Four, Five and 
Six. 
 
1.3.2 Archival records 
Archival records including databases are used in Chapters Four and Five. The cost data 
used in both chapters came from DWS national and regional archives and databases. 
Additionally, Statistics South Africa‘s consumer price index (CPI) archive (Statistics South 
Africa, 2015) is used to adjust the cost data (in Chapter Four) to December 2012 rand 
values, so that inflation is a controlled variable. 
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1.3.3 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were used in Chapter Six so that information could be gathered 
regarding different opinions and views of the decision-making that took place during the 
building of De Hoop Dam (Van Teijlingen, 2014; Collis & Hussey, 2009). The interview 
questions as provided in the interview guide (Appendix E) related to different stages of 
Zindiye‘s (2012) rational decision-making model as well as to perceptions of the decision-
making models that were perceived to be used in making the decision to build De Hoop 
Dam. 
 
A purposive sampling technique was used to select ten interviewees. The researcher 
chose interviewees according to personal judgement and advice taken, based on the 
strength of the interviewee‘s knowledge and experience of the subject being studied 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). The decision of who to interview was made before any of the 
interviews were conducted. Purposive sampling was chosen because a limited number of 
people were involved in the project, and because the topic was sensitive in nature. 
 
1.3.4 Unit reference value (URV) analysis 
In Chapter Four, the difference between the expected and actual costs of building a dam 
were calculated, for all four case studies, using URVs, which are a type of cost-
effectiveness analysis, used and developed in South Africa by the DWS (Van Niekerk, 
2012). URVs calculate the cost per cubic metre of water over the lifetime of a water 
infrastructure project (for example, at the point where the water leaves the dam) by 
dividing the net present value of the capital, operating and maintenance costs by the 
discounted yield of the dam over its lifespan. The URV analysis made use of a 
recommended discount rate of eight per cent and sensitivity analysis of six per cent and 
ten per cent (Van Niekerk, 2013; Mullins et al., 2007).  
 
1.3.5 Inter- and intra-case comparisons 
In Chapters Four and Five, four case studies were compared in respect of: firstly, the 
differences between expected and actual URVs in Chapter Four; and secondly, the 
potential increases in mean annual runoff (MAR) from invasive alien plant (IAP) 
management in Chapter Five. 
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Intra-case comparisons were used where additional data was explored: firstly, in the Berg 
River Dam case (in Chapter Five), in terms of a 45-year projection (the given lifespan of 
dams in South Africa) of the impacts on MAR if IAP management is not continued; and 
secondly, in the De Hoop Dam case (in Chapter Six), in terms of the decision-making that 
resulted in the De Hoop Dam being built. 
 
1.3.6 Decision-making analysis 
In Chapter Six, the decision-making process behind the building of De Hoop Dam (the 
most recent case study) was analysed using the rational decision-making model (RDMM) 
as a framework (Zindiye, 2012). Each of the seven steps of the RDMM was discussed 
using firstly, DWS planning reports; and secondly, responses to semi-structured interviews 
(Van Teijlingen, 2014; Collis & Hussey, 2009). These interviews were analysed using 
content analysis, which enables systemic ordering, structuring, and grouping large 
amounts of qualitative information by identifying themes and patterns (Collis & Hussey, 
2009). 
 
1.4 SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The scope of this study limited case studies to new dams (and their catchments) having 
been built during the past two decades in South Africa. Water quality is an important 
aspect of water supply management, however, it has not been considered in this study. 
Demand-side management (DSM) is consistently the option with the lowest cost per cubic 
metre of water supplied or saved when compared with other options such as water supply 
infrastructure development or water re-use (Van Zyl & Leiman, 2002). However, due to the 
lack of reliable and available data as well as scope limitations, DSM was not considered in 
depth in this study. 
 
This study assumes that data received from the Department of Water Affairs is both 
reliable and accurate. Furthermore this study assumed that the continued management, 
development and security of water supply cannot exist without some infrastructure to store 
water as yield. 
 
The government department responsible for South Africa‘s water resources has had 
several name changes since its inception, (discussed further under 2.3.5). In this study, 
the Department will be referred to as the DWS unless otherwise specially stated (however, 
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references will be labelled according to the name of the Department at the time of the 
relevant publication, for example DWAF). 
 
 
 
1.5 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
Chapter One has provided an introduction and background to this study, to its main 
purpose and research aims, its research design and methodology, as well as to the scope 
and assumptions of the study. 
 
Chapter Two focuses on the background to South Africa‘s water supply. It is a theoretical 
chapter considering: the biophysical aspects of water supply generation in South Africa; 
the current and perceived future supply of, demand for water in a South Africa; and lastly 
the economics of water in terms of its pricing and value. 
 
Chapter Three presents the study‘s research design and methods. The chapter centres on 
the mixed methods research paradigm, within which a case study methodology is 
presented. The case selection process is explained and the chosen and rejected cases 
are detailed. Thereafter the data collection and analysis methods used in this study are 
listed and explained. Finally, the quality criteria and ethical approval of the study are 
discussed. 
 
The focus of Chapter Four is to calculate and evaluate the estimated and actual costs of 
building and operating water infrastructure for the cases (dams) selected in Chapter Three. 
The costs are evaluated using the URV analysis method. Thereafter a discussion of the 
results relating to the cases is presented. Finally, conclusions for the chapter are provided. 
 
The emphasis of Chapter Five is on analysis of the case studies in the context of one DSM 
option, namely IAP management. The chapter begins by explaining IAP management as 
an alternative water supply option. Subsequently, other alternative water supply options 
are presented to provide context for IAP management. The current impacts as well as 
hypothetical potential impacts of not clearing IAPs in the case study catchments based on 
data from the National Invasive Alien Plant Survey (Kotzé et al., 2010) are presented and 
discussed. Finally, conclusions for the chapter are provided 
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Chapter Six focuses on the decision-making process related to the construction of De 
Hoop Dam, which is the most recently completed case study. The chapter starts with a 
presentation of the RDMM within the context of a variety of decision-making models. Next 
the decision-making making documentation used in the De Hoop Dam case is listed. 
Thereafter, the seven steps of the RDMM are used as a framework to analyse the 
decision-making process. The analysis is based on the information gathered in the semi-
structured interviews and the documentation referred to previously. The findings are 
augmented by the findings from Chapters Four and Five. Finally, conclusions for the 
chapter are provided  
 
Chapter Seven presents a general conclusion of the whole study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
WATER SUPPLY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
Chapter Two provides the context for the analyses presented in Chapters Four, Five and 
Six. To understand the capacity for the generation of water supply in South Africa, bio-
physical aspects of climate, soils and ecosystems are considered. Thereafter, the supply 
of and demand for water in South Africa are examined in terms of current and estimated 
future water supply and demand, including the management of supply limits. 
Subsequently, the economics of water are discussed regarding the pricing and value of 
water in South Africa, as well as the links to water resource development in South Africa. 
  
2.2 UNDERSTANDING THE BIO-PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF WATER SUPPLY 
GENERATION 
The National Water Act 36 of 1998 defines water resources as all surface and 
groundwater resources in South Africa (RSA, 1998). The availability of water resources is 
dependent on a number of underlying bio-physical aspects, the most important of which 
are climate, topography, soils and ecosystems which regulate and limit when, where and 
how much water occurs, on average, in a specific area (DWA, 2013b; Driver et al., 2012, 
Le Maitre et al., 2009). 
 
2.2.1 Climate 
While the global average rainfall is 860 millimetres per year, the average rainfall in South 
Africa is just 450 millimetres per year, making it the 30th driest country in the world (DWA, 
2013b; King et al., 2011). In addition to being lower than average, the rainfall (also known 
as mean annual precipitation or MAP) in South Africa, is also highly seasonal (Davies & 
Day, 1998). Thus rainfall, as shown in Figure 2.1, is unevenly spread both geographically 
and in time, both within a single year and over a period of years (DWA, 2013b; King et al., 
2011; Davies & Day, 1998). 
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Figure 2.1: Mean annual precipitation (MAP) of South Africa 
 
(Source: Schulze, 2012) 
 
Rainfall variation is also partly influenced by the topography. Mountains form an almost 
continuous barrier between the wetter coastal areas, influenced by ocean currents, and 
the drier interior, as is apparent in Figure 2.2 (King et al., 2011, Davies & Day, 1998). Two 
moisture-generating ocean currents flow along South Africa‘s coasts, namely the west 
coast‘s Benguela current (cold) and the east coast‘s Agulhas current (warm). 
 
Additionally, rainfall variation in South Africa is enhanced by variability in average 
temperatures, as shown in Figure 2.3. South Africa also has high average temperatures 
and solar radiation, both of which cause high mean annual evaporation (MAE), especially 
in the drier western half of the country as shown in Figure 2.4 (DWA, 2013b; King & 
Pienaar, 2011; Davies & Day, 1998). MAE exceeds MAP in large parts of the country, 
resulting in water scarcity before any water is actually used. 
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Figure 2.2: Altitude map of South Africa 
 
(Source: Schulze, 2012) 
 
Figure 2.3: Mean annual temperatures of South Africa 
 
(Source: Schulze, 1997) 
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Figure 2.4: Mean annual evaporation (MAE) of South Africa 
 
(Source: Middleton & Bailey, 2008) 
 
High MAE results in the amount of water that runs into the rivers, dams and lakes (known 
as mean annual runoff or MAR), being about ten per cent of the MAP (DWA, 2013b; 
Schulze, 2012; King et al., 2011). This low average conversion can be seen in Figure 2.5. 
Along with Australia, South Africa has one of the lowest rates of MAP to MAR conversion 
in the world (DWA, 2012a).  
 
As a result of all these factors, MAR in South Africa is also highly variable (Figure 2.6). 
MAR is generally higher in the southern and eastern parts of South Africa and lower in the 
western and northern parts (DWA, 2012a). As a result of this variability, it is estimated that 
50 per cent of MAR is generated on just eight per cent of the land area in South Africa 
(WWF-SA, 2013). 
 
Lastly, climate change is expected to exacerbate climate-related water scarcity. It is 
expected that the western two-thirds of South Africa will likely become drier with shorter 
rainfall periods, while the eastern and southern coastline will become wetter due to more 
intense rainfall events (Schulze, 2012; Lumsden et al., 2009; Colvin et al., 2009).  
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Figure 2.5: Mean annual runoff (MAR) as a percentage of Mean annual precipitation 
(MAP) 
 
(Source: Schulze, 1997) 
 
Figure 2.6: Mean annual runoff (MAR) of South Africa 
 
(Source: Middleton & Bailey, 2008) 
14 
 
2.2.2 Soils 
South Africa is not only dry but its geology is old, diverse and has been exposed to steady 
erosion over time (Davies & Day, 1998). The geology and erosion has led to a diverse 
spread of soil types across South Africa (Fey, 2010). Many of South Africa‘s topsoils are 
vulnerable to erosion and this has led to nutrient-rich sediment flowing down South Africa‘s 
rivers to coastal ecosystems (Basson, 2008). 
 
The severity of soil erosion depends on the combined cumulative and synergistic effects of 
climate, topography, land cover, land use and other soil erosion features, such as rainfall 
erosivity and soil erodibility (Msadala et al., 2010). Erodibility is the likely potential for 
erosion and thus sedimentation to occur. High to low erodibility runs loosely from north to 
south, as observed in Figure 2.7.  
 
Figure 2.7: Soil erodibility throughout South Africa 
 
 (Source: Middleton & Bailey, 2008) 
 
Soil erosion impacts on the water supply when sediment accumulates in dams, reducing 
capacity (Msadala et al., 2010; Basson, 2008). Gariep Dam, the biggest dam in the 
country, has half a cubic kilometre of sediment in it, from a capacity of roughly five-and-a-
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half cubic kilometres (Legge, 2012). This means nine per cent of the water storage 
capacity of the dam has already been lost to siltation, and this may also then increase the 
rate of evaporation through shallower water. This reduction in yield reduces water supply 
and security. Siltation has further economic impacts that are preventable, such as the cost 
of dredging a dam, as the Mount Fletcher Dam attests – having silted up 70 per cent in just 
four years (CSIR, 2013). An example of these impacts is the Mapochs Dam (shown in 
Figure 2.8), on the Mapochs River (that flows into De Hoop Dam), which is completely 
silted up (Dini and Legge, 2015). It has been de-silted before, but has silted up again 
through poor land-use practices by mining operations up-river from the dam (Dini and 
Legge, 2015). There are no water benefits from the dam, other than as a sediment trap for 
down-river water-abstraction options. It is estimated that there are 500,000 cubic metres of 
silt being held back by the dam wall, and that this poses as dam-safety risk that could see 
this silt being deposited into the newly constructed De Hoop Dam (K. Legge, personal 
communication, 14 April 2014).  
 
Figure 2.8: Photos a) and b) show Mapochs Dam fully silted, upriver of De Hoop 
Dam 
 
(Source: a - Researcher‘s own photo, 2014; b - Google Earth, 2014) 
 
It is clear that building a dam which will rapidly silt up, as the Mapochs Dam has done, 
makes little economic sense. Before a dam is built, measures must be taken to ensure that 
sediment movement and siltation impacts are minimized, as far as possible. The DWS 
appears to have learned this lesson, in that it has commissioned a major catchment 
management initiative through the Department of Environmental Affairs‘ Working for 
Ecosystems programme, to prevent undue erosion into the dams to be built on the 
Ntabelanga Dam site on the Umzimvubu River in the Eastern Cape (in the same area as 
the Mount Fletcher Dam) (Zuma, 2014). 
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Poor soil management can also lead to an increase in land degradation, salinisation and 
increased levels of suspended solids (turbidity), which cause subsequent decreases in 
water quality and soil productivity (Flügel et al., 2003; DWA, 1986). These decreases in 
water quality lead to higher operational and maintenance costs for water supply as a result 
of the need for additional water purification. Furthermore, poor soil management has social 
consequences, such as creating muddy drinking water for people who access drinking 
water directly from rivers, as well as accelerating the nutrient and toxic runoff. 
 
Soils and geology of South Africa also affect the quantity and quality of groundwater. 
Aquifer-based water resources are sparsely distributed, can be difficult to abstract, and are 
less well quantified in South Africa than are surface water resources (DWA, 2013b). 
 
Groundwater is used in many rural areas, small towns, mines, industries and by farmers in 
many areas (DWA, 2013b); however the lack of large aquifers in South Africa, poor water 
quality (natural and from pollution), slow recharge rates as well as lack of knowledge and 
information have limited the use and potential growth of groundwater as a water supply 
(Davies & Day, 1998; DWA, 2013b). There is also still uncertainty around issues such as 
how much groundwater contributes to low flows in rivers (King et al., 2011). Groundwater, 
as a relevant water resource in South Africa, is quantified under 2.3.1 in this chapter. 
 
When new water supply alternatives (including groundwater options) are being considered, 
the decision-makers should ask questions with reference to the impacts of soil erosion and 
sedimentation. An example would be: what are the short-term and long-term costs and 
benefits of rehabilitating the land?  
 
2.2.3 Ecosystems 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005, p.29) defines an ecosystem as follows: 
 
An ecosystem is a dynamic complex of plant, animal, and microorganism 
communities and the non-living environment interacting as a functional unit. 
Humans are an integral part of ecosystems. Ecosystems provide a variety of 
benefits to people, including provisioning, regulating, cultural and supporting 
services. 
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Aquatic ecosystems range from coastal to wetland to inland water, and from relatively 
naturally functioning to highly impacted. While the coastal ecosystems do add to the 
national water supply through desalination, the majority of the national water supply occurs 
as part of the inland water ecosystem, primarily through rivers, weirs, dams and inter-basin 
transfers (IBTs).  
 
The state of rivers in South Africa is not good, with 60 per cent of rivers classified as 
threatened, while 25 per cent are critically endangered (DWA, 2013b). The state of 
wetlands is even worse: 65 per cent are classified as threatened of which 48 per cent are 
critically endangered (DWA, 2013b). Rivers and wetlands are classified as endangered 
when there is little of the river still in good health (Driver et al., 2011). 
 
This deterioration in river health, shown in Figure 2.9, is largely due to poor surface water 
management; altering the flow of rivers (for example, through building weirs); over-
abstraction and decreased dilution capacities (through abstraction, dams, inter-basin 
transfers and return flows); growing levels of pollution and eutrophication (especially from 
failing waste treatment works, agricultural runoff, industry and mines); poor land 
management practices (including destruction of river banks and the impact of IAPs); and 
invasive alien fish (DWA, 2013b; Driver et al., 2011; CSIR, 2010; Le Maitre et al., 2009; 
Currie, 2007). 
 
When implementing water supply alternatives, decision-makers need to be aware of the 
generally poor state of rivers in South Africa and the specific causes of the poor health, so 
that the underlying conditions can be improved (or at least not exacerbated) by the 
selected alternative. Decision-makers should be able to compare not only the short term 
costs and benefits of all the alternatives but the long-term ones too. 
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Figure 2.9: Inland water ecosystem health in South Africa 
 
(Source: CSIR, 2010)  
 
2.3 WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Following on from discussion of the biophysical aspects of water-supply generation, 
Section 2.3 provides insights, within a South African context: the currently available water 
resources; the current demand for water; and the current and perceived future water 
supply limits. The Department of Water and Sanitation‘s response strategy to these limits 
is discussed. 
 
2.3.1 Available water resources  
Surface water is the main source of water in South Africa and provides many times more 
water than return flows or groundwater do (DWAF, 2004). The breakdown of water 
sources used in South Africa is approximately: 77 per cent surface water, fourteen per 
cent return flows and nine per cent groundwater (DWA, 2013c). A further water source is 
desalination which occurs on a limited scale, due to high costs and energy consumption 
(DWA, 2013b). While currently limited, the DWS in its second National Water Resources 
Strategy (DWA, 2013b), considers desalination to be an important future source of water 
for coastal communities. 
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Return flows contain treated or untreated waste water that returns to stream flows (or 
groundwater); either directly or indirectly, after initial use (DWA, 2013b). Return flows are 
usually re-used by a different user for a different use than its initial use, for example 
domestic waste water being used for irrigation (DWA, 2013b). Return flows originate from 
urban, irrigation mining and industrial water users (DWAF, 2004). 
 
Available surface water is estimated as the MAR of just over 49 000 million cubic metres 
per annum (DWA, 2013a; DWA, 2013b; Middleton & Bailey, 2011). This MAR figure 
includes water that drains into South Africa from Lesotho and Swaziland. Not all of the 
MAR is available for human use however, as water is allocated by legal priority to remain 
in the rivers to meet the ecological Reserve (DWA, 2013b; RSA, 1998).  
 
The Reserve is made up of ecological and basic human needs components. It is the only 
water guaranteed by law, and it has a prior right to water access (King et al., 2011; Palmer 
et al., 2002; RSA, 1998). The ecological Reserve is the quantity and quality of water that is 
set aside for river ecosystem maintenance, protection and to support ecological 
functioning (King et al., 2011; De La Harpe & Ramsden, 2002; RSA, 1998). The ecological 
Reserve varies, depending on the health of the river and the resource quality objectives 
that are aimed for.  
 
However, the ecological Reserve has not yet been fully implemented since it is part of an 
incompletely determined suite of resource directed measures which include classification 
of South African rivers (which determines the present ecological state), ecological water 
requirements and water user needs, together with setting resource quality objectives 
(Palmer et al., 2004). Other barriers include skills and capacity limitations, and a lack of 
information about the state of some rivers (DWA, 2013b; Brown, 2009). In a few areas 
where preliminary ecological Reserves have been quantified, they have not been 
implemented due to the water in the catchment being nearly completely allocated or 
already over-allocated (DWA, 2013b; Brown, 2009).  
 
Only some of the remaining MAR is captured by dams and inter-basin transfers and is 
available to be designated as yield (DWA, 2013b). This is because the DWS defines yield 
as water that can be abstracted for a guaranteed 98 out of every 100 years (King & 
Pienaar, 2011; DWAF, 2004). As a result of the uncertainty and variability of rainfall and 
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runoff in South Africa, surface water yield is estimated to be 10 240 million cubic metres 
per annum or approximately 20 per cent of the MAR (DWA, 2013b and see item 4.2.2). 
The importance of dams is emphasised by yield accounting for approximately 20 per cent 
of MAR, while dams store about 70 per cent of the MAR (CSIR, 2010). 
 
While groundwater only accounts for a small part of the water used in South Africa (9 per 
cent), it is a strategic resource as it is the only water source for approximately 65 per cent 
of the population (CSIR, 2010). The DWS estimates that current groundwater use in South 
Africa is approximately 2 000 million cubic metres per year, that it has a potential 
sustainable yield of around 7 500 million cubic metres per year and that there needs to be 
more focus on groundwater as part of a conjunctive strategy with surface water (DWA, 
2013b and 2013c). 
 
The World Bank (2006) states that groundwater has the following benefits:  
 It normally has excellent microbiological and chemical quality, avoiding the added 
financial burden and logistic complexity of a water treatment facility. (As noted in 
DWA, 2013b however, in some parts of South Africa, salinisation is an issue). 
 It provides natural storage and drought resilience, eliminating the need for 
construction of expensive surface water-storage facilities. 
 It can be widely distributed, facilitating phased development close to demand 
location, reducing the scale of distribution infrastructure with the implication of lower 
(and flexible) investment requirements. 
 
In the South African context, groundwater has a number of these benefits including 
development of potential, geographic diversity, greater efficiency as it is not as vulnerable 
to evaporation, the ability to hold surplus surface water through artificial recharge, and the 
fact that it offers security during dry periods when surface water supply is stressed 
(Braune, 2009). Groundwater management is outside the scope of this research, however 
it should be taken into consideration by the Minister when making water supply decisions. 
 
2.3.2 Demand for water  
In South Africa there are six main water users (not including water transferred out) 
requiring water in different quantities and of differing quality. They are agriculture 
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(including varying seasonal requirements), urban, rural, mining (including bulk industrial), 
power generation, and afforestation (Table 2.1) (DWA, 2013b; CSIR, 2010).  
 
Table 2.1: Water allocation by water user sector for the year 2013 
Water user/sector 
Proportion of 
allocation (%) 
Agriculture 67 
Urban 18 
Rural 4 
Mining 5 
Power generation 2 
Afforestation 3 
Transfer out 1 
(Source: Adapted from DWA, 2013b) 
 
Agriculture is the dominant water user in South Africa; however, urban and rural water use 
have continued to increase as the DWS attempts to provide everyone with access to safe 
potable water (King et al., 2011). The growing economy and population continue to 
increase the demand for water (DWA, 2013b). A knock-on effect of the growing population 
is an increased food requirement, which has led to an increase in agriculture water use 
(DWA, 2013b). 
 
Not only is South Africa a dry country with limited water resources, but it also uses more 
water per capita than some of its drier neighbours, such as Botswana and Namibia 
(Hedden & Cilliers, 2014). Coupled with this inefficient use of water, it is estimated that 
nearly 37 per cent of water is classified as non-revenue water, meaning loss in physical 
leaks and commercial losses as well as unbilled authorised consumption, for example, 
firefighting (Mckenzie et al., 2012). While this loss is at the same level as the global 
average, it is much higher than in similarly water-scarce countries such as Australia, 
whose losses are about ten per cent (Mckenzie et al., 2012). 
 
2.3.3 Current and future water supply limits  
Water scarcity in South Africa is as much a result of physical limits as it is of poor 
management and inefficient usage (DWA, 2013b). This is despite world class regulatory 
frameworks such as the National Water Act (RSA, 1998) and two editions of the National 
Water Resources Strategy (DWA, 2013b; DWAF, 2004) which have been developed since 
the end of apartheid in 1994. In theory, the purpose of the DWS‘s supply-side orientated 
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strategy (Van Zyl & Leiman, 2002) as outlined in the National Water Act (RSA, 1998) is 
firstly, to fulfil the Reserve to supply both ecological and basic human needs; secondly, to 
fulfil international obligations; and thirdly, to supply water to users such as irrigation, 
industry and domestic users, above the level of basic human needs. 
 
Through this supply-side orientated strategy, it was estimated that, as of 2005, over 95 per 
cent of South Africa‘s water resources had already been allocated (CSIR, 2010; Van Zyl & 
Leiman, 2002). Water resources in South Africa are highly developed, used and regulated 
to deal with the country‘s growing water requirements (DWAF, 2004). Consequently many 
rivers have been heavily altered by water resource infrastructure such as dams, weirs and 
inter-basin transfers.  
 
An issue affecting water current and especially future water supply limits is the lifespan of 
water resource infrastructure. Many of South Africa‘s dams were built more than 40 years 
ago. Considering the fact that the civil works sections of a dam have an economic lifespan 
of 45 years, and that the mechanical and electrical works have lifespans of 30 years – 
frequent maintenance and repairs and planned upgrading and development are critical to 
ongoing water security in South Africa (DWAF, 1996b). This is a concern in South Africa 
as there is currently a considerable backlog of water infrastructure repairs, maintenance 
and upgrades, especially when the infrastructure is owned by municipalities (DWA, 
2013b). 
 
Further issues relating to current and future water supply limits include climate change, 
water quality degradation (as a result of many sources of pollution) and the spread of IAPs 
(WWF-SA, 2013, DWAF, 2004). For example, the DWS has estimated that IAPs alone 
have already reduced the national yield by an estimated 695 million cubic metres (DWA, 
2013b). Reconciliation studies carried out by the DWS indicate that surface water alone 
will be insufficient to support the economy as it grows (DWA, 2013b; CSIR, 2010). This is 
despite numerous inter-basin transfers (shown in Figure 2.10, where the arrows show the 
direction of each transfer scheme), dams and other water resource infrastructure 
developments having been undertaken throughout South Africa to enhance water security 
(DWA, 2013b, DWAF, 2004). 
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Figure 2.10: Inter-basin transfers between water management areas 
 
(Source: DWAF, 2004) 
 
The gap between demand and supply of water is already extensive. As indicated in Figure 
2.11, for example, 30 per cent of all towns and cities in South Africa are already 
experiencing water deficits, with a further 25 per cent of towns forecast to experience 
water deficits within the next ten years (DWA, 2013b).  
 
There are very few water management areas in South Africa which still have the potential 
for economically viable water development. These areas, such as the Pongola basin (near 
the Mozambique border), are all located far from where the demand is highest, and long 
distances between water source and demand lead to higher water prices due to the 
increased transport costs (DWA, 2013b).  
 
Nevertheless, Hedden and Cilliers (2014), Van der Merwe-Botha (2010), the CSIR (2010) 
and Herold (2009), all indicate that a water crisis is looming, if not already underway. 
Hedden and Cilliers (2014) maintain that there is already a gap between water demand 
and supply and that it will continue to grow unless drastic measures are taken to reduce 
demand, increase supply and improve water use efficiency and quality. In their second 
National Water Resources Strategy (NWRS 2 – DWA, 2013b, p. 7), the DWS state that 
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―South Africa does not face a water crisis at the moment, but is at risk if water is not taken 
seriously and interventions not applied timeously.‖ 
 
Figure 2.11: Forecast water deficits in South African towns and cities 
 
(Source: DWA, 2013b) 
 
However the DWS also acknowledge in their 2013 Strategic overview of the water sector 
in South Africa (DWA, 2013a) that water usage exceeds reliable supply (i.e. yield at 98 per 
cent assurance) and that a drought would cause large-scale water restrictions. The same 
document goes on to declare that the three best ways to solve this problem are additional 
bulk water infrastructure development (despite the NWRS 2 (DWA, 2013b) stating that 
there are very few economically viable dam sites left), reconciliation studies (to better 
understand demand), and, water conservation and demand management (DWA, 2013a).  
 
To meet future water demands, the DWS states that South Africa will need to invest in 
alternative solutions; because South Africa‘s water systems have already been nearly fully 
developed, there are not many supply-side potential solutions left. The focus needs to be 
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on maintaining the supply the country does have at recommended quality levels, on 
advancing water technology to be more efficient and effective (though fixing the problem of 
non-revenue water), and on promoting demand-side management. 
 
2.3.4 Managers of the water supply limits 
The DWS has, under different names and mandates, long been responsible for managing 
South Africa‘s water resources. This entails managing the quantity and quality of water 
available for society to use, how the water is used and what effects this may have on the 
aquatic ecosystems of South Africa (King et al., 2011). According to the National Water 
Act (36 of 1998), the current strategic focus is to protect, use, develop, conserve, manage 
and control the water resources of South Africa using the guiding principles of 
sustainability and equity for all South Africans, to ensure that water supply (of acceptable 
quality) exceeds demand (DWA, 2013b). The strategic focus has changed since the days 
of Water Act (54 of 1956), when government participation in water resource management 
was limited to the development of water supplies for irrigation purposes (DWA, 2012a; 
Rowlston, 2011). 
 
Before the 1912 Water Act, water resources were managed separately by each of the four 
colonies (Transvaal, Natal, Cape and the Orange Free State) (Legge, 2009; Tewari, 2009). 
Water Act No. 8 of 1912 created the Union Irrigation Department, which would become the 
Department of Water Affairs in 1956, when the Water Act (54 of 1956) was passed. This 
Act was legislated in recognition of the Department‘s extended scope (Tewari, 2009). 
Decades later, the Department was linked with forestry to become the Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry. In 2009 the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry was 
divided when Forestry moved to the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and 
the name of the department reverted to the Department of Water Affairs. In 2014, the 
name of the Department was again changed from Department of Water Affairs to 
Department of Water and Sanitation (Sithole, 2014). Table 2.2 reflects this transformation, 
together with selected changes in water law, strategic focus and water thinking over the 
past century. 
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Table 2.2: A timeline of events selected in relation to their impact on water 
infrastructure development 
Event 
Name of 
Department 
Purpose of legislation and the institutional 
response by DWA 
Irrigation and 
Conservation of 
Water Act (8 of 
1912) 
Union 
Irrigation 
Department 
Consolidation and amendment of the use of water 
from public streams for irrigation, domestic and 
industrial purposes. The Act also stimulated the 
building of water supply storage infrastructure (i.e. 
dams). 
Vaal River 
Development Bill 
(Act 38 of 1934) 
Department of 
Irrigation 
The first steps towards ownership of water by the 
government were made. 
End of World 
War II (1939–45) 
Department of 
Irrigation 
Fundamental change in water management thinking 
occurred. Emphasis changed from flat tariffs to pro-
rata tariffs as the mix of water users changed. The 
fact that water supply is limited was accepted for the 
first time. 
Water Act (54 of 
1956) 
Department of 
Water Affairs 
The Act tried to apply the water rules of wetter 
European countries to a drier South Africa. 
Government made all the decisions with an 
authoritarian, centralised approach. The Act 
specifically stated that public water could not be 
privately owned, with the exception of groundwater. 
Agricultural, industrial and urban water use was 
roughly equalised. Design and planning tasks were 
separated in the Department and a hydrological 
division was created. Land-owners were given water 
rights because agriculture was the most important 
focus of the 1956 Act. This Act was heavily based on 
water rights, benefiting white farmers and excluding 
all non-white South Africans. This Act repealed the 
Irrigation and Conservation of Water Act (8 of 1912). 
1994 – first 
democratic 
elections  
South African 
Government 
In 1994 the first democratically elections were held 
after many decades of minority rule and the first 
democratically elected government came into power.  
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Event 
Name of 
Department 
Purpose of legislation and the institutional 
response by DWA 
Constitution of 
the Republic of 
South Africa (Act 
108 of 1996) 
South African 
Government 
In 1996 a new constitution became law. In the Bill of 
Rights of the Constitution of South Africa, there are 
three fundamental objectives for managing water 
resources in South Africa. These are equitable 
access to water, sustainable use of water, and 
effective and efficient use of water. Water is first 
recognised as a basic human right in the 
Constitution. 
Water Services 
Act (108 of 1997) 
Department of 
Water Affairs 
and Forestry 
The main aim of this Act is to ensure the right to 
basic water supply and sanitation. It contains rules on 
setting national tariffs and the setting of a regulatory 
framework for water services institutions. 
National Water 
Act (36 of 1998) 
Department of 
Water Affairs 
and Forestry 
The main objectives of the National Water Act (NWA) 
are to protect, use, develop, conserve, manage and 
control the water resources of South Africa using the 
guiding principles of sustainability and equity. The 
NWA recognises that water is a natural resource that 
belongs to all people. The NWA recognises two rights 
to water which are basic human needs and water for 
the environment, and a priority to take account of 
international agreements. The NWA is built on 28 
principles as laid out in the 1997 White Paper on a 
National Water Policy in South Africa. The NWA 
recognises that South Africa is water scarce and that 
water is unequally dispersed. This Act repealed the 
Water Act of 1956 (54 of 1956). 
National Water 
Resource 
Strategy (2004) 
Department of 
Water Affairs 
and Forestry 
The purpose of this strategy was to develop and 
utilise a framework for managing water resources 
and the preparations of catchment management 
strategies. It also provided information about the 
current and expected future demand for and supply 
of water.  
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Event 
Name of 
Department 
Purpose of legislation and the institutional 
response by DWA 
National Water 
Resource 
Strategy 2 (2013) 
Department of 
Water Affairs 
This strategy reviews and updates the strategy from 
the National Water Resource Strategy of 2004 with a 
strategic focus to protect, use, develop, conserve, 
manage and control the water resources of South 
Africa using the guiding principles of sustainability 
and equity for all South Africans. It further links the 
development goals from the Water for Growth and 
Development framework (DWAF, 2009a). It also 
provides information about the current and expected 
future demand for and supply of water. 
(Researcher‘s own construction based on: DWA, 2013b; Van Vuuren, 2012; Rowlston, 2011; Tewari, 2009; 
Legge, 2009; DWAF, 2004; De La Harpe & Ramsden, 2002; RSA, 1998; RSA, 1997; Triebel & Van Niekerk, 
1994; DWAF, 1986) 
 
The monumental changes that came about politically from the first free democratic 
elections in South Africa in 1994 and from the new progressive South African Constitution 
in 1996, laid the platform for a comprehensive evaluation of water policy and legislation in 
South Africa. This evaluation led to the fundamental principles and objectives for a new 
water law in 1996, followed by a white paper on national water policy in 1997 (DWAF, 
1997) and finally the National Water Act (NWA) in 1998 (RSA, 1998) which was a 
substantial improvement on past water legislation (Rowlston, 2011; DWAF, 2004). 
 
Rowlston (2011) states that, due in large part to the measures taken to protect the aquatic 
ecosystem, the NWA is seen to be one of the most progressive pieces of water legislation 
in the world. Rowlston (2011) continues, noting that although the intention to implement 
the protection measures exists in the NWA, there is no common understanding on how to 
implement certain aspects of the NWA. For example, in the policy and principles upon 
which the NWA is built, the ecological Reserve has a ―priority of use, by right‖, but there is 
no unambiguous statement in this regard in the NWA. Furthermore, in the National Water 
Resource Strategy (NWRS – DWAF, 2004), the ecological Reserve is listed at the top of a 
guide on priorities for water use, but further on in the same report, it is asserted that the 
order of the list may differ under certain conditions. 
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The NWA, like the Constitution on which it is built, may incur conceptual complications 
because it is human-centred (Rowlston, 2011; Tewari, 2009). The NWA establishes the 
National Government as the public trustee of South Africa‘s water resources to protect 
them and uphold the environmental principles, but because of the human-centeredness, 
the aquatic environment only has important NWA status because of its usefulness to 
humans (Rowlston, 2011; Tewari, 2009). The DWS needs to constantly stress and 
promote the message to the public, and especially to decision-makers and policy-makers, 
that aquatic ecosystems are virtually impossible to replicate, even with modern 
technological advances. The DWS promotes the message through NWA-enforced public 
consultations (Rowlston, 2011). 
 
2.4 ECONOMICS OF WATER 
In the previous section, the supply of and demand for water were quantified. The 
economics of water are now discussed in terms of the pricing and value of water.  
  
2.4.1 Pricing of water 
DWS‘s water pricing strategy has four main objectives, namely social equity (correcting 
past imbalances), ecological sustainability (effective aquatic ecosystems), financial 
sustainability (enough revenue to cover maintenance, development and management 
costs), and economic efficiency (reflecting the value of water and its scarcity) (DWA, 
2012a). In South Africa, water prices (known as tariffs or charges) are regulated from 
source to tap, in order to be both pro-poor and appropriate (DWA, 2013b; DWA, 2012a). 
These regulations have resulted in raw water tariffs being kept low artificially, which 
creates an under-recovery of costs (DWA, 2013b). Raw water tariffs, known as first tier 
tariffs, are prices for the use of untreated water and do not include water servicing pricing 
such as bulk or distribution tariffs, which are second and third level tariffs (DWAF, 2007b). 
Raw water charges are split into water resource management charges and water resource 
development charges and vary by geographic area, water use, water user and by water 
supply infrastructure project (DWAF, 2007b). As an example, variation by water supply 
infrastructure project is shown in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3: Domestic, industrial, and irrigation raw water charges for selected cases 
 
(Source: DWA, 2012a) 
 
There is considerable water price variation around South Africa and the tariffs are not 
always based on the volume of water used (DWA, 2013b). As a result, the operations and 
maintenance of infrastructure has deteriorated despite government subsidies (DWA, 
2012a). A further consequence of keeping the price of water low is that it does not 
accurately reflect the scarcity of water in South Africa, nor does it fully cover the 
management costs (DWA, 2013b; DWA, 2012a). There is also no economic regulation (or 
independent regulators) of water tariffs in South Africa (DWA, 2012a). A risk of low costs is 
that they may suddenly be raised as a result of insufficient quantity or quality (DWA, 
2012a). The pricing strategy is inconsistently applied across South Africa, largely due to 
the historical situation and its sporadic evolution (DWA, 2012a). 
 
In attempting to solve these issues, the DWS has revised their pricing strategy by aiming 
to directly link charges to costs in order to cover the full costs of the water and improve 
water use efficiency (DWA, 2013b; DWA, 2012a). The DWS further recommends that 
implementation of an appropriate pricing structure, through improving billing and revenue 
collection at local government level, could also help significantly (DWA, 2013b). Further 
recommendations include scheme-based pricing so that prices reflect the costs and the 
strengthening of economic regulation in particular, throughout the water‘s journey from 
source to tap (DWA, 2012a). 
 
2.4.2 Value of water 
Water has much more than a monetary value; it is priceless, because life would cease 
without it. The real value of water is not fully reflected in the pricing of water, especially if 
the value of healthy, functioning ecosystems is taken into account (DWA, 2013a). 
Province
Scheme 
ID
Scheme Description SMP ID SMP Description Sector
2012/13 
Domestic & 
Industrial 
Raw Water 
Charges  
(c/m³) 
2012/13 
Irrigation Raw 
Water 
Charges  
(c/m³) 
Western Cape 360
Berg River Project (Berg River Dam) 
784
Raw water from Berg River Dam to exising 
users from system D&I 13.85 12.87
Western Cape 360
Berg River Project (Berg River Dam) 
785
Raw water from Berg River Dam to third 
party users D&I 13.85 12.87
Western Cape 360
Berg River Project (Berg River Dam) 
783
Raw water from Berg River Dam to the City 
of Cape Town D&I 13.85 -
Mpumalanga 352 Sabie River (Inyaka Dam) 756
Releases from the dam to downstream river 
users D&I 30.27 5.10
Mpumalanga 352 Sabie River (Inyaka Dam) 757 Supply directly from the dam pump station D&I 30.27 5.10
Limpopo 298 Sabie River (Inyaka Dam) 535
From Nandoni Dam and the river 
downstream of the dam D&I 78.05 16.51
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Nevertheless, the DWS defines the full value of water as the economic value plus its 
intrinsic value (DWA, 2012a). While it is difficult to quantify the intrinsic value of water in 
monetary terms, it is much easier to quantify its economic value (DWA. 2012a). According 
to the DWS, the economic value of water can be broken down into four parts: the value to 
the users (quantified by willingness to pay), the net benefits of return flows (such as 
recharging groundwater), the net benefits from indirect use, and adjustments for social 
objectives such as poverty relief (DWA. 2012a). The DWS further suggests that the full 
value and the full costs should conjunctively be used to determine water allocations, and 
that decisions about water resources should be distinct from decisions about how to 
finance the allocation (DWA. 2012a).  
 
2.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided the context on which this study is premised. The amount of 
water available in South Africa is limited first and foremost by bio-physical aspects. The 
amount of water available in South Africa is further limited by the sources used and the 
present infrastructure. 
 
Water scarcity in South Africa thus exists as much from physical limits as it does from poor 
management and inefficient usage, despite the world class regulatory framework that 
exists (DWA, 2013b). Current pricing strategies do not promote promised social equity, 
ecological sustainability, financial sustainability or economic efficiency. Raw water costs 
are being kept artificially low; there has been an under-recovery of costs, which has led to 
the operations and maintenance of infrastructure deteriorating despite government 
subsidies, and the low costs do not accurately reflect the scarcity of water in South Africa 
(DWA, 2013b; DWA, 2012a). 
 
The real value of water is not fully reflected in the pricing of water, especially if the value of 
healthy, functioning ecosystems is taken into account (DWA, 2013a). It is therefore vitally 
important for water resource management decisions to be undertaken in the best possible 
manner.  
 
The research design and methodology are discussed in the following chapter (Chapter 
Three).  
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Research is a process of investigating and exploring in order to find solutions to a specific 
problem in a structured and orderly manner, so as to increase knowledge, and in 
organisations, to increase the quality of the decision-making (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009; 
Collis & Hussey, 2009). Quality research is dependent on rigorous, logical and organised 
research design, methodology and methods to frame the question and produce valid 
conclusions from results (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009).  
 
In this study, the mixed methods research (MMR) paradigm (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004) provided the overall framing, and is appropriate for selecting a case study 
methodology (Johansson, 2003). Within this framing, data collection methods included 
semi-structured interviews (Yin, 2014; Collis & Hussey, 2009), documentation and archival 
records (Yin, 2014), and data analysis methods including unit reference values (URVs -
Van Niekerk, 2013), inter- and intra-case analysis and content analysis in analysing the 
decision-making process (Collis & Hussey, 2009). Finally, at the end of this chapter, 
quality objectives and ethical considerations are discussed. 
 
3.2 RESEARCH PARADIGM AND METHODOLOGY  
A research paradigm is a structure of fundamental thinking and understanding, about the 
world and the essence of knowledge, which indicates how a particular research study will 
be undertaken (Morgan, 2014; 2007; Bryman, 2004). Paradigms can be defined as 
―shared belief systems‖ that show how research can be undertaken in specific fields 
(Morgan, 2007). 
 
In this study, the MMR paradigm incorporates collecting, analysing and combining 
quantitative and qualitative data in a set of related case studies (Yin, 2011; Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Quantitative and qualitative research are combined to provide a 
better understanding of the research problem, through the increased number of 
perspectives that are analysed (Yin, 2011). Multiple perspectives ensure that pre-existing 
assumptions are less likely to influence the outcomes, while promoting the strengths of the 
two approaches and strengthening their validity. When the research question addresses a 
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broad issue, it is often useful to focus the research effort by selecting case studies to 
demonstrate possible developments in knowledge. Additionally the case study 
methodology is consistent with the MMR paradigm (Yin, 2014; 2011). 
 
Case study methodology focuses on explaining and understanding a phenomenon in a 
real-life setting (Yin, 2014; Collis & Hussey, 2009). In designing a case study, the type of 
case study used and the number of cases analysed, are important (Yin, 2014; Collis & 
Hussey, 2009). Yin (2014) classifies case studies into three main types; explanatory, 
exploratory and descriptive. This study makes use of the descriptive, multiple-case study 
design to explain the decision-making processes in water-supply development in South 
Africa. Descriptive research engages in explaining or classifying the attributes of a 
phenomenon or population (Collis & Hussey, 2009). Multiple-case study design considers 
multiple units of analysis within several cases (Yin, 2011). Data collection and analysis 
methods are embedded consistently within each case study; the multiple-case design 
allows exploration of the similarities and differences between and within cases, and the 
evidence is considered to be robust and reliable (Baxter & Jack, 2008) while aiming to 
reproduce conclusions across different cases (Yin, 2014). The selection of multiple case 
studies used in this study is discussed in the next section. 
 
3.3 CASE SELECTION AND EXCLUSION 
The process of selecting case studies (dams) for this study was revised iteratively to 
ensure it was rigorous. The selection process and criteria used in selecting the four cases 
for this study are explained in the next section. An explanation for the exclusion of certain 
dams and the inclusion of the four selected dams is also provided.  
 
3.3.1 Criteria for selecting dams 
To be selected, the dam needed to be in the DWS‘s Dam Safety Office‘s list of registered 
dams. To increase the likelihood of good, reliable data, selection was limited to Category 3 
dams (those with a dam wall height of at least twelve metres, a storage volume of one 
million cubic metres or more, and a high hazard potential in terms of economic loss and 
loss of life (Cullis et al., 2007)). As of September 2013, there were 288 Category 3 dams 
registered in South Africa (DWA, 2013a).  
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The following steps set out the process of, and criteria for, the selection of dams: 
a. Consider dams built after 1990 because, according to the DWS, there is limited dam-
cost data before 1990 (Legge, 2012).  
b. Ensure that there is reliable cost and yield data on the selected dams. Only dams that 
increase the yield in their catchment are considered. Examples of dams that are 
rejected are mine tailings dams used for holding the mix of leftover materials from 
mining processes (for example, Merriespruit Tailings Dam near Virginia, Free State.), 
flood-attenuation dams built to control floods and remaining empty most of the time (for 
example, Qedusizi Dam near Ladysmith, Kwazulu-Natal), and hydro-electric/pumped 
storage scheme dams such at the Palmiet Pumped Storage Scheme. 
c. Include at least one dam from winter and summer rainfall areas, to ensure that different 
climatic conditions are included. 
d. Include a variety of wall types in order to eliminate the cost bias of different wall types. 
e. Ensure reliability and availability of the selected dams. Dams must be preferably 
impounded and handed over (or at least 95 per cent complete), so that actual post-
construction costs are available. In the case of an incomplete dam, the most recent, 
expected final cost of the dam, as calculated by the DWS, must be used.  
f. Ensure a variety of uses of the dam water, so as to prevent water-use bias (for 
example, agricultural, industrial, and domestic uses). 
g. Include a variety in terms of size (full-supply capacity) and dam wall height to eliminate 
size bias. 
h. Exclude dams where the yield is manipulated by upstream infrastructure, such as inter-
basin transfers, as this does not allow for separation of costs with sufficient confidence. 
i. Use only existing dams where the wall has not been raised, as a wall-raising does not 
necessarily mean an increase in full supply capacity or yield (for example, Stompdrift 
Dam). This is typical of the DWS‘s dam safety rehabilitation programme whereby the 
non-overspill crest level of embankments (the part of the dam wall above the water line 
when the dam is at full supply capacity) is raised to improve stability. 
j. Select dams on the availability of data regarding the surrounding catchment area 
(studied in Chapter Four). 
k. Take into account the dams in which there is a policy-maker demand or interest, so 
that there is more information available for future studies and decision-making, as well 
as increasing the benefits and usefulness of this study.  
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In selecting the dam schemes that were most appropriate to this study, six iterative steps 
were followed, as summarised in Table 3.1. As the study developed, the selection process 
changed from an informal selection, to a selection based on more rigorous process, using 
all of the criteria listed above. The sixth iteration resulted in the final selection of dams. 
 
Table 3.1: Changes in the selection process and selected dams 
Level Reason for selection change Selected dams as a result of the change 
1 
All major dams built since 1980 
in South Africa 
870 Dams 
2 
Studying all dams built since 
1980 was not feasible due to 
scale and lack of data 
availability 
Five to eight major dams in South Africa 
3 
Refined to Category 3 dams, as 
classified by the DWS (DWA, 
2013a) and dam wall raisings 
only. 
Berg River Dam; De Hoop Dam; Flag Bashielo 
Dam; Inyaka Dam; Koster Dam; Kromme River 
Dam; Nandoni Dam; Qedusizi Dam; 
Welbedacht Dam; Woodstock Dam. 
4 
Refined to post-1990 dams due 
to the lack of available cost data 
on pre-1990 dams. 
Aloe Cove Dam; Berg River Dam; Bloemhoek 
Dam; Bridle Drift Dam; Flag Bashielo Dam; 
Inyaka Dam; Masinger Dam; Nandoni Dam; 
Paris Dam. 
5 
Dam wall raisings excluded due 
to lack of change in yield. 
Berg River Dam; De Hoop Dam; Inyaka Dam; 
Midmar Dam; Nandoni Dam; Spring Grove 
Dam. 
6 
Final selection: dams 
downstream of other 
infrastructure (for example, 
IBTs) excluded. 
Berg River Dam; De Hoop Dam; Inyaka Dam; 
Nandoni Dam. 
(Source: Researcher‘s own construction) 
 
Based on the criteria and Table 3.1, the following four dams were selected and included in 
this study, namely: Inyaka Dam, Nandoni Dam, Berg River Dam and De Hoop Dam. The 
locations of the four selected dams are shown in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Location of the selected dams 
 
(Source: Google Earth, 2013) 
 
3.3.2 Excluded dams 
The dams listed below were excluded at Levels 4, 5 or 6 of the selection process. 
 
A. Flag Bashielo Dam  
Flag Bashielo Dam is situated on the Olifants River in Limpopo Province. The Olifants 
River is the most over-subscribed river in the country in terms of demand and has 
enormous water quality and pollution concerns as a result of (inter alia) the industrial and 
mining pollution in the upper part of the catchment (Ashton & Dabrowski, 2011). Owing to 
the high demand for water from the Olifants River, the Flag Bashielo Dam was raised to 
increase the yield of the dam by 16 million cubic metres in 2004. Construction of the raised 
embankment was completed in 2005. 
 
The catchment is highly developed with upstream reservoirs of Witbank Dam, Loskop 
Dam, Rhenosterkop Dam, Flag Bashielo Dam, De Hoop Dam (currently under construction 
on the downstream tributary of the Steelpoort River), Blyde River Dam, and Massinger 
Dam in Mozambique.  
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This option of the Flag Bashielo Dam raising was thus excluded from the list of schemes 
because the yield is manipulated by the upstream developments of the Witbank and 
Loskop Dams, which have a significant influence on increased yield. Furthermore, this 
"marginal" raising is actually dependant on a system of development for which costs of 
components are untraceable, for example, the costs of the Loskop Dam and its 1974 dam 
wall raising. 
  
B. Massingir Dam 
Massingir Dam is located on the Mozambican section of the Olifants River and was built 
with foreign funding with the intention of raising the dam using radial gates. It is similar to 
Midmar Dam in that the original construction included building the earth flanks to make 
provision for a future raising of the dam wall. The recent raising would thus not be a 
realistic reflection of development costs for increased yield, even if the costs were known. 
Because the dam is built in a foreign country and because of its construction differences 
and unknown costs, Massingir Dam was excluded from the list of selected dams. 
 
C. Bloemhoek and Bridle Drift Dams 
Bloemhoek Dam is situated on the Jordaan Spruit, near the town of Kroonstad in the Free 
State, while Bridle Drift Dam is situated on the Buffalo River, near East London in the 
Eastern Cape. Both of these dams were excluded because they had their walls raised. 
Dam wall raisings do not necessary mean an increase in full supply capacity or yield, for 
example where dam safety rehabilitation has raised the walls. Furthermore, dam wall 
raisings are difficult to compare with dams that have been newly built, as the cost of a dam 
wall raising is a fraction of the cost of building a new dam.  
 
D. Aloe Cove Dam 
Aloe Cove Dam is located on a tributary of the Crocodile River, near the town of 
Krugersdorp in Gauteng. Aloe Cove Dam has been excluded for a number of reasons 
(Shaw, 2013): it has no yield and its value is for recreation purposes; no real construction 
records were kept; and the dam was built in stages from money generated from the profits 
of the Heia Safari Ranch Hotel. 
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E. Paris Dam 
Paris Dam is situated on the Bivane River in northern Kwazulu-Natal near the town of 
Vryheid. Paris Dam was built by and is owned by the Impala Irrigation Board. Paris Dam 
was excluded because the DWS did not build or subcontract the dam to be built and 
because there was a lack of detailed and reliable financial cost data. 
 
F. Midmar Dam  
Midmar Dam is situated on the Umgeni River in central Kwazulu-Natal near the town of 
Howick. It was designed and built for a future wall raising by way of mechanical (radial) 
gates. The embankments were built originally to make provision for future raising. The 
costs for this raising are thus quite distorted as the majority of the cost of the increase in 
yield was actually spent during the original construction.  
 
Another reason why Midmar Dam was excluded is because it is downstream of an IBT. 
This IBT brings water into this catchment from the Mooi Umgeni Transfer Scheme Phase 1 
(MMTS1) and the Spring Grove Dam further up the Mooi River.  
 
G. Spring Grove Dam 
Spring Grove Dam is currently (as of February 2014) under construction on the Mooi River 
in Kwazulu-Natal as Phase 2 of the Mooi Mgeni Transfer Scheme. Spring Grove dam is 
being built by the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority. 
 
Spring Grove Dam was excluded from the list of selected dams because firstly, there is an 
upstream ITB; and secondly, there was no reliable estimate of the actual cost of the dam 
because it was less than 95 per cent finished at the time of the selection process (early 
2013). 
 
3.3.3 The selected dams 
The cases being analysed in this study include the following four dams, namely the Inyaka, 
Nandoni, Berg River and De Hoop dams, and their catchment areas. In order to achieve 
insights into the decision-making processes of dam construction, each case study is 
analysed in terms of a) evaluating the efficiency of water delivery in terms of infrastructure 
development costs (using unit reference value analysis), as discussed in Chapter Four; 
and b) the management of invasive alien plants as a catchment-based option to increase 
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the water yield of the catchment, as discussed in Chapter Five. Furthermore, one case 
(the De Hoop Dam) examines the process of decision-making in more detail, as discussed 
in Chapter Six. The insights from the various case studies are brought together in the 
overall considerations of focus and depth on appropriate decision-making criteria in water 
supply development in Chapter Six.  
 
The stages in a case study are identified as case selection, initial investigations, collection 
of data, analysis of data and writing the report (Collis & Hussey, 2009). As the case 
selection and initial investigations have already been dealt with, data collection and 
analysis methods are discussed in the next section. 
 
3.4 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS  
Using data and methodological triangulation (multiple data sources and collection 
methods) allows for a more in-depth understanding of the cases (Yin, 2014; Collis & 
Hussey, 2009). Each data collection method and analysis, described in this section, is 
linked to the chapter in which it is used. 
 
3.4.1 Documentation 
The documentation used in Chapters Four, Five and Six was gathered mainly from the 
DWS. The documentation was mostly in the form of laws, regulations, national strategies, 
and various planning reports. Other documentation was collected from sources other than 
the DWS such as the Agricultural Research Council (Kotzé et al., 2010), and research 
papers from academic institutions such as Couzens and Dent (2006). 
 
3.4.2 Archival records 
Archival records including databases are used in Chapters Four and Five. The cost data 
used in both chapters came from DWS national and regional archives and databases. 
Additionally, Statistics South Africa‘s CPI headline index was used to adjust the cost data 
(in Chapter Four) to December 2012 rand values, so that inflation is a controlled variable 
(Statistics South Africa, 2015). The CPI headline index is shown in Appendix B. A further 
database used (in Chapters Four and Five) in the collection of MAR information was the 
Water Resources of South Africa, 2005 study (Middleton & Bailey, 2011).  
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3.4.3 Semi-structured in-depth interviews 
An interview approach (used in Chapter Six) was selected to gather different opinions and 
views of people involved in the decision-making process that took place during the building 
of De Hoop Dam (Van Teijlingen, 2014; Collis & Hussey, 2009). Semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews were used to elicit responses to focused subjects as well as additional broader 
issues. Semi-structured, in-depth interviews consist of a list of predetermined questions, 
where the order and wording of questions can be altered (depending on perceived 
appropriateness) and explanations can be given (Van Teijlingen, 2014; Collis & Hussey, 
2009). 
 
The purposive sampling technique was used to select interviewees. Where the researcher 
chose interviewees based on personal judgement and advice taken, these were based on 
the strength of the interviewee‘s knowledge and experience of the subject being studied 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Purposive sampling was chosen because there were a limited 
number of people involved in the project, and because the topic was sensitive in nature.  
 
Potential interviewees were contacted through an introductory email, asking them if they 
would agree to be interviewed. In a covering letter, it was explained that the interviews 
were voluntary and that they would be anonymous and confidential, to induce interviewees 
to speak freely. Before each interview started the interviewees were asked to sign an 
informed consent form (an example of the covering letter, the consent forms and the 
interview guide are available in Appendix E).  
 
Consequently, ten people involved in the management (at various levels) and decision-
making concerning the planning and construction of the De Hoop Dam were interviewed. 
Of the ten, nine worked for the DWS directly and one was a heavily involved consultant. 
The interviewees have been labelled P1 to P10 to maintain their anonymity. Five 
interviewees (P4, P6, P7, P9, and P10) were involved in the planning (including design) 
stage of ORWRDP Phase 2A and the other five (P1, P2, P3, P5 and P8) were involved in 
the construction stage. 
 
Interviews were conducted at the convenience of interviewees. Five of the ten interviews 
were face-to-face; however, due to unavoidable circumstances, three interviews were 
conducted telephonically and two by email. Interviews lasted from 45 to 90 minutes, 
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depending on how much detail was provided by the interviewee and the extent and focus 
of the interviewee‘s involvement. Interviews were captured in handwritten notes by the 
researcher, who acted as the interviewer. The researcher emailed a typed transcript to 
each interviewee, and asked each to ensure that the transcript was a true and fair 
reflection of the interview, in order to verify the transcripts and provide construct validity of 
the interview process (Yin, 2011; Riege, 2003). Any changes that the interviewees made 
were captured and the transcripts were then accepted. Some of the interviewees provided 
documents as additional source materials. 
 
3.4.4 Unit reference value (URV) analysis 
URVs are used in Chapter Four and offer a type of cost-effectiveness analysis, used and 
developed in South Africa by the DWS (Van Niekerk, 2012). These URVs are a calculation 
of the cost per cubic metre of water over the lifetime of a water infrastructure project (for 
example, at the point where the water leaves the dam). As part of a multiple criteria 
analysis (see section 4.2.7), planners in the DWS use URVs to sort water-resource 
developments from most effective to least effective in terms of the cost per cubic metre of 
water (Van Niekerk, 2013). URVs can also be used to optimise the size of a water 
resource development such as the height of a dam wall and compare the result to other 
options, such as raising the wall in the future (Van Niekerk, 2013). 
 
The recommended discount rate used in the calculations, in Chapter Four, is eight per 
cent (Mullins et al., 2007) and the recommended sensitivity analysis used is six per cent 
and ten per cent (Van Niekerk, 2013; Fuguitt & Wilcox, 1999). Thus, URVs can be 
calculated using the following formula, shown in Figure 3.2: 
 
Figure 3.2: URV equation 
 
(Source: Van Niekerk, 2013) 
 
The assumptions necessary for calculating the URVs of the selected dams are provided 
below: 
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a. Construction costs are ring-fenced to be able to compare all cases equally and include 
direct construction costs of the dams. An example of an excluded cost is the delivery 
system cost of pipelines and pumping stations. 
b. Estimated and actual construction costs are shown in December 2012 rand values to 
eliminate inflation bias as far as possible. Costs are adjusted using the CPI headline 
index (Appendix B). 
c. Operational and maintenance (O&M) costs only commence in the year after the last 
year of construction and are shown in Appendix C.  
d. Actual O&M costs from the DWS, available and complete, are used in the URV 
calculations. Furthermore, for comparison purposes (and where DWS data is 
unavailable or incomplete) estimated and actual O&M costs are calculated using the 
DWS guidelines (DWAF, 1996b and Appendix A). The guidelines split the O&M costs 
into civil works costs and mechanical and electrical costs due to their different 
economic lifespans. Civil works have an economic lifespan of 45 years and are 
depreciated at 0.25 per cent per annum, while mechanical and electrical works have a 
lifespan of 30 years and are depreciated at four per cent per annum (DWAF, 1996b). 
e. Yield also only commences in the year that O&M expenses begin because the dam will 
not reach full supply capacity before then (at which time the benefits of the dam begin). 
f. The construction costs are spread equally over the construction lifespan of the dam 
and the O&M costs are spread evenly over the post-construction lifespan of the dam 
except for the thirtieth year after construction finishes. In the thirtieth year the O&M 
costs are calculated as ten per cent of the cost of construction in order to replace the 
mechanical and electrical works, which have a lifespan of 30 years. 
g. In line with DWS practice, a discount rate of eight per cent will be used to calculate the 
URVs with six per cent and ten per cent also calculated as a sensitivity analysis. 
 
Based on the above equation and assumptions, the URVs for the expected and actual 
costs of the four dams can be calculated. The URV calculations are shown in Appendix C 
and the results are shown in section 4.5. A history of URVs is presented in section 4.2.6. 
 
3.4.5 Inter- and intra-case analysis 
Inter-case analysis was used in Chapters Four and Five. Four cases are compared in 
respect of the differences between expected and actual construction costs, primarily using 
URVs (in Chapter Four) and in terms of the 2008 impact of invasive alien plants (IAPs) on 
MAR as well as the potential impact to MAR over 45 years if IAP management is not 
continued (in Chapter Five).  
 
Intra-case analysis was used where additional data was available in the De Hoop Dam 
case (in Chapter Six), in terms of the decision-making that resulted in the De Hoop Dam 
being built. The De Hoop case was chosen for further analysis because it was still under 
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construction when this study started (in 2013), it is the latest major dam to be completed 
(in 2015) in South Africa, there is more information available on the De Hoop Dam than for 
most other dams (a problem encountered during case selection), and because the majority 
of managers and personnel involved in project decision-making were still accessible. 
 
3.4.6 Decision-making analysis 
In the governmental decision to build De Hoop Dam, it is evident that politics, and 
therefore to some degree the political decision-making model, played a role. However, 
because of their complexity, limitations and need for additional data-gathering, the political 
and bounded rationality decision-making models will not be used as frameworks to 
analyse the decision to build the De Hoop Dam. Instead, the RDMM is used as a 
framework, as discussed in Chapter Six. The RDMM was chosen by the researcher based 
on personal judgement, advice taken, and the strengths of the RDMM – which include the 
fact that it is most likely to result in the decision-making of a group or individual being 
reliable and logical, it is a logical step-by-step process, the limitations of the rational model 
(such as the steps not being followed in order when innovative decisions are made) are 
not as severe as those of the bounded rationality or political models, and because the 
rational model actively takes external forces into account at every step (Zindiye, 2012). 
 
Each of the seven steps of the RDMM is discussed using DWS planning reports and 
responses to semi-structured interviews (Van Teijlingen, 2014; Yin, 2011; Collis & Hussey, 
2009). The DWS planning documents used in Chapter Six are all part of the series of 
reports for the detailed planning phase of Phase Two of the ORWRDP. 
 
The transcriptions from the semi-structured, in-depth interviews (Chapter Six) were 
analysed using content analysis which enables systematic ordering, structuring, and 
grouping of large amounts of qualitative information by identifying themes and patterns 
(Collis & Hussey, 2009). Each transcription was read through twice and relevant phrases 
were identified and then linked to the seven steps of Zindiye‘s (2012) rational decision-
making model. 
 
3.5 QUALITY CRITERIA 
According to Collis and Hussey (2009), there are two aspects of research that reflect the 
credibility of research findings: validity and reliability. Validity refers to the level of accuracy 
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of the findings in relation to what is supposed to occur (Collis & Hussey, 2009). Validity is 
more difficult to measure in qualitative studies than in quantitative studies because there 
are no generally accepted guidelines to test for validity (Struwig & Stead, 2001). Therefore, 
in order to give greater confidence in the validity of the interviews, the researcher made 
use of participant validation. This was achieved by emailing each of the interviewees with 
their interview transcripts and asking them to read through and comment on them.  
 
Research is said to be reliable if someone else repeats the research and obtains 
consistent results (in a quantitative study) or similar findings and inferences in a qualitative 
study (Collis & Hussey, 2009). Furthermore, reliability of the qualitative aspects of this 
study, such as the interviews, can be evaluated by assessing their credibility, 
transferability, dependability and conformability (Collis & Hussey, 2009; Pitney & Parker, 
2009). Credibility relates to how well the findings are supported by the collected data. 
Credibility is addressed through data source and collection triangulation, and frequent 
debriefing during supervisor meetings (Collis & Hussey, 2009). The credibility of this study 
was strengthened through methodological triangulation through the use of semi-structured 
interviews; documentation and archival records (Yin, 2014; Collis & Hussey, 2009; 
Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Transferability relates to whether the findings can be applied to 
other, similar studies (Pitney & Parker, 2009). While transferability rests with the reader, 
the researcher needs to supply sufficient information in order for the reader to be able to 
do so (Pitney & Parker, 2009). The research procedures and methods used in this study 
have been clearly detailed in order to strengthen potential transferability. Dependability 
closely relates to reliability in quantitative research, focusing on whether research 
processes are methodical, meticulous and ably recorded (Collis & Hussey, 2009). 
Dependability is addressed through the detailed explanations of the research paradigm, 
methodology and methods used within this study. Conformability relates to whether the 
research process has been adequately recorded so that the reader may ascertain if the 
findings arise from the data (Pitney & Parker, 2009). Conformability is addressed by 
ensuring consistency in data collection by using an interview guide (Appendix E), and in 
data analysis by using recognised methods of analysis (Collis & Hussey, 2009). 
 
3.5 ETHICAL CONDUCT 
Yin (2014) emphasises that protecting human participants in case study research is 
essential. Sekaran and Bougie (2009) contend that ethical conduct should characterise 
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data collection and analysis, as well as the writing and publishing of the information. In 
order to protect participants, special care should be taken to gain informed consent, 
protect the participants from harm (such as through misrepresentation of the nature of the 
research), protect participants‘ privacy and confidentiality, ensure voluntary participation, 
and conduct the research with dignity (Yin, 2014; Sekaran & Bougie, 2009; Collis & 
Hussey, 2009).  
 
In this study, the researcher carefully explained the research and ethical aspects to 
potential participants prior to their agreeing to participate. The explanation was conducted 
through an introductory email with a covering letter (shown in Appendix E). The email 
made it clear that participation was voluntary and that the interview would occur at a time 
that was convenient to the participants. Furthermore, it was explained that the interviews 
would be recorded by hand and that a typed transcript of the interview would be sent to the 
participant, in order to verify the transcripts and provide construct validity of the interview 
process (Yin, 2011; Riege, 2003). Potential participants were made aware that the 
interviews would be completely anonymous and confidential, and that they would not 
receive any remuneration for their participation. Additionally, participants were informed 
that the interview data would be used for research purposes only and would be handed to 
the supervisor after submission, for private storage. 
 
Before each interview started, participants were informed again that their participation was 
voluntary, anonymous and confidential. Confidentiality was protected by assigning each 
transcript a different number (from P1 to P10). Additionally, each participant was asked to 
sign a consent form prior to the start of the interview (shown in Appendix E). In the case of 
three interviews that were not conducted face-to-face (two were conducted by telephone 
and one by email), the participants were first asked to send the researcher an email 
consenting to the interview. Lastly, participants were informed that they could withdraw 
from the research study at any stage without penalty. 
 
This research complied with all ethical requirements of the Rhodes University Department 
of Management‘s Human Research Ethics Committee. 
 
In the following chapter (Chapter Four), an analysis of estimated and actual URVs of the 
four case studies, is presented.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE COST OF DAM CONSTRUCTION AND COMPARATIVE COSTING 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
In Chapter Two, water supply generation in South Africa was explored in terms of bio-
physical considerations, the national water supply and demand, the management of water 
supply limits, and finally the pricing and value of water. Chapter Four now looks at the first 
objective of this study, which is to calculate and evaluate the variation between estimated 
and actual construction unit reference values (URVs) for a selection of dams.  
 
Chapter Four addresses the first research objective by retrospectively exploring the costs 
of building (as seen in Figure 4.1) and operating selected water infrastructure schemes 
(dams) in South Africa, and analyses important financial and economic criteria used by the 
DWS in their decision-making. The evaluation of costs compares the estimated costs – at 
the time when the proposal to develop each selected dam was approved by the then 
Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry – with the actual costs following the construction of 
each of the dams (after adjusting the costs for inflation).  
 
Figure 4.1: The De Hoop Dam under construction 
 
(Source: Young, 2014) 
 
Chapter Four thus questions whether ministers were put in a fair position to make an 
informed decision about the costs and benefits of a dam. Furthermore, it explores the 
quality of data being kept by the authorities on the costs and benefits (such as yield) of 
completed dams. 
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The National Water Act (36 of 1998: p.51) stipulates in section 109, that the Minister of 
Water and Sanitation ―may acquire, construct, alter, repair, operate or control government 
waterworks in order to protect, use, develop, conserve, manage and control the nation‘s 
water resources in the public interest‖. Government waterworks are developed to meet an 
identified demand and may comprise infrastructure for bulk water storage and conveyance 
from the resource to the place of use (typically including a mix of: dams, pipelines, canals, 
pump stations, electricity supply works, access roads, telecommunications, minor office 
and accommodation). This study refers to the waterworks infrastructure – excluding 
pipelines transferring water away from the dam, but including the land on which it is 
situated as a dam – although it is understood that this refers to the collective infrastructure 
from source to supply for the specific yield. It is noted that this definition of a water supply 
scheme to meet an identified demand is limited to bulk water and excludes the user 
infrastructure costs such as municipal infrastructure for distribution to individual properties.  
 
4.2 UNDERSTANDING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES OF WATER SUPPLY 
DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA  
Section 4.2 explores the motivations, reasons and the decision-making behind the 
construction of dams in South Africa. Furthermore, it explores the financial decision-
making criteria that are applied when deciding whether or not to build a dam. These 
criteria include cost benefit analyses (CBAs), URVs and multiple criteria analysis (MCA). 
 
4.2.1 Making decisions 
Decision-making concerning infrastructure projects is often difficult and uncertain as 
authorities try to find optimal solutions to developmental needs. There have been many 
voices raised in questioning the sustainability of the outcomes of the infrastructure choices 
that have already been made (Hay et al., 2012; National Planning Commission, 2012). The 
costs of many infrastructure projects are questioned (Flyvbjerg, 2009; 2005). Allegations of 
corruption and collusion in many of the big infrastructural projects – such as sports 
stadiums, roads, railways, power supply, water supply, land reform, and other large 
projects that get put out to tender – have also been made. Examples of this are the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Thamae & Pottinger, 2006; Darroch, 2004), land reform 
programmes (Dardagan, 2012), and the collusion of construction companies working on 
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the Berg River Dam, Cape Town Stadium, the Gautrain and other projects nationwide 
(Gedye, 2013; Nicholson, 2013; SAPA, 2013; Steyn, 2011; SAPA, 2009). 
 
Arguably one of the best ways to address the challenges of corruption and collusion is to 
require independent CBAs for infrastructure projects. This will not address the corruption 
threat in the sense of who is awarded the tender, but rather it addresses whether or not 
the project should go ahead on the basis of the benefits outweighing the costs. Requiring 
CBAs for infrastructure projects will also be likely to have a positive effect on public policy 
by providing improved information and by holding public officials more accountable for the 
outcomes (Guasch & Hahn, 1999). 
 
In practice, CBAs are popularly used when comparing infrastructure projects where all the 
components have monetary values that are easy to calculate (see, for example, Mullins et 
al., 2007). However, it is often the case that water supply infrastructure projects have 
components that are difficult to quantify economically, such as some environmental and 
social costs (Redford & Adams, 2009; MEA, 2005). Examples of these difficult-to-cost 
components include calculating the monetary value of the water quality benefits of a 
healthy wetland (such as trapping silt, improving water quality and flood attenuation) or the 
full costs of relocating communities (such as relocating graves or maintaining livelihoods in 
a changed environment) away from a selected infrastructure site. Even though obtaining or 
calculating some of the environmental and social costs is difficult, it does not mean that the 
value of components (whether costs or benefits) is low or zero. There is a risk that some of 
these environmental and social values may be undervalued or completely overlooked 
when deciding on the site of an infrastructure project.  
 
Such an analysis does not negate the need for dams (as is raised in section 4.2.2). Water 
supply decision-making invariably involves trade-offs. It is inevitable that some costs (as 
well as opportunity costs) are necessary to obtain the planned benefits. At issue is whether 
we can weigh up these costs and benefits when making decisions. It is also important to 
understand who pays and who benefits (albeit to different extents) from the outcomes. 
 
Decision-making and trade-offs are not limited to building dams; they are also important in 
water security alternatives such as DSM (discussed further in Text Box 1 below) and 
catchment management. It has not been possible to obtain an estimate of the proportion of 
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the budget of the water sector that has been spent on building dams as a source of water 
supply, versus the proportions spent on other options such as DSM or catchment 
management (conserving the supply of water). Take, for example, the Western Cape 
Systems Analysis (DWAF, 1996a) which ran between 1989 and 1995. The WCSA 
consisted of 24 predominately supply-side alternatives to enhance the supply of water to 
Cape Town and the surrounding area. These alternatives were contrasted with the Palmiet 
Phase 1 scheme that was under consideration at the time in terms of yield and relative 
cost. It has not been possible to obtain accurate comparative figures here either, but it is 
clear that the bulk of the alternatives were supply-side options (DWAF, 1996a).  
 
Text Box 1: Demand-side management (DSM) 
DSM, also called water demand management, is a strategy implemented by a water 
institution or water user to limit the anticipated water use to meet objectives such as the 
sustainability of water supply and economic efficiency (DWAF, 2004). It is often linked with 
water conservation strategies. An example of DSM is encouraging and educating people 
on how they can save water in their homes by using low-flow showerheads and taps as 
well as by fixing leaking pipes and taps. Another example of DSM is raising the price of 
water, as it would serve as an incentive to conserve water use. This however is not true for 
all water use due to limited cost recovery. In areas where the cost of water is not 
recovered, increasing the price to limit water abuse has zero impact. 
 
Internationally, DSM has been implemented in many countries as part of integrated water 
resource management approaches. The examples of Namibia, Israel and Australia 
(Sydney) show that DSM is not new and that it is still being implemented successfully. 
Namibia, the driest sub-Saharan country in Africa, implemented DSM measures in 1990, 
and over a seven-year period, water consumption did not increase, while population 
increased by 35 per cent (Van der Merwe, 1999). More recently, Israel launched a 
multimedia awareness campaign and reduced consumption by ten per cent by the end of 
2009 (Thivet & Fernandez, 2012). Since 2002, Sydney‘s water use has decreased in 
seven out of nine years between 2002/2003 and 2011/2012. This has been due to the 
implementation of water efficiency programmes such as ―Water Wise Rules‖, to encourage 
water saving behaviours (Sydney Water, 2013).  
 
While DSM is a necessary and useful water management tool that needs far more 
emphasis (Van Rooyen & Versfeld, 2010), it is outside the scope of this study.  
 
DSM was not even listed as an option in the systems analysis of the Western Cape 
(DWAF, 1996a), which contained a separate, short, superficial section listing a few 
suggestions on how water could be saved, without giving cost or quantity of water saved 
estimates.) The Skuifraam (now Berg River) Dam was the preferred ―next scheme to be 
built‖ in the WCSA (DWAF, 1996a); however, the Minister of the DWS at the time, 
Professor Kadar Asmal, put the Berg River Dam on hold until 1999, as he wanted water 
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conservation and demand management programmes to first be implemented (Pottinger, 
1999). The absence of DSM in the Western Cape Systems Analysis illustrates a focus on 
supply-side options, especially the building of dams. 
 
A supply-side contribution to conserve supply is to fix aging infrastructure. Yet the massive 
cost of replacing aging water infrastructure (indicated by former DWS Minister Edna 
Molewa to be R58 billion per annum over a ten-year period (Donnelly, 2012)) clearly 
indicates that some of the choices made between building new water supply options and 
conserving existing water supply options should be retrospectively questioned. For 
example, McKenzie et al. (2012) estimated that 36.8 per cent of the water that enters the 
national system is classified as non-revenue water. Non-revenue water is made up of 
physical water losses (for example, a burst pipe) and commercial water losses (for 
example, billing errors) and unbilled consumption (for example, water for firefighting) 
(McKenzie et al., 2012). The cost of repairing aging infrastructure relative to supplying 
additional water through augmentation such as with a dam, is a vital consideration in 
certain parts of the country. CBAs can be used to compare the costs and benefits of 
repairing aging infrastructure in relation to building new infrastructure.  
 
CBAs can also be used in retrospective assessments, which attempt to ascertain whether 
the actual costs and benefits are in line with what was estimated. By retrospectively 
assessing decisions, analysts and decision-makers can improve decision-making by 
comparing their expectations with the actual outcomes (Guasch & Hahn, 1999). This may 
also help to create a functioning institutional memory and appropriate document archiving; 
both severely lacking currently in the DWS, based on the extreme difficulties experienced 
in this study in tracking down data relating to decision-making on the selected dams (and 
more so with the dams that could not be included in this study, for lack of accessible data).  
 
4.2.2 The South African water dilemma 
As explored in Chapter Two, South Africa is a water-scarce country that has already made 
use of most of the economically located surface water options to increase water supply in 
the country. Increasing the water supply of the country means increasing the amount of 
water that can secured as ―yield‖. Yield is discussed in Text Box 2. 
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Text Box 2: Water yield 
 
The assured water supply is the amount of water that is abstracted from the system (the 
total yield) at different levels of assurance. Yield is the guaranteed supply of water at a 98 
per cent level of assurance (DWAF, 2004; King et al., 2011). This means that the water 
(yield) is guaranteed, on average, in 98 out of 100 years (DWA, 2013b). The DWS‘s 
planning directorate uses a 98 per cent assurance of supply in their planning when 
calculating available water supply. However, the level of assurance that water users get 
depends on the water use. Water use assurance ranges from 100 per cent assurance of 
supply for strategic industrial use (such as Eskom‘s power generation) down to a minimum 
of 70 per cent assurance of supply (for irrigation). Domestic, industrial and mining have a 
minimum of 90 per cent assurance of supply (RSA, 2007). 
 
Since yield is calculated at a 98 per cent assurance, the yield of a dam is always much 
less than the total amount of water held when the dam is full (called full supply capacity or 
FSC). For example, De Hoop Dam has an estimated yield of 64 million cubic metres and a 
FSC of 347 million cubic metres. Another reason for the big difference between yield and 
FSC is because the water that is needed for the ecological Reserve (as required by The 
National Water Act 36 of 1998) is not regarded as available for other uses (DWAF, 2004). 
The amount of water defined as yield could be increased if the level of assurance was 
decreased but the risk of water shortages would increase, undermining water security. 
Without changing the level of assurance, the main ways that yield can be increased are 
through: 
  
 construction or raising of dams (reservoirs) and weirs (by increasing storage capacity);  
 construction of desalination plants (to turn sea-water into drinking water);  
 increasing of abstraction of water from rivers; 
 management of ―water factories‖: catchments and riparian areas with high water-
generating potential (for example, through the control of IAPs (Van Wilgen et al., 2008), 
land- and wetland-management (Le Maitre et al., 2009);  
 additional groundwater abstraction.  
 
Transferring water into one area from another, known as an IBT (or inter-basin transfer) 
will increase yield in the receiving catchment, but will of course deplete yield in the 
catchment from which it is taken. There are costs and benefits associated with these IBTs. 
These include the potential social and economic benefits in the receiving catchment, which 
stem from meeting increased water demand, as well as generating hydropower (WWF, 
2007). One of the major costs would be financial as IBT projects are frequently large, 
expensive and complicated. Other costs include energy costs of pumping, when the 
movement of water into another catchment cannot be provided by gravity alone, and the 
legal and political costs of an IBT in a trans-border catchment (WWF, 2007). One of the 
impacts that is internationally cited from IBTs is the movement of fish and other fresh-
water biota (including plants) into areas in which they previously did not occur (Davies and 
Day, 1998). These can become invasive in the systems into which they are introduced, 
disrupting biological diversity and the ecological functioning of the systems. Another long-
term cost that is seldom recognised is the reduction of the assimilative capacity of the river 
from which the water is removed. 
 
The siltation of dams and rivers is a further major factor in water yield. De-silting dams, 
and reducing the levels to which silt will enter a dam, will lessen the loss of yield. This too 
has costs and benefits that should be assessed. For example, it was estimated at the end 
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of 2012 based on 500 000 cubic metres of silt in a 25 metre high concrete dam, that the 
cost of dredging a dam to remove the silt would cost R75 per cubic metre, compared with 
building new dam storage which costs approximately R20 per cubic metre (Legge, 2014). 
The cheapest option would be to stop sediment entering into the river system in the first 
place (Legge, 2012), which in this case was not costed.  
 
Options to reduce evaporation are clearly important for water yield. The conjunctive use of 
ground and surface water (Foster et al., 2010) can realise greater yield than would be 
possible from using just one source . There will be costs and issues (such as separate 
management for surface and groundwater) for these benefits, but the fact that conjunctive 
use is so seldom employed suggests that the costs are perceived to outweigh the benefits.  
 
Evapo-transpiration is also an important consideration in terms of yield. For example, 
evapo-transpiration by waterweeds such as water hyacinth (Eichhornia crassipes) can 
increase natural evaporation levels by up to 3.2 times (Marlin, 2010). It has also been 
shown that invading trees (such as pine trees) within a riparian area will use significantly 
more water through evapo-transpiration than the same trees will away from the riparian 
zone (Le Maitre et al., 2015; Dzikiti et al., 2013). 
 
As has been mentioned, water conservation though the repairing of defective pipes and 
canals (and leaking reservoirs), would also effectively increase the actual yield. The costs 
and benefits of this are addressed in the main body of the text. 
 
A main goal of the DWS is to develop a water supply reserve (so that supply is greater 
than demand). In aiming for this supply reserve there is also a need to consider whether 
water is lost to the system (consumptive use, for example, when watering your garden in 
the middle of a windy day, when evaporation levels can be far higher), or whether it is 
being returned to the system (non-consumptive use, for example, through the sewerage 
system when taking a bath) (Berger & Finkbeiner, 2010; DWAF, 2004). There are water 
storage, purification and pumping costs connected with such ―non-consumptive use‖ that 
should also be considered. However, these seem to be more academic arguments than 
practical considerations in water security, if the lack of such points in selected planning 
documents (of all spheres) is at all representative. 
 
The quality of water may also be considered to be a factor for water yield. In certain 
circumstances, additional water is needed for dilution (for example, when highly salinated). 
Yield, in the end, is what can actually be used. Once again, there are costs and benefits 
that need to be understood, and acted upon. The salinisation of soil through inappropriate 
irrigation methods has been shown in the Free State (Le Roux et al., 2007), in the so-
called ―bread basket‖ of the United States of America (Pitman and Läuchli, 2002), and 
along the Murray-Darling River in Australia (Save the Murray, 2007). Large-scale irrigation 
can also lead to the salinisation and contamination of groundwater through the absorption 
by soils of a mineralised residue left over by evaporation (Van Weert & Van Der Gun, 
2012). Furthermore, the World Commission on Dams (2000) found that 20 per cent of 
irrigated land has been lost to salinisation. Decision-makers should consider which choices 
to prioritise, and where impacts are irreversible, these should be acknowledged as high 
risks. 
 
Dams are a necessary part of the water supply in most parts of the world (Scudder, 2005; 
World Commission on Dams, 2000). In a country like South Africa, with variable climate 
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and rainfall, periodic droughts, uneven spread of demand for water (both seasonally and 
geographically), and general water scarcity (only 450 mm of rainfall per annum, on 
average), dams are necessary for water security. Dams are also an option to regulate the 
uneven supply of water that is a reality in South Africa, as well as to match the 
development goals set out by Government in documents such as the National Water 
Resources Strategy: Second Edition (DWA, 2013b) and National Development Plan: 
Vision for 2030 (National Planning Commission, 2012). 
 
In the National Water Act (36 of 1998), section 117(c)(1) stipulates that all dams with a 
storage capacity of more than 50 000 cubic metres and a wall height of more than five 
metres have to be registered with the DWS (there are many thousands of smaller dams 
that are not registered with the DWS (Legge, 2014; Davies & Day, 1998)). With over 5 000 
registered dams in South Africa, as shown in Table 4.1, there has clearly been a perceived 
need for dams in the country (DWS, 2014a). These dams (registered and unregistered) all 
delay the flow of water in South Africa‘s rivers at the start of the rainfall season. What 
gives rise to a retrospective study like this one, is looking at dams that have been built, to 
see if they were in fact necessary at the time, or if there were more effective alternatives 
options that existed at the time these dams were built. 
 
Table 4.1: Classification of registered dams in South Africa 
Size class Number % 
Small (less than 12m) 3775 75.0% 
Medium (12m – 30m) 1079 21.5% 
Large (30m and above) 176 3.5% 
Total 2030 100 
(Source: DWS, 2014a) 
 
The need to address alternatives applies to DSM and the conservation of supply as well. 
For example, when the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme was being proposed, a study 
was done by a Mr Larry Farwell (a water specialist seconded by the USA to work with the 
late Professor Kader Asmal), looking at water use in the Department of Water Affairs‘ own 
building. He found that over 90 per cent of the water being used in the ―Sedibeng‖ building 
was being lost to leaks (L. Farwell, personal communication, 8 October 2012). He argued 
that there are already existing dams that supply water to Gauteng, and questioned the 
need to build an additional dam supplying water to Gauteng, when DSM and conservation 
of supply (leak management and unaccounted-for water) had clearly not been addressed. 
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The bottom line of this argument is that while the building of new dams and IBT schemes 
are inevitable in South Africa, the opportunities are limited (DWA, 2013b). However, even 
in these cases, it is necessary to consider environmental and social impacts. But, as the 
Mount Fletcher Dam attests – having silted up 70 per cent in just four years (CSIR, 2013) 
– even the building of new dams requires an assurance that there will be water, not silt, to 
fill the dam in the long term.  
 
In this respect, it is important to look at not only the relative costs of dams and their 
alternatives, but also at the timing of interventions. There may be lower risks of a gap 
between water supply and demand if some interventions are prioritised over others. Text 
Box 3 further discusses the timing of interventions and the long-term costs of dams. 
 
Text Box 3: The long-term costs of dams 
 
The timing of interventions is an important consideration. South Africa typically borrows money at interest rates 
requiring a need to be prudent (Gordhan, 2014). It may make sense, then, to build infrastructure when it is 
most needed, and to optimise the limited period of its lifespan. (This would take into account inflation costs of 
building dams.) As can be seen from the table of options in the Western Cape Systems Analysis (Table 4.1; 
DWAF, 1996a), there are several dam options that can be considered. These dams have been largely 
considered on the basis of financial costs alone, and not including economic costs. Even so, it is clear that as 
the best options/sites for dams are taken, more marginal options/sites must be considered, and the cost-
benefit ratio is less favourable.  
 
By looking at DSM, maintenance of infrastructure (as part of the conservation of supply), and catchment 
management, considerable savings can be made with timeous action. For example, the Working for Water 
programme in the Olifants Catchment (Limpopo / Mpumalanga Provinces) is estimating a doubling period of 
about seven years for the black wattle (Acacia mearnsii) (Kotzé et al., 2010). The cost to clear does not 
increase in a linear manner; rather it depends upon considerations such as slope, soil, accessibility and other 
factors (Marais & Wannenburgh, 2008), and thus may double in less than seven years. The water impact of 
the IAPs would also more than double in that period, as it is not just the spread of the plants, but also the 
growth (and therefore higher levels of evapo-transpiration) of each tree. It may then make sense to clear the 
catchment as soon as possible, for economic reasons (Görgens & Van Wilgen, 2004). The same would be 
true of making timeous repairs to canals, pipes and other infrastructure for the distribution of water. 
 
The argument is to advocate prioritisation of factors such as catchment management, and to delay the building 
of dams. If the authorities could eliminate the need for the last (and most marginal/expensive) dams on the list, 
there could be significant savings.  
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Table 4.2: A 1996 list of potential options to augment the Cape Town’s water supply 
 
(Source: DWAF, 1996a) 
 
4.2.3 Background and motivation for the construction of a dam 
A decision to build a dam is driven by a perceived need for greater water security in an 
area or region, together with consideration of where a dam is perceived to be the best 
option for meeting that need. Other reasons for building a dam include flood attenuation, 
recreational benefits (although not given as a reason in itself) and the hydroelectric energy 
benefits that are often linked with the building of dams. Hydroelectric dams are, however, 
more common in countries with higher assured runoff – where hydroelectricity is 
sometimes the main purpose for building a dam – than they are in South Africa (World 
Commission on Dams, 2000).  
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Before a decision to build a dam is made, substantial planning processes are required. 
This includes comparisons of alternative options, analyses of locations and infrastructure 
size, trade-offs (environmental, social and other) and a need to provide answers to the 
following questions: What is the projected demand for water? What options are available 
to meet the demand with sufficient assurance of supply? What are the relative costs and 
benefits of the different options?  
 
While some of the questions are perhaps obvious – where to build the dam, what type of 
dam to build, what size of dam to build, what impacts, environmental and social, will 
building the dam have, how much will it cost; and what alternative options are available – 
the answers are invariably subtly different and difficult to evaluate. 
 
The National Treasury has produced frameworks for government infrastructure projects 
that show respectively the different steps (and their explanations) which projects are 
supposed to follow (see Figure 4.2), together with their potential pitfalls (see Figure 4.3). 
The National Treasury expects projects like building dams to follow these frameworks.  
 
Figure 4.2: Framework of an infrastructure project's life cycle  
 
(Source: National Treasury, 2012) 
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Figure 4.3: Framework of an infrastructure project’s potential pitfalls 
 
(Source: National Treasury, 2013) 
 
The planning that the National Treasury requires entails looking at the current assured 
supply of water in contrast to current and future expected demand. The assured supply is 
the amount of water that is already abstracted from the system (the total yield) at different 
levels of assurance. The DWS‘s planning directorate uses a 98 per cent assurance of 
supply when calculating available water supply. This means that water (yield) is 
guaranteed, on average, in 98 out of 100 years (DWA, 2013b). The level of assurance that 
water users get depends on the use of the water and it ranges from 100 per cent 
assurance of supply for strategic industrial use (such as Eskom‘s power generation) down 
to a minimum of 70 per cent assurance of supply (for irrigation). Domestic, industrial and 
mining have a minimum of 90 per cent assurance of supply (RSA, 2007).  
 
Demand for water continues to increase around South Africa for a number of reasons. 
These include human population growth and movement of population (largely from rural to 
urban areas); the continued issue of providing water for the basic human needs 
component of the Reserve to alleviate inequality of access of water, as laid out in the 
National Water Act of 1998 (RSA, 1998) and the National Development Plan (NPC, 2012); 
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and the continued growth of agricultural, mining and industrial water needs from new and 
expanded businesses. Other reasons for an increase in the demand for water include 
droughts, possible climate change and catchment degradation. Water loss would be an 
additional reason, involving aging infrastructure, leaks and unaccounted-for water. So too 
might deteriorating water quality, and the need to dilute polluted water to reach acceptable 
standards. The National Water Act requires that water be allocated to maintain the 
ecological component of the Reserve. This quantity of water does not, however, increase 
(RSA, 1998) although climate change may become a factor (Hedden & Cilliers, 2014). 
 
If the demand for water is likely to surpass supply, then either supply must increase 
(through harnessing additional yield in the catchment, bringing the water in from another 
catchment through an IBT, or options such as desalination) or demand must decrease 
(through DSM, catchment management, or the conservation of supply such as reducing 
unaccounted-for water). This will prevent water shortages and the economic, 
environmental and social consequences of a prolonged water shortage, including unequal 
access to supply (such as, people ―at the end of the pipe‖ getting no water).  
 
It is clear from White Papers (such as DWAF, 1998a; DWAF, 1998b; DWAF, 1994), 
systems analyses (for example, DWAF, 1996a) and other planning documents (such as 
DWA, 2013b; DWAF, 2009a; DWAF, 2007a) of the DWS, that substantial research and 
planning does guide decision-making to ensure water security. It could be argued that this 
focus is within a framework that is predominately supply-side oriented. However, 
historically there has been less exploring of options such as DSM, catchment management 
and effluent water recycling (King et al., 2011). Only recently has there been greater 
emphasis on the conservation of existing supply, especially in terms of leaks and aging 
infrastructure (DWA, 2013b; DWAF, 2004). 
 
One aspect that may be a factor in the apparent focus on dams, rather than on alternative 
options, is that the Constitution has made the work of the DWS a national function, and the 
building of dams is something that can be managed in its entirety by DWS. By contrast, 
DSM is a function of local government. Because there are now the three largely 
autonomous spheres of government, rather than the hierarchical ―tiers‖ of government in 
the past, the national DWS must work through and with local government for DSM. This 
has its difficulties, as the efforts to address both water supply and especially sanitation 
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have shown (Van der Merwe-Botha, 2010; Herold, 2009). Similarly, catchment 
management is a ―concurrent responsibility‖ (mainly within provincial government), and 
has the added complication of DWS needing to work in partnership with other 
departments, notably the Department of Environmental Affairs, the Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and the Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform.  
 
Although co-operative government and governance is required in all aspects of work, it is 
clear that the DWS has far greater autonomy in the building of dams than it does for many 
of the alternatives. It should be recognised, however, that these institutional challenges 
were not always the case, and that the DWS (including its previous names and mandates) 
has always had a tendency to pursue the building of dams rather than exploring other 
alternatives. The profound changes in water law, policy and the structure of the DWS that 
have occurred in the last twenty years in documents such as the National Water Act (RSA, 
1998), the National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS) (DWAF, 2004), the NWRS Second 
Edition (DWA, 2013b) and the Water for Growth and Development Framework (DWAF, 
2009a, DWAF, 2009a), are trying to lessen this tendency. 
 
In the DWS, Strategic Planning, detailed planning (called Options Analysis), Construction, 
and Water Resource Information Operations Management are all in distinct units called 
chief directorates. It can be expected that tensions occur between these units, as it is well 
documented in many organisations (Duze, 2012; Nuttall, 2012; Knight et al., 2008). There 
is no way of being able to question the contribution of intra-departmental tensions in this 
study, but it is raised as a possible reason for the difference between planning cost 
estimates by the DWS and the final costs. 
 
4.2.4 Financial decision criteria applied to a decision to build a dam 
When a decision to build a dam is made, a number of scenarios are developed to provide 
decision-makers with information. These scenarios vary according to aspects of the dam 
such as height of the dam wall or wall type selection. One of the main results of the 
variation in each scenario is that the financial costs will differ. These costs may be direct 
and easy to calculate (such as the cost of the dam wall), or they may be indirect and more 
difficult to calculate. These indirect aspects are often called ‗externalities‘ and can be 
social/environmental costs (such as the loss of natural beauty) or social/environmental 
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benefits (for example, provision of new recreational opportunities such as sailing on or 
fishing in the dam). Related to this are opportunity costs – the alternative options for which 
the resources could have been used. Also applicable when comparing scenarios are the 
associated cumulative impacts.  
 
Many costs and other variables can be difficult to quantify and therefore require subjective 
judgement. Decisions are always value-based, and decision-makers can purposely fail to 
take account of particular decision implications, so that their preferred choice is selected.  
 
It may be expected that archived documentation would provide the detail necessary to 
make an informed decision. Merely providing a financial analysis will not do so. For 
example, strategic environmental assessments, URVs and economic CBAs are all helpful 
and even necessary, but on their own are inadequate. That is why water planners make 
use of MCAs, to contrast and compare alternative options.  
 
4.2.5 Cost-benefit analyses (CBAs) 
The financial implications of options are calculated and compared through mostly financial 
analyses in the planning stage to determine the optimal solutions. One of the main types of 
financial analysis is the CBA (also known as benefit-cost analysis) which determines and 
then compares the benefits and costs of various project options.  
 
CBAs are used to compare and rate different projects and/or different alternatives in the 
same project (for example, comparing the cost of different dam wall heights when planning 
a dam). The total financial and economic costs to the total financial and economic benefits 
are stated in rand (monetary) terms. This comparison results in a ratio. If the ratio is less 
than one-to-one (meaning that benefits are greater than costs), the project is worth 
pursuing further. If the ratio is more than one-to-one, the project is considered non-viable. 
If there are multiple projects or alternatives for the same project, the project or alternative 
with the lowest CBA is selected, so that the return on investment is as high as possible.  
 
As a CBA relies on putting monetary values on the components, it means that those which 
can easily be given a rand value (for example, the cost of a house to be flooded by a dam) 
are at risk of being given higher importance than things which are difficult to give a rand 
value to (for example, loss of a family graveyard, or home). 
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There may be many variables, some of them not obvious at the start of a CBA, which 
should be factored into the CBA in order to have a more accurate calculation of the relative 
cost of different options. The value of a human life is often used as an example of where 
CBAs are vulnerable (Kernohan, 2012). CBAs are also vulnerable in that costs are 
generally short-term in nature, while benefits are long-term in nature (Gruber, 2010). This 
further complicates the comparison. Where there is compensation involved, the value 
ascribed to variables is complex, and is vulnerable to being manipulated. 
 
CBA should include or be supplemented by risk assessments (Mullins et al., 2007). Dam 
safety standards have been significantly enhanced over the past two decades (DWA, 
2012b; RSA, 1998), and these additional potential costs and risks need to be taken into 
account. But some risks are not well-understood. For example, the invasive Yabby crayfish 
(Cherax destructor) burrows into earthen walls of dams and can lead to a failure of the 
wall, with the resulting dangers not only in terms of disaster management, but also in 
terms of water security from the failed dam (Withnall, 2000). Similarly, poor water quality 
from agricultural runoff of nitrates and phosphates, coupled with human waste through 
failed sewage treatment, may lead to eutrophication and the growth of toxic algae in a 
dam. This has happened at Hartbeespoort Dam (Venter & Ledger, 2010). Addressing 
eutrophication incurs significant costs, which may not have been included in the original 
planning figures (Marshall, 2014).  
 
Another type of risk that one might expect in a CBA for water development is the 
introduction of invasive or potentially invasive species through IBTs. A local example is the 
transfer of the sharp-tooth catfish (Clarias gariepinus) (Kadye & Booth, 2013; Bruton, 
1988). Consideration of risks such as aquaculture development (DAFF, 2014) raises one 
of the most important questions that should be established in a CBA, namely ―Who 
benefits, and at whose cost?‖ 
 
In most choices, there are ‗winners‘ and ‗losers‘, and there is a need to balance how those 
who benefit compensate those who lose. Sometimes the winners and losers are different 
over time, and some losses cannot be recompensed, further complicating the 
considerations. For example, a decision to build a dam may give water security and profit 
from the productive use of land to specific land-owners (an accusation often made during 
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the apartheid era, regarding for example, the Pongolapoort Dam) while taking away 
options from others (for example, the poor communities in the Pongola flood plain who 
relied on the annual flooding of the river for food security) (Van Vuuren, 2009). There are 
almost always different costs and benefits for different stakeholders resulting in 
uncomfortable trade-offs. 
 
The discount rate used in CBAs is another challenging aspect of the work. The discount 
rate is a weighting process similar to an interest rate that reflects the value of a cost or 
benefit over time (Mullins et al., 2007). As will be discussed in the next section, the DWS 
has settled on an eight per cent discount rate (Mullins et al., 2007), with six per cent and 
ten per cent being used as a sensitivity analysis (Van Niekerk, 2013). However, for many 
variables, people will argue that this eight per cent discount rate is inappropriate – in other 
words, that the value of something is halved within nine years (known as the rule of 72) 
(Kernohan, 2012; Moles et al., 2011). An example of this would be that higher discount 
rates lead to environmental benefits being reduced in value and therefore appearing less 
efficient – with the cost of environmental damage being reduced in magnitude, and 
therefore being more likely to be overlooked (Fuguitt & Wilcox, 1999). 
 
From an analysis of some of the early assessments being done after democracy in South 
Africa, it is clear that the promotion of equity and job creation were not formal factors in 
many CBAs. When a comparison was made in the Western Cape Systems Analysis 
(DWAF, 1996a), and the Working for Water option of clearing IAPs in the catchment was 
evaluated against the Skuifraam Dam (Berg River Dam) option, the impounded water was 
judged as being almost three times as expensive as the savings from clearing invasive 
plants. However, a construction budget was approved that was many times more than the 
cost of clearing the invasive plants (DWAF, 1998a). Job creation was not considered, nor 
was an assessment made of who would benefit and who would pay.  
 
The challenge with CBAs, then, is less the technique of how to weigh up costs and 
benefits, and more how to put a rand value on many of the components. 
 
4.2.6 URVs 
URVs offer a type of cost effectiveness analysis, used and developed in South Africa by 
the DWS (Van Niekerk, 2012). URVs calculate the cost per cubic metre of water over the 
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lifetime of a water infrastructure project (for example, at the point where the water leaves 
the dam). As part of an MCA (section 4.2.7), planners in the DWS use URVs to sort water-
resource developments from most effective to least effective in terms of the cost per cubic 
metre of water (Van Niekerk, 2013). URVs can also be used to optimise the size of a water 
resource development, such as the height of a dam wall and compare the result to other 
options, such as raising the wall in the future (Van Niekerk, 2013). 
 
In order to calculate a URV, the net present value of the capital costs and the operational 
costs are needed as well as the discounted yield. In order to calculate net present values, 
a discount rate is needed. In South Africa, it has been found that a discount rate of eight 
per cent is suitable as it is the recommended discount rate by international organisations 
such as the World Bank (Mullins et al., 2007:67-68). However, it must be stated that 
choosing an appropriate discount rate has caused much debate in literature (Gruber, 
2010; Boardman et al., 2006). This is because an eight per cent discount rate has been 
higher than inflation (at six-and-a-half per cent as at February 2014) over the past decade 
and that it is also higher than the social discount rate (Gruber, 2010; Mullins et al., 2007). 
A further issue is long-term environmental impacts, since an eight per cent discount rate 
will render the amount insignificant over any long period of time due to compounding 
interest (Mullins et al., 2007). A solution to this problem may be the use of discount rates 
that decline over a period to a percentage approaching zero, so that the costs and benefits 
to future generations are more realistic and fair (Mullins et al., 2007). This solution would 
also be in line with the National Water Act (RSA, 1998) where the two main principles are 
equity (fairness to the current generation) and sustainability (fairness to future generations) 
(Palmer et al., 2002).  
 
It has become the norm to do a sensitivity analysis by doing additional URV calculations 
using discount rates of six and ten per cent to offer a comparative context for the different 
options. (Van Niekerk, 2013; Fuguitt & Wilcox, 1999). This is done to show the sensitivity 
of the present value to different discount rates as well as showing if the selected project is 
still the best option at other discount rates. Even though six and ten per cent are the norm 
it is difficult to understand why, say seven and nine per cent are not used. According to 
Mullins et al., (2007), lower discount rates would then result in capital-intensive 
construction techniques being used more often. Since the recommended discount rate in 
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South Africa is eight per cent and the recommended sensitivity analyses are six and ten 
per cent, that is what is used in this study.  
 
In Britain, a cost-effectiveness analysis called the discounted unit cost was developed in 
the 1970s to reduce the number of options for a water scheme (Herrington, 2006). Van 
Niekerk (2013) noted that the British discounted unit cost is fully equivalent to the South 
African URV.  
 
Van Niekerk (2013) describes the standard incremental approach to calculating URVs (see 
Figure 3.2 in section 3.4.4) as inadequate for calculating the URVs for IBTs because it 
does not take the condition of the catchment receiving the water into consideration, nor 
does the standard URV approach take variable costs (directly linked to the amount of 
water transferred) into consideration. Instead, Van Niekerk (2013) proposed and 
developed a new method for calculating URVs called the ‗comprehensive approach‘ 
shown in Figure 4.4. This approach splits the present value (PV) of life-cycle costs into PV 
of capital costs plus the PV of operating and maintenance (O&M) costs. Where this 
approach differs from the standard approach is in the breakdown of the PV of O&M costs. 
In the comprehensive approach, the PV of O&M costs is equal to the PV of maintenance 
costs plus PV of fixed operating costs plus PV of variable operating costs.  
 
Figure 4.4: Comprehensive URV approach 
 
(Source: Van Niekerk, 2013) 
 
While Van Niekerk‘s work was focused on using URVs in IBTs, he concluded that the 
comprehensive URV was not limited to IBTs but that it could be used in other water-related 
operations such as desalination schemes; however no mention of use in dam schemes 
was made. The reason for not using Van Niekerk‘s comprehensive URV approach in 
comparing different dam schemes, is that dam operational costs are not as variable as 
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IBTs, since IBTs transfer different amounts of water for different reasons at different times 
of the year. In calculating the URV for an IBT using the standard and comprehensive 
methods on the same example, Van Niekerk (2013) showed that the standard method has 
a bias towards variable costs and this leads to considerably different URV outcomes when 
compared to using the comprehensive method. These differences could lead to less-than-
optimal decisions being made.  
 
More accurate analyses make for better decision-making; however, in calculating the 
URVs in section 4.5 (Appendix C), the standard URV method is used. This is because it 
has long been the preferred method used in water resource infrastructure projects and 
because, despite numerous attempts, it has only been possible to obtain O&M costs for 
the Nandoni and Berg River Dams, as the De Hoop Dam does not yet have actual O&M 
costs, and estimated costs were not forthcoming from the DWS. No estimated or actual 
O&M costs for Inyaka Dam (the oldest of the four cases) were forthcoming, despite the 
fact that the O&M costs should be budgeted for and spent on an ongoing long-term basis. 
 
Van Niekerk (2013) does not ask the question of how the URV works over the long term. If 
DSM could delay the building of a dam, it may be that subsequent dams to supply the 
same area may also be delayed, and then the last potential dam may never need to be 
built. That would result in a significant saving (especially as the last potential dam would 
likely be the least favourable and most expensive option – the best options having been 
already implemented). It is difficult to see how this consideration is factored into the 
decision-making process. The question, then, is whether this focus on URVs takes into 
consideration the long-term costs and benefits of different options. 
 
4.2.7 Links to multiple criteria analysis (MCA) 
Also known as multiple criteria decision-making or multiple criteria decision analysis, MCA 
is a formal process which identifies and ranks a set of options using multiple and 
sometimes conflicting measures where no single ideal solution exists, so that a decision 
can be reached (UK Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009; Mendoza 
& Martins, 2006). A MCA can assist decisions made by groups or single persons where 
various measures are weighted according to the decision-makers‘ preferences, so that a 
single solution can be reached. Different MCA methods exist and the choice of suitable 
methods is critical. MCAs may improve the validity of the selected solution by making the 
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process more transparent (Mendoza & Martins, 2006). The MCA methods include, but are 
not limited to, financial analysis, CBA and cost-effectiveness analysis (UK Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2009). URV calculations are one of the many 
methods used in MCAs. However, data availability and scope preclude the use of MCAs in 
this study. 
  
4.3 METHODS 
The data collection methods used in this chapter includes documentation (see section 
3.4.1) and archival records (see section 3.4.2). The data analysis method used in this 
chapter is the URV analysis (see section 3.4.4). In the data analysis, all the costs are 
adjusted to December 2012 rand values, using the CPI historical index (shown in 
Appendix B), so that inflation is a controlled variable (Statistics South Africa, 2015). The 
methodology and methods have been explained in more detail in Chapter Three. 
 
4.4 OVERVIEW OF THE SELECTED SCHEMES/DAMS 
Following the selection of case studies in Chapter Three, an overview of the cases is now 
presented in the order of their construction – the Inyaka Dam, the Nandoni Dam, the Berg 
River Dam, and finally the De Hoop Dam. 
 
4.4.1 Inyaka Dam 
Inyaka Dam (also spelt Injaka Dam) is located on the Marite River, a tributary of the Sabie 
River in Mpumalanga Province. Inyaka Dam was constructed as part of the first phase of 
the Sabie River Government Water Scheme (Figure 4.5).  
 
Figure 4.5: The Inyaka Dam over-spilling 
 
(Source: bigal-sa, 2006) 
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The purpose of Inyaka Dam is to supply water for domestic and irrigation uses in the 
surrounding areas. Inyaka Dam was constructed between 1995 and 2002. A summary of 
the main features of Inyaka Dam is shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Summary of the main features on Inyaka Dam 
Date of construction:   
(a) Year of completion 2002 
(b) Duration of construction (in years) 7 
(c) Public or private design DWA 
(d) Public or private construction Group 5 
Storage data and use   
Anticipated storage volume in m3 (Full Supply Capacity) 120,000,000 
Live storage volume in m3 (FSC) 123,700,000 
Volume of sediment in reservoir 0 
Planned users Irrigation / domestic 
MAR   
(a) Natural catchment (m3) 101,000,000 
(b) Developed catchment (m3) 78,947,000 
Yield   
(a) When planned (m3/annum) 41,200,000 
(b) Revised Not revised 
Further data  
Pre-development approvals White Paper 
Current use Primary water 
Catchment area (sq. km) 209 
Wall type 
Composite dam (concrete spillway / 
earthfill) 
Wall height (m) 53 
Spillway type Ogee 
Crest length (m) 550 
(Source: Adapted from DWAF, 1994) 
 
In 1994, a White Paper (DWAF, 1994) was issued by the Acting Director-General, Mr M 
Erasmus of the then Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, on ―Proposed Sabie River 
Government Water Scheme‖. In the introduction to the White Paper, it is stated: 
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To the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry 
I have the honour to present herewith my report on the proposed Sabie River 
Government Water Scheme (First Phase: Injaka Dam and Bosbokrand Transfer 
Pipeline), prepared in terms of Section 58 of the Water Act (Act 54 of 1956). 
 
The following costs, in Table 4.4 are detailed in the White Paper for the scheme, including 
the cost of the Inyaka Dam. The costs are shown in March 1994 prices, and then adjusted 
to December 2012 prices using the CPI (see section 3.4.4 and Appendix B). 
 
Table 4.4: Breakdown of the estimated cost of Inyaka Dam 
White Paper description 
Costs at Mar 1994 
(in rand values) 
Adjusted for Dec 2012 
(in rand values) 
Townships and works buildings 10,000,000 31,250,000 
Temporary roads 900,000 2,812,500 
Permanent access roads 1,000,000 3,125,000 
Excavation 15,930,000 49,781,250 
Embankment: fill 25,340,000 79,187,500 
Embankment: drainage 5,100,000 15,937,500 
Embankment slope protection: upstream 4,850,000 15,156,250 
Embankment slope protection: downstream 510,000 1,593,750 
Spillway and outlet works: mass concrete 81,600,000 255,000,000 
Spillway and outlet works:rReinforced concrete 11,290,000 35,281,250 
Mechanical and electrical works and instrumentation 9,260,000 28,937,500 
Reservoir cleaning 1,500,000 4,687,500 
Fencing of reservoir 100,000 312,500 
Gauging weir on Sabie River 2,262,000 7,068,750 
Construction site clearance and landscaping 4,011,000 12,534,375 
Miscellaneous items 500,000 1,562,500 
Permanent accommodation 1,500,000 4,687,500 
Contingencies 3,500,000 10,937,500 
Relocating existing road, bridge, power lines, water treatment 
works and pipelines 
41,727,000 130,396,875 
Environmental (social and natural) programmes, land values 
and compensation 
13,500,000 42,187,500 
Total (March 1997 prices): 234,380,000 732,437,500 
(Source: Adapted from DWAF, 1994) 
 
In July 2013, The DWS confirmed the actual cost of the Inyaka Dam, through the final 
payment certificate (No 76), dated 25 June 2002, to be R305 000 000 (VAT included). The 
adjusted cost of this amount in December 2012 prices is R536 971 831. Unfortunately, no 
breakdown of the actual costs can be found. This means that a detailed comparison of the 
69 
 
estimated and actual costs of Inyaka Dam is impossible. There is also a risk that some of 
the expected costs have not been factored in to the actual costs, and it is not then a 
comparison between like and like. 
 
In the construction completion report of Inyaka Dam (DWAF, 2003), it is reported that 
Group 5 Roads Africa (the company contracted to build Inyaka Dam) finished the work in 
December 2001, two years after the target date. The main reasons for the extended 
construction time were reported to be 250 days of work lost to rain, six metres of extra 
excavations needed for all concrete structures and then filled with concrete, and numerous 
changes of design throughout the construction period (DWAF, 2003). The extended 
construction time, design changes as well the costs of claims granted to the contractor 
were reported to be the main reasons for increase in the cost of the dam (DWAF, 2003). 
 
Not only has there been no breakdown of the capital costs, but it was only possible to 
secure limited information from the DWS regarding the O&M costs of the Inyaka Dam 
since its completion. This was despite the extensive efforts that were made to secure this 
information from the DWS. The O&M costs for the first six years of the operation of the 
dam (2003 to 2008) were not forthcoming; however, the following five years of O&M costs 
(2009 to 2013) were secured. The reported O&M data was not used in the Inyaka Dam 
URV calculation because it is an incomplete time series and, as shown in Table 4.5, it has 
high volatility between years. Instead, the O&M costs were calculated using the DWS‘s 
O&M guidelines, as equal to 4.25 per cent of the capital cost of the project (DWAF, 1996b 
& Appendix A).  
 
Table 4.5: Actual O&M costs of Inyaka Dam  
Year 
O&M cost in 
2012 rands (in 
million ZAR) 
Cost as a % of 
capital cost 
O&M Cost in 2012 rands 
calculated using DWS guidelines 
(in million ZAR) 
Cost as a % of 
guideline O&M 
costs 
2009 1.00 0.19 21 4.37 
2010 1.42 0.26 21 6.22 
2011 1.77 0.33 21 7.76 
2012 2.47 0.46 21 10.81 
2013 2.04 0.38 21 8.93 
(Source: Adapted from DWS, 2014b) 
 
It is indicated in Table 4.5 that the reported O&M costs are equal to eleven per cent (at 
most) of the O&M costs as calculated using the DWS guidelines. This indicates that either 
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the actual cost data may be incomplete or that DWS guidelines are unrealistic. Financial 
management requirements would dictate that such O&M costs should be captured before 
payments can be made (Public Finance Management Act, No 1 of 1999). The lack of a 
fulltime series of O&M cost data weakens the attempts of this study to understand the real 
costs and benefits of water supply options. 
 
4.4.2 Nandoni Dam 
Nandoni Dam (which was formerly known as Mutoti Dam) is located on the Luvuvhu River, 
which flows into the Limpopo River in Limpopo Province. Nandoni Dam, as shown in 
Figure 4.6, was constructed as part of the Luvuvhu River Government Water Scheme. 
 
Figure 4.6: The Nandoni Dam over-spilling 
 
(Source: Brits, 2008) 
 
Construction of Nandoni Dam began in 1999 and was completed in 2005, taking seven 
years to complete; however, it was expected to be completed in four years (DWAF, 
1998b). The purpose of Nandoni Dam is to supply water for domestic and irrigation uses in 
the surrounding areas. A summary of the main features of Nandoni Dam is shown in Table 
4.6. 
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Table 4.6: Summary of the main features of Nandoni Dam 
Date of construction:   
(a) Year of completion 2005 
(b) Duration of construction (in years) 7 
(c) Public or private design DWA 
(d) Public or private construction DWA 
Storage data and use   
Anticipated storage volume in m3 (FSC) 166,881,600 (2010 hydro survey) 
Live storage volume in m3 (FSC) 166.2 
Volume of sediment in reservoir 0.07%/a 
Planned users Irrigation / domestic 
MAR   
(a) Natural catchment (m3) Not given  
(b) Developed catchment (m3) 130,000,000 
Yield   
(a) When planned 93,400,000 
(b) Revised Not revised 
Further data  
Pre-development approvals White Paper 
Current use Primary water domestic 
Catchment area (sq. km) 1,380 
Wall type Earthfill and concrete gravity 
Wall height (m) 47 
Spillway type Ogee 
Crest length (m) 2,215 
(Source: Adapted from DWAF, 1998b) 
 
In 1998, a White Paper (DWAF, 1998b) was issued by the Director General of the then 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Mr AM Muller, on the ―Proposed Luvuvhu River 
Government Water Scheme‖. In the preamble to the White Paper, it is stated: 
 
To the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry: I have the honour to present herewith 
my report on the proposed Luvuvhu River Government Water Scheme to augment 
the water supplies to the Thohoyandou, Malamulele and Louis Trichardt regions of 
the Northern Province in terms of Section 58 of the Water Act (Act 54 of 1956). 
 
The following costs, in Table 4.7, are detailed in the White Paper for the whole scheme, 
including the cost of the Nandoni Dam. The costs are shown in March 1997 prices, and 
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then adjusted to December 2012 prices using the CPI inflation index (see section 3.4.4 
and Appendix B). 
 
Table 4.7: Breakdown of the estimated cost of Nandoni Dam 
White Paper description 
Costs at Mar 1997  
(in rand values) 
Adjusted for Dec 2012 
(In rand values) 
Nandoni Dam 222,000,000 540,145,985 
Relocation/infrastructure 74,200,000 180,535,280 
Development and training 3,000,000 7,299,270 
Subtotal (excluding VAT) 299,200,000 727,980,535 
VAT @ 14% 41,888,000 101,917,275 
Total (March 1997 prices): 341,088,000 829,897,810 
(Source: DWAF, 1998b) 
 
From costs that were provided by Johannes van Zyl (from Mr Louis Cronje) of the DWS in 
2013, Table 4.8 presents the actual costs (in November 2008 rand values , and adjusted 
to December 2012 using the CPI inflation index) for the Nandoni Dam (see section 3.4.4 
and Appendix B): 
 
Table 4.8: Breakdown of the actual cost of Nandoni Dam 
Description 
Costs at Nov 2008  
(in rand values) 
Adjusted to Dec 2012 
(in rand values) 
Administrative costs 94 931 500 115 770 122 
Housing and works buildings 17 575 200 21 433 171 
Roads and bridges 4 612 700 5 625 244 
Plant and equipment installation 1 363 800 1 663 171 
Maintenance and running costs 23 833 300 29 065 000 
Delays and waste 13 645 200 16 640 488 
Claims and servitudes 27 420 700 33 439 878 
Training 3 367 000 4 106 098 
Dam construction 233 107 500 284 277 439 
Relocation AP work done by DWAF 31 416 500 38 312 805 
Contracts 140 717 300 171 606 463 
Flood damage repairs  385 100 469 634 
Other costs 540 800 659 512 
Total (including VAT @ 14%): 592 916 600 723 069 024 
Additional costs (in September 2012 rands) 5 527 404 5 588 882 
Final Total (including VAT @ 14%): 598 444 004 728 657 906 
(Source: DWA, 2013) 
 
While Tables 4.7 and 4.8 both have a breakdown of costs, the line items are not directly 
comparable because the costs are broken down to different levels. Nevertheless, it is 
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apparent that the cost of the Nandoni Dam has decreased from an estimated R830 million 
to R729 million, or 88 per cent of the original estimated cost. 
 
While the actual cost of construction was less than expected cost, the O&M costs still need 
to be taken into account. Despite repeated efforts to get the actual O&M costs from the 
DWS, the only figures received (shown in Appendix C) indicated expenditure of the actual 
O&M costs received from the DWS for between 2007 and 2013 are just 0.29 per cent per 
annum on average of the actual cost of the dam (R729 million in December 2012 rand 
values). This is way below the DWS guidelines of about 4.25 per cent per annum (DWAF, 
1996b). Actual O&M costs using the DWS guidelines have also been calculated for 
comparison and are shown in Appendix C. There is no logical reason to suppose that the 
O&M costs for Nandoni Dam would be just seven per cent of the DWS guideline costs. No 
explanation of this was forthcoming from the DWS. The estimated O&M costs for Nandoni 
Dam calculated using the DWS guidelines are shown in Appendix C (DWAF, 199b). 
 
It is not sufficient only to look at the cost comparison. When Minister Kader Asmal (the 
then Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry) gave the Director General his approval to go 
ahead with the Luvuvhu River Government Water Scheme in 1998, it was on the basis of a 
return on investment from R830 million (converted to December 2012 rand values ). This 
cost was for the delivery of an annual yield of 93.4 million cubic metres of water to the 
Thohoyandou, Malamulele and Louis Trichardt (now Makhado) regions of the Northern 
Province (now Limpopo).  
 
Efforts to ascertain what the yield has been for each of the years that the dam has been 
operative, and to whom the water has gone, have proven to be unsuccessful. As will be 
discussed later, the fact that it was not possible to get data on the actual yield of the dam 
and importantly to whom the water has gone, is cause for concern. It would be reasonable 
to expect that water resource decision-makers would want to know whether what was 
projected to be the benefits have been realised, acknowledging that there may well be 
valid reasons for the changes.  
 
The equity and sustainability requirements in the National Water Act (RSA, 1998) have not 
been met in the Nandoni Dam case. The pipes delivering the water to the intended 
beneficiaries were defective, and ten years after the construction of the dam was 
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completed, the beneficiaries still do not have the promised water for basic human needs 
from the dam. However, the problems around the bulk water supply pipelines could not 
have been anticipated at the time of the proposal to the Minister (Molewa, 2014). 
 
The impact of the dam and scheme on the inflow stream requirements for the ecological 
Reserve was not estimated at the time of the decision being taken, but was later done 
(CSIR, 2001). The level of siltation in the dam has been recorded as a low 0.07 per cent 
per year (DWAF, 2008). 
 
4.4.3 Berg River Dam 
The Berg River Dam (which was formerly known as Skuifraam Dam) was constructed on 
the Berg River, near Franschoek in the Western Cape, as part of the Berg Water Project. 
The Berg River Dam, shown in Figure 4.7, was constructed between 2005 and 2010. 
 
Figure 4.7: The Berg River Dam nearing full capacity 
 
(Source: unknown) 
 
The purpose of the Berg River Dam is to augment Cape Town‘s domestic and industrial 
water supply (as well as the surrounding agricultural area), to ensure that, in the short and 
medium term, a water deficit doesn‘t occur (DWAF, 1998c). A summary of the main 
features of the Berg River Dam is shown in Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.9: Summary of the main features of Berg River Dam 
Date of Construction:   
(a) Year of completion 2008 
(b) Duration of construction (in years) 4 
(c) Public or private design Berg River Consultants 
(d) Public or private construction BRP Joint Venture 
Storage data and use   
Anticipated storage volume in m3 (FSC) 126,400,000 
Live storage volume in m3 (FSC) 122,000,000 
Volume of sediment in reservoir 0 
Planned users Municipality / industrial 
MAR   
(a) Natural catchment (m3) 139,000,000 
(b) Developed catchment (m3) 115,600,000 
Yield   
(a) When planned 56,000,000 m3/a 
(b) Revised Not revised 
Further data  
Pre-development approvals Decision to proceed  
Current use Municipality / industrial 
Catchment area (sq. km) 77.03 
Wall type Concrete face rockfall dam 
Wall height (m) 65 
Spillway type Side channel spillway 
Crest Length (m) 2,215 
(Source: Researcher‘s own construction) 
 
The site of the Berg River Dam (near Franschoek), was considered as a potential dam site 
as far back as 1904 (Legge, 2012). The site has been considered many times since then 
and was prominent in the 1996 Systems Analysis document, Water of the Western Cape 
(DWAF, 1996a), which listed all the potential alternatives to supply water to the City of 
Cape Town and the surrounding areas. The alternatives, shown in Table 4.2, were listed 
with their expected yield and costs compared to the cost of the Palmiet Phase 1 Scheme. 
The Berg River was listed as having an estimated yield of 56 million cubic metres and a 
cost of 2.4 times more than the Palmiet Phase 1 (which had an estimated yield of 
31 million cubic metres). In 1996, the public, through a public participation process 
(DWAF, 1996a), helped to select the Berg River Dam as one of the preferred infrastructure 
development options to provide water to the Cape Town area. 
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In 1998, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry released a document as part of the 
Skuifraam (now Berg River) Dam Feasibility Study, called Guidelines for Implementation 
(DWAF, 1998a). The report was originally drafted as a White Paper. However, when a 
White Paper was no longer required for dams due to a change in law brought about by the 
promulgation on the National Water Act (RSA, 1998), it became part of the Berg River 
Dam‘s Feasibility Study suite of papers.  
 
The following costs, in Table 4.10, are detailed in the Skuifraam Dam Feasibility 
Assessment: Guidelines for Implementation (DWAF, 1998a). The costs are shown in June 
1995 prices and then adjusted to December 2012 prices using the CPI inflation index (see 
section 3.4.4 and Appendix B). Text Box 4 refers to a possible error in Table 4.10.  
 
Table 4.10: Breakdown of the estimated cost of the Berg River Dam 
Record of implementation decisions - 
description 
Costs at June 1995 
(in rand values) 
Adjusted for Dec 2012 
(in rand values) 
Planning design and supervision 29 488 000 82 139 276 
Preliminary and general 66 918 000 186 401 114 
Preliminary works, access 383 210 1 067 437 
Accommodation 7 500 0000 20 891 365 
Fencing 30 400 84 680 
Excavation 15 313 000 42 654 596 
Solum preparation 735 000 2 047 354 
Drilling and grouting 1 837 000 5 116 992 
Embankment fill 58 931 000 164 153 203 
Concrete works 116 524 000 324 579 387 
Robertsvlei – drilling and grouting 4 015 000 11 183 844 
Mechanical items for dam 9 000 000 25 069 638 
Landscaping 6 196 000 17 259 053 
Miscellaneous items 10 237 000 28 515 320 
Contingencies 29 786 000 82 969 359 
Pump station 2m3/s 17 500 000 48 746 518 
Pipeline to Dasbos 2m3/s 10 200 000 28 412 256 
Increase to outlet works capacity 11 500 000 32 033 426 
Subtotal (excluding VAT) 396 183 610 1 103 324 819 
VAT @ 14% 50 000 000 139 275 766 
Environmental programmes, land costs and 
compensation 
23,500,000 65,459,610 
Total: 469,683,610 1,308,310,891 
(Source: DWAF, 1998a) 
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From costs that were provided by the Chief Director for the Western Cape in the DWS, in 
2013, the figures in Table 4.11, for the actual costs of the Berg River Dam are already in 
December 2012 rand values , and therefore there is no need for adjustment (Khan, 2013). 
 
Table 4.11: Breakdown of the actual cost of the Berg River Dam 
Description Costs at Dec 2012 (in rand values) 
Construction – dam 665 399 744 
Construction – supplement C21-A 306 638 494 
Construction – supplement C21-B 69 085 789 
Construction – supplement C21-C 148 310 487 
Construction – infrastructure 53 698 300 
Engineering – BRC 164 129 661 
Engineering – DWAF 3 508 961  
Engineering – others 17 900 827 
Administration – staff cost 53 144 888 
Administration – governance 6 731 731 
Administration – public relations 40 898 765 
Administration – facilities 25 352 621 
Administration – financial services 27 401 395 
Total: 1 582 201 661 
(Source: DWA, 2013) 
 
The fact that there are no line items in the tables of expected and actual costs that are 
directly comparable, shows the difficulty of trying to compare dams on a financial basis. 
This also begs the question, why the people in charge of keeping track of the costs of the 
dam have shown the costs in ways that are inconsistent and difficult to compare 
Nevertheless, the increase in capital costs from the expected cost of R1.31 billion at the 
planning stage to the actual cost of R1.58 billion represents an increase in costs of 20.93 
Text Box 4: Breakdown of estimated costs of the Berg River Dam 
 
There may be an error in Table 4.10, regarding the White Paper costs of the Berg River Dam. In 1995 Rands, 
VAT at 14% is given as R50 million. However, R50 million is equal to the 14% (VAT) on an amount of 
R357 142 857 (R50 million/0.14), and not the R396 183 610 (the subtotal of all the line items added together). 
The R50 million is equal to a VAT rate of 12.623%. It is assumed that the VAT figure was not a mistake, and 
is correct, in that some of the line items did not incur VAT. It is not apparent from the figures, and would have 
to have related to sub-components in the figures shown. 
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per cent. Although significant, it is certainly better than in the case of De Hoop Dam 
(73.69% increase), raising the question of why this should be so. Next, the O&M costs 
need to be added.  
 
The Berg River Dam estimated O&M costs are calculated using the DWS guidelines and 
are shown in Appendix A (DWAF, 1996b). The actual O&M costs (shown in Appendix C) 
received from the DWS consist of two categories – the first is the compensation of 
employees, and the second is goods and services. Although these do not align with the 
guidelines for the costs (which breaks the O&M costs down into ‗civil works‘ and 
‗mechanical and electrical‘ components and are also calculated in Appendix C), the total 
average actual costs per annum are 0.28 per cent of the cost of the dam in December 
2012 rand values . This is, once again, way below the guidelines of 4.25 per cent for such 
costs anticipated by DWS (DWAF, 1996b and Appendix A). Once again, no explanation 
was forthcoming form the DWS. 
 
As with the Nandoni Dam case, it is not enough to look only at the cost comparison. When 
Minister Ronnie Kasrils (of the then Water Affairs and Forestry) gave his approval for the 
Berg Water Project to go ahead in 2001, he did so on the basis that the return on 
investment (on the cost of R1.31 million in December 2012 rand values) would be an 
annual yield of 57 million cubic metres of water for the City of Cape Town and surrounding 
areas. However, this is uncertain; for example, Van Niekerk (2013) found that in other IBT 
schemes that he studied retrospectively, there was little correlation between the amount of 
water that was expected to be transferred in the planning phase, and that which was 
actually transferred. 
 
It should be noted that the Berg River Dam project was the first dam project in South Africa 
where specific provision was made to clear IAPs in the catchment of the dam. A budget of 
R21 million has been spent on the catchment (0.13% of the actual costs of the dam), 
although the Working for Water Programme would have put in a budget itself over the 
years. Furthermore, the Berg River Dam project was possibly the first dam project in South 
Africa where the design of the dam was changed to accommodate environmental water 
flows for the ecological Reserve (Pienaar & King, 2011).  
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4.4.4 De Hoop Dam 
De Hoop Dam, shown in Figure 4.8, is on the Steelpoort River in the south-eastern part of 
Limpopo Province. The construction is finished, but approximately R50 million will be spent 
for site rehabilitation, security fencing and dam monitoring instrumentation, and will be 
completed in 2015 (R. Martin, personal communication, 9 April 2014). The construction of 
De Hoop Dam is Phase 2A of the Olifants River Water Resources Development Project 
(ORWRDP). The purpose of De Hoop Dam is also to supply water for domestic and 
industrial (mining) uses in the surrounding areas. 
  
In 2003, President Thabo Mbeki announced during his opening of Parliament address that 
there was to be a dam constructed in the Olifants River Catchment to ensure adequate 
water supply for anticipated developments in the area. As this was the first that the then 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry had heard of a proposed dam in this area, the 
implementation of the ORWRDP was placed on the fast track by Cabinet (DWAF, 2006). A 
summary of the main features of De Hoop Dam is shown in Table 4.12. 
 
Figure 4.8: The De Hoop Dam nearing completion 
 
(Source: Labuschagne, 2013) 
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Table 4.12: Summary of the main features of De Hoop Dam 
Date of Construction:   
(a) Year of completion 2014 
(b) Duration of construction (in years) 8 
(c) Public or private design DWA 
(d) Public or private construction DWA 
Storage Data and Use   
Anticipated storage volume in m3 (FSC) 347,400,000 (ORWRDP HR) 
Live storage volume in m3 (FSC) 0 
Volume of sediment in reservoir 0 
Planned users Domestic / industrial 
Mean annual runoff (MAR)   
(a) Natural catchment (m3) 134,000,000 (ORWRDP Hydro Report) 
(b) Developed catchment (m3) 116,000,000 (Info brochure) 
Yield   
(a) When planned 80,000,000 m3/a (RID) 
(b) Revised 64,000,000 revised 
Further Data  
Pre-development approvals 
Record of implementation decisions 
S110 
Current use None - pipelines are still being installed. 
Catchment area (sq. km) 2,865 
Wall type RCC gravity 
Wall height (m) 88 
Spillway type Uncontrolled stepped central ogee 
Crest length (m) 1,015 
(Source: Researcher‘s own construction) 
 
The following costs, in Table 4.13, are found in the ORWRDP Phase 2A (Dam on the 
Steelpoort River at De Hoop): Record of Implementation Decisions (DWAF, 2006). The 
costs are shown in June 2005 prices and then adjusted to December 2012 prices (see 
section 3.3.4). 
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Table 4.13: Breakdown of the estimated cost of De Hoop Dam 
Description 
Costs at June 2005 
(in rand values) 
Adjusted for Dec 2012 
(in rand values) 
Net construction costs 632,800,000 1,002,852,615 
Contingency provision 85,500,000 135,499,208 
VAT (14%) 100,600,000 159,429,477 
Subtotal 818,900,000 1,297,781,300 
Other Costs:   
Graves & archaeological work 3,000,000 4,754,358 
Valuator, survey & land acquisition 50,000,000 79,239,303 
Public participation consultant 5,000,000 7,923,930 
Relocation of utilities (Eskom & utilities) 10,000,000 15,847,861 
Relocation of provincial road R555 96,000,000 152,139,461 
Professional fees   
(a) Environmental Control Officer / EMC 3,000,000 4,754,358 
(b) Site supervision including site transport 65,000,000 103,011,094 
(c) Review panel 1,000,000 1,584,786 
(d) Disputes Review Board 5,000,000 7,923,930 
(e) Pre-qualification 300,000 475,436 
(f) Implementation financing 1,500,000 2,377,179 
(g) Consultant planning 300,000 475,436 
(h) Road consultant (fees & disbursements) 6,300,000 9,984,152 
Trial quarry 1,000,000 1,584,786 
Subtotal (excluding VAT) 247,400,000 392,076,070 
VAT @ 14% 34,600,000 54,833,597 
Total other costs 282,000,000 446,909,667 
Construction costs 818,900,000 1,297,781,300 
Total costs 1,100,900,000 1,744,960,967 
(Source: Researcher‘s own construction) 
 
The De Hoop Dam is still under final construction. The actual cost of the dam has been 
extrapolated from the costs to date that were provided by the De Hoop Dam Project 
Manager in the DWS (Martin, 2014). The costs are shown in November 2014 prices and 
have been converted into December 2012 prices, so as to be comparable with the other 
dams. The actual cost of the De Hoop Dam is forecast to be R3.370 billion in November 
2014 rand values , or R3.031 billion in December 2012 rand values . This is a 74 per cent 
increase, when compared to the expected costs of R1.745 billion (in December 2012 rand 
values). 
 
In addition to the increase in the costs, a decrease in the benefits (estimated water yield) 
occurred. In the record of implementation decisions (RID) report for De Hoop Dam, the 
yield was originally said to be 80 million cubic metres per annum (DWAF, 2006b). In 2009 
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the DWS commissioned the Olifants Reconciliation Strategy to study the management and 
infrastructure options to meet the growing water demand in the catchment up to 2030, as 
well as to recalculate the yields of the De Hoop and Flag Boshielo Dams (DWA, 2010). 
The De Hoop Dam yield was recalculated as 64 million cubic metres per annum. This 
represents a twenty per cent decrease in the planned benefits. The reasons given for this 
significant change were new information, better water-use information (upstream irrigation 
use) and updated hydrology (DWA, 2010). In summary, DWS was anticipating getting an 
annual yield of 80 million cubic metres per annum for R1.745 billion, but now anticipate 
getting 64 million cubic metres per annum for R3.031 billion – in essence, a 217 per cent 
increase in the cost per volume.  
 
From the interviews conducted with senior managers within the DWS (see Chapter 6), 
some of the reasons for the significant increases in the cost of the De Hoop Dam were the 
lack of infrastructure development capacity at the time (owing to competing demand for the 
2010 World Cup infrastructure), the economic downturn of 2008 stifling the development of 
mining operations (which were meant to contribute towards the budget), the need for 
greater foundations than had been anticipated, a prolonged strike by construction workers, 
and an unanticipated level of rainfall. Another factor mentioned was the slow rate of work 
and pouring concrete, due partially to those people employed on contracts (under section 
76 of the National Water Act) outside the provisions of the Public Service Act 103 of 1994. 
These employees are limited to actual work relating to construction of a DWS 
infrastructure project. There were times, however, when the speed of pouring concrete 
was exceptionally fast (Water and Sanitation Africa, 2012; Van Niekerk, 2012) and in the 
interviews it was questioned whether progress was deliberately slowed down to have work 
for those responsible for the construction. 
 
For the URV calculations, the O&M costs need to be added to these construction costs. 
Since the De Hoop Dam has not started operating yet, there are no actual O&M costs, so 
the DWS O&M guidelines are used for both the estimated and actual O&M costs (DWAF, 
1996b and Appendix A). The O&M costs for the De Hoop Dam are shown in Appendix C. 
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4.5 SUMMARY OF DATA 
A summary of the data necessary to calculate the URVs of the four selected schemes (the 
Inyaka, Nandoni, Berg River and De Hoop dams) is shown in Table 4.15. The data shown 
in Table 4.15 includes the estimated and actual costs of construction of each dam, as well 
as the MAR and yield of each dam.  
 
The estimated and actual costs are shown with a time dimension aspect, in two columns. 
The first shows the cost data in the year the costs were occurred. The second shows the 
costs when they have been brought to 2012 rand values to eliminate inflation bias so that 
the costs of the dams may be compared equally.  
 
Inflationary differences are removed by converting the estimated costs (from a1 to a2, in 
Table 4.15) and actual costs (from b1 to b2, in Table 4.15) to December 2012 rand values. 
This is done using the CPI headline index (Statistics South Africa, 2015) as the guideline 
document on inflation in South Africa over the past 50 years (shown in Appendix B). The 
formula to convert a cost from its original time period to the chosen time period (in this 
case December 2012, which is the base year, in other words equal to 100) is: cost in year 
it occurred divided by the CPI of that year times the CPI of December 2012. This can also 
be written as: December 2012 Cost = Cost in year A / CPI in year A x December 2012 
CPI.  
 
An example of this is converting the estimated cost of the De Hoop Dam to December 
2012 rand values: Cost is R 1 101 million in June 2005 rand values and the CPI for June 
2005 is 63.1. CPI in December 2012 is 100. Therefore cost of the De Hoop dam in 
December 2012 rand values is: R 1 101/63.1*100 = R 1 745 million. 
 
All the cost data in Table 4.15, except for the actual cost of the Berg River Dam, are from 
the records of the DWS. The actual cost of the Berg River Dam is from the record of the 
Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA), which is a state-owned entity the DWS 
contracted to build the Berg River Dam. Part of the uncertainty of the costs is that there 
are other costs that may not be quantified, for example the cost to the DWS of supervising 
the TCTA.  
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Table 4.15: Summary of the data for the calculation of URVs 
 
Berg River Dam De Hoop Dam Inyaka Dam Nandoni Dam 
Estimated Costs (in Million ZAR) and relevant dates 
(a)  At planning 
stage 469.68 
June 
1995 1,100.90 
June 
2005 234.38 
March 
1994 341.09 
March 
1997 
(a) Converted to 
2012 rands 1,308.31 
Dec 
2012 1,744.69 
Dec 
2012 732.44 
Dec 
2012 829.90 
Dec 
2012 
Actual Costs (in Million ZAR) and relevant dates 
(b) At the end of 
construction 1,582.20 
Dec 
2012 3,370.00 
Nov 
2014 305.00 
June 
2002 598.44 
Nov 
2008 
(b) Converted to 
2012 rands 1,582.20 
Dec 
2012 3,030.58 
Dec 
2012 536.97 
Dec 
2012 728.66 
Dec 
2012 
MAR  (Million m3/a) 
115.60 116.00 78.95 130.00 
Yield (Million m3/a) 56.00 64.00 41.20 93.40 
 (Source: Researcher‘s own construction) 
 
To understand the data in Table 4.15, the quality of the sources of the data is relevant. In 
Table 4.16 the sources of the data are indicated, and whether or not a breakdown of the 
costs is available. A lack of official published documents as the source of data must 
diminish confidence in its integrity. Similarly, a lack of a breakdown of the costs would 
inhibit the confidence of the analysis. It has not been possible to clarify whether the data 
collected has been audited by the Auditor General.  
 
Table 4.16: Integrity of data  
Dam Cost Data Source Breakdown of costs 
Inyaka Dam Estimated capital costs DWS White Paper Yes - Partial 
  Actual capital costs Single DWS total No 
 O&M costs Incomplete DWS time series No 
Nandoni Dam Estimated capital costs DWS White Paper No 
  Actual capital costs Detailed DWS breakdown Yes 
 O&M costs DWS time series No 
Berg River Dam Estimated capital costs DWS RID report Partial 
  Actual capital costs Long-term cost plan Partial 
 O&M costs DWS time series Partial 
De Hoop Dam Estimated capital costs DWS RID report Partial 
  Actual capital costs Single DWS total No 
 O&M costs Not applicable n/a 
(Source: Researcher‘s own construction) 
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4.6 UNIT REFERENCE VALUE (URV) ANALYSIS OF SELECTED DAMS 
As discussed under 3.4.4 in Chapter Three, URVs are a type of CBA used in water 
infrastructure decision-making. URVs show the infrastructure cost per cubic metre of 
water. For example, a URV of one indicates that the cost of delivering a cubic metre of 
water is one rand. While URVs can be calculated for an entire scheme, standard practice 
is to calculate the URV at the point where the water leaves the dam (abstraction point). 
The formula used for calculating URVs is shown in Figure 3.2 and the necessary 
assumptions for the calculations are listed under 3.4.4 in Chapter Three. 
 
From these assumptions and using the yields, estimated and actual construction and O&M 
costs (in December 2012 rand values) and the DWS document, Guidelines for the 
economic life, and annual operational and maintenance costs (DWAF, 1996b & Appendix 
A), the expected and actual URVs for the four chosen dams can be calculated. These 
URVs are shown in Table 4.17. The Nandoni and Berg River Dam have two actual URV 
calculations each to shown the difference between the O&M costs from the available DWS 
data (Appendix C) and the DWS guidelines (DWAF, 1996b, Appendix A). The De Hoop 
Dam has two calculations to show the actual difference in the URV calculation that 
resulted from the estimated yield decreasing twenty per cent between planning (De Hoop 
Dam URV 2) and building the dam (De Hoop Dam URV 1). 
 
The reason that the ―difference as a %‖ calculations are the same for the different discount 
rates (six, eight and ten per cent in Table 4.17) for calculations using the DWS guidelines 
to calculate O&M costs, is because the change (the fixed discount rate) in the costs and 
yield is constant. What is important is the level of difference shown, for example, the De 
Hoop Dam has a difference of 73.71 per cent which is more than double that of any of the 
other dams.  
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Table 4.17: URVs of the estimated and actual costs of the selected dams 
Summary of estimated and actual URV calculations 
  Discount rate 6% 8% 10%   
  
 
(in Rands/m3)   
Inyaka Dam URV: estimated 1.43 1.54 1.64   
  URV: actual 1.05 1.13 1.21   
  Difference -0.38 -0.41 -0.44   
  Difference as a % -26.69%   
  
    
  
Nandoni Dam URV: estimated 0.71 0.77 0.82   
  
    
  
  URV: actual 1 (based on guidelines) 0.63 0.67 0.72   
  Difference -0.09 -0.09 -0.10   
  Difference as a % -12.20%   
  
    
  
  URV: actual 2 (based on DWS data) 0.43 0.50 0.57   
  Difference -0.29 -0.27 -0.26   
  Difference as a % -40.35% -35.23% -31.22%   
  
    
  
Berg River Dam URV: estimated 2.11 2.34 2.56   
  
    
  
  URV: actual 1 (based on guidelines) 2.55 2.82 3.10   
  Difference 0.44 0.49 0.54   
  Difference as a % 20.93%   
  
    
  
  URV: actual 2 (based on DWS data) 1.66 2.00 2.33   
  Difference -0.44 -0.33 -0.23   
  Difference as a % -21.05% -14.30% -8.97%   
  
    
  
De Hoop Dam 1 URV: estimated* 2.04 2.18 2.32   
  URV: actual 3.55 3.79 4.02   
  Difference 1.51 1.61 1.71   
  Difference as a % 73.71%   
  
    
  
De Hoop Dam 2 URV: estimated* 1.69 1.80 1.91   
  URV: actual 2.93 3.13 3.32   
  Difference 1.24 1.33 1.41   
  Difference as a % 73.71%   
  
    
  
*De Hoop 1 is based on a yield of 66 million m
3
 and De Hoop 2 on a yield of 80 million m
3
 
 (Source: Researcher‘s own construction) 
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What Table 4.17 reveals is that there is a great deal of variation between and within the 
URVs of the four dams. The calculations of the URVs for both the Inyaka and Nandoni 
dams show that the actual URV was lower than the estimated URV. Inyaka has a 
difference between the estimated and actual URVs of negative 26.69 per cent. The 
Nandoni Dam, meanwhile, has a difference of negative 12.20 per cent if the DWS 
guidelines are followed for O&M costs, but a much larger difference (negative 35.23 per 
cent at an eight per cent discount rate) if the DWS O&M data is used. These variations 
occur because the DWS O&M data is not consistent from year to year and because the 
O&M costs from the DWS guidelines are significantly more than from the data. For the 
same reasons, the Berg River Dam also has large differences between the calculations 
using the guidelines (20.93 per cent) and the DWS data (negative 14.30 per cent at an 
eight per cent discount rate). The big difference between the actual URV calculations for 
the Berg River Dam (R0.82 per cubic metre) when compared to the Nandoni Dam (R0.17 
per cubic metre), is possibly due to the Berg River Dam‘s O&M costs (from DWS) being 
higher compared to the capital cost, than the same comparison for the Nandoni Dam. 
 
Furthermore, the De Hoop Dam calculations show, firstly, that the dam has the highest 
difference between estimated and actual URVs and secondly, that the twenty per cent 
decrease in estimated yield has increased the URV calculations in real terms by 28 cents 
a cubic metre at an eight per cent discount rate (from R1.33 to R1.61). 
 
The URVs show that a cubic metre of water, in December 2012 rand values, using actual 
costs data and an eight per cent discount rate, is least expensive from the Nandoni Dam 
(between R0.50 and R0.67) and most expensive from the De Hoop Dam (initially R3.13 
and then up to R3.79 when the yield was recalculated), even though it was the most recent 
of the dams to be built, showing the need for institutional learning in the DWS. Inyaka Dam 
(R1.12) and Berg River Dams (between R2.00 and R2.82) were between the extremes. In 
the Nandoni and Berg River Dam cases the ranges are due to the differences between 
DWS data and guideline based O&M costs. 
 
4.7 FURTHER ISSUES RELATING TO THE SELECTED DAMS AND THEIR URVS 
In terms of the broader purpose of this study – water supply development decision-making 
in South Africa, and specifically the comparison of between the costs and benefits of dams 
and catchment management options – the pertinent comparison would not just be the cost 
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of the dam, per se, but the cost of the full scheme. It would appear that here the costs may 
be more difficult to predict, and in fact the accuracy of the opportunity costs may be 
different than those just for the dam. For example, the Nandoni White Paper (DWAF, 
1998b) put the estimate of the cost of development and training at R3 million (adjusted to 
R7.3 million in December 2012 rand values), whereas the actual expenditure for this has 
been R4.1 million – 56.2 per cent of the expected cost. An additional complication, for 
example, in the Nandoni Dam case is that other parts of the scheme, such as the 
pipelines, have not yet been completed nearly ten years after the dam was built – and thus 
the full benefits have not yet materialised (Molewa, 2014). 
 
The creation of jobs in the construction and maintenance of dams is an important 
consideration that did not feature in the Nandoni White Paper or official policies of the then 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, but have nevertheless been extremely valuable 
in a country with such high unemployment and poverty. It is now a major focus in the 
National Development Plan (2012), and can be expected to be monitored and reported 
upon by the Department. 
 
Furthermore, it does not appear that there were there any real trade-offs offered to the 
Minister in the White Paper of the Nandoni Dam, as alternatives to building the dam. The 
Luvuvhu River Dam Feasibility Study (DWAF, 1997) resulted in a systems analysis of the 
Luvuvhu River that showed a number of alternative dam sites and their suitability; 
however, the feasibility study did not look at other non-dam alternatives. It is not clear if 
there were viable non-dam options in the area, which could have met the supply and 
demand needs of those being served (including options for DSM and unaccounted-for 
water). It was also not clear if there were any other existing dams on the Luvuvhu River 
that could absorb additional water flow, especially during low-flow periods. The DWS Dam 
Safety Office‘s List of registered Dams (DWA, 2011) shows that there are four other dams 
on the Luvuvhu River, all of which were built before the Nandoni Dam and one of them, the 
Albasini Dam, is a Category Three dam. 
 
In the case of Nandoni Dam, it is therefore not possible to look at the costs of the full 
scheme, and the projected benefits, and to make a comparison with catchment 
management options that might have been considered at the time. However, in terms of 
the costs of the dam itself, it would appear that the costs that the then Director General 
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presented to the then Minister were a significant underestimation, and did not afford the 
Minister the opportunity to make a sufficiently informed decision.  
 
The wisdom of delaying the building of dams is not only the deferring of costs, but the fact 
that one might be able to remove the last dam(s) from the proposed development list in a 
catchment entirely, through investing in catchment management and other interventions 
(for example, DSM). The potential savings of not having to build those final dams are 
substantial – more so because inevitably they are the most expensive, and least 
favourable, dam options.  
 
The knock-on costs of a dam should be part of the decision-making for comparison 
purposes. For example, the building of the Berg River Dam did lead to a need for a further 
water-purification plant, which cost a further R1 billion. If IAPs had been cleared in 
catchments and riparian zones, it is not clear whether further purification would have been 
necessary, although it possibly would have been. However, for DSM and unaccounted-for 
water, there would not have been a need for water purification, making the comparison so 
much more favourable for that option. 
 
Lastly, it is apparent from the calculations that a limitation of URVs is that they do not 
adequately take the long-term costs and benefits of different options into consideration, 
primarily because water supply does not grow with interest and therefore, in reality, cannot 
be discounted to a present value (Mullins et al., 2007). 
 
4.8 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The point must be raised that decision-makers act on the basis of available information, 
and it is disconcerting to discover that a retrospective analysis of these costs and benefits 
is so difficult to uncover. It would be logical to think that the DWS, the National Treasury 
and the Auditor General would want well-documented analyses of decisions to build dams, 
and auditing of the cost-effectiveness of these decisions. Relevant to this is that political 
decision-makers are asked for a decision on a dam or scheme, based on plans that may 
later change (and where decision-making is delegated to officials).  
 
Furthermore, it is difficult to access cost data for dams in South Africa (estimated cost data 
is easier to find than actual cost data). This is especially so for estimated cost data for 
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dams planned during the 1990s (such as Inyaka Dam and Nandoni Dam), when plans 
known as White Papers were required and published by the Government before 
permission to construct the dam was granted. Since after the Nandoni White Paper was 
published in 1998, the National Water Act (36 of 1998) was promulgated, and White 
Papers have been replaced by RID reports. Even the new RID reports are not readily 
accessible. The RID report for the Berg River Dam (that was originally drafted as a White 
Paper) and called the ‗Guidelines for Implementation‘ was not held by the DWS or the 
TCTA (the state-opened entity that built the dam), but rather it was found in the archives of 
an engineering firm that was involved in the project (E. Van Der Berg, personal 
communication, 22 August 2013). The difficulty in securing data, despite the willingness of 
officials in DWS to assist, is a problem that will continue to compromise the assessments 
of decisions made in the public‘s interests. This underlines a lack of acceptable archiving 
and curation within the DWS. 
 
Another issue is that there is no consistent way of displaying costs (even for White 
Papers), and this makes it harder to know if the same costs are being shown when 
comparing the estimated and actual costs of a dam. This then makes the comparison of 
estimated and actual costs more complicated and uncertain. Added to this is the 
inconsistent availability of O&M cost data, especially considering how difficult this data was 
to get hold of. Obtaining O&M data for the three dams (not including De Hoop Dam as it 
has not yet incurred these costs) took nearly two years of repeatedly contacting the DWS 
head and regional offices. Considering that O&M costs are yearly governmental 
expenditures that are ratified by National Treasury, they should be readily available. 
 
Added to the inconsistent availability of O&M cost data, there is a lack of information 
regarding the actual annual yield (the benefits) from dams in South Africa. Although the 
assurance of supply (having the water available) is a key consideration, dams are built on 
the promise of yield. While weekly reporting of the water levels in large dams across the 
country does occur, there is little evidence of actual yield justifying decisions. 
 
4.9 CONCLUSIONS 
The first objective of this study is to calculate and evaluate the variation between 
estimated and actual URVs for a selection of water supply infrastructure schemes. To 
achieve this objective an understanding of cost-benefits analyses within a water supply 
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development context was presented. Then the estimated and actual URVs for four case 
study dams (the Inyaka, Nandoni, Berg River and De Hoop dams) were analysed and 
discussed. 
 
A first important conclusion from this chapter is the difficulty that was experienced in 
obtaining water resources data from the DWS. Obtaining expected and actual construction 
costs as well as O&M costs for the four cases from the DWS turned out to be time-
consuming and challenging as data was often not readily available, or, in the case of the 
Inyaka Dam‘s O&M costs, incomplete. Furthermore, there is uncertainty that not all 
incurred costs were reflected in the actual costs. Whether this is true, and whether it would 
have further increased the actual costs, can only be speculated upon. 
 
A second important conclusion is that there is considerable variation between the 
estimated costs (at the time that the decision to build the dams was taken) and the actual 
costs of building the dams. In addition to the capital costs the URV analysis used DWS 
O&M guidelines costs in all four cases and additional DWS O&M cost data in the Nandoni 
and Berg cases. The unit reference value (URV) analyses, using an eight per cent 
discount rate, revealed that both Inyaka (27 per cent less expensive than planned) and 
Nandoni (twelve per cent less expensive when O&M guideline costs were used; or 35 per 
cent less expensive when available O&M data costs were used) cases the actual cost was 
less than expected. In the Berg River case, the actual cost was 21 per cent more than 
expected when O&M guideline costs were used; but fourteen per cent less than expected 
when available O&M data costs were used. This was possibly due to big difference 
between the O&M costs from the guidelines and the data. The De Hoop Dam URV 
calculation was the highest by a long way (74 per cent more expensive than estimated); 
however this was further exacerbated in real terms by an eighteen per cent decrease in 
estimated yield. 
 
A third conclusion is that the URV analysis is a limited tool in that it does not adequately 
take the long-term costs and benefits of different options into consideration. The clearest 
example of this limitation is that yield does not grow with interest and therefore, in reality, 
cannot be discounted to a present value. Nevertheless it was found that, at an eight per 
cent discount rate, and in December 2012 rand values, the actual cost of water is getting 
more expensive in real terms. Unit reference values estimated that water cost per cubic 
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metre is: R1.13 from Inyaka Dam, R0.50 to R0.67 from Nandoni Dam, R2.00 to R2.82 
from Berg River Dam and R3.79 from the De Hoop Dam. 
 
The final conclusion of this chapter is that externalities were, at best, a limited 
consideration in the costs of the four cases. Other than for the Berg River Dam, none of 
the estimates included an analysis of the catchment management alternatives (or 
supplementary action). None of the proposals to the relevant Minister included a budget 
for a concurrent DSM intervention, although this was mentioned in the case of the Berg 
River Dam. None of the proposals looked at the conservation of supply in terms of aspects 
such as leaks, aging distribution infrastructure and other aspects of unaccounted-for water. 
 
In the following chapter (Chapter Five), an analysis of the costs and effect of IAP 
management, in the catchments of the dams analysed in this chapter, is presented. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AN ANALYSIS OF INVASIVE ALIEN PLANT (IAP) MANAGEMENT AS A 
WATER SUPPLY OPTION IN SELECTED CATCHMENTS  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The second objective of this study is to analyse the costs and benefits of IAP management 
as a water supply option. The costs and water benefits of IAP management, as a 
component of water conservation and enhancement of existing supplies of water, are 
analysed in this chapter. Although only IAP management is considered, other options are 
mentioned so as to provide a broader context for the multiple approaches needed in water 
supply optimisation. The catchments of the four dams analysed in Chapter Four are the 
case studies for the analysis. 
 
Systematic review of past decisions (and decision-making processes) and their associated 
actual costs and benefits can assist future decision-making and reduce cost escalation by 
building institutional knowledge. Opportunity costs associated with the estimated and 
actual costs of building a dam and other infrastructure projects should be included in such 
reviews. Opportunity costs estimate the costs of alternatives that were forgone in the 
decision to build infrastructure, in other words, other potential interventions that could have 
been considered by the decision-makers at the time of the decision.  
 
The Minister of Water and Sanitation is identified in the National Water Act 36 of 1998 as 
the principal water resource decision-maker. The Minister is supported in decision-making 
by officials in the DWS. The National Treasury, Department of Environmental Affairs, 
Department of Economic Development and the relevant provincial government(s) also 
contribute to decision-making processes. Although the Minister of Water and Sanitation 
has to submit the recommendations to the Cabinet for final approval, the principal decision 
will have been taken by the Minister. This would include opportunity cost considerations. 
 
Decisions about water supply systems are complex and are best approached by 
evaluating multiple options rather than just a single option. If infrastructure development is 
implemented alongside other options, it could increase and optimise the water-mix (a 
combination of demand and supply options) to meet the national requirements for water.  
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The second National Water Resources Strategy (DWA, 2013b) states that the water-mix 
needs to be diversified, and lists a number of possible additional options, such as 
desalination and water re-use. A further additional option is IAP clearing (Le Maitre et al., 
2009). It is possible for infrastructure decisions to include a directive for associated IAP 
clearing as was tested when the Berg River Dam was built (Geland et al., 2008). Inclusion 
of water-mix options can contribute to the vision of equity and sustainability that the 
National Water Act (36 of 1998) is based upon, by ensuring that any gaps between the 
demand and supply of water are managed and ultimately reduced to ensure a healthy 
water balance while also creating job opportunities (DWA, 2013b). A benefit from 
diversifying the water-mix may be creating jobs, which is imperative in South Africa, with 
its high unemployment and low skill levels (Statistics South Africa, 2014). 
 
In South Africa, there are chronic imbalances in terms of poverty, unemployment and 
inequity (National Development Plan, 2013). The relative benefits for the poor, particularly 
in terms of temporary and long-term employment opportunities, would have been a factor 
when the then Minister (of Water Affairs and Forestry) and the senior departmental officials 
weighed up alternatives for water supply enhancement options. It is argued here that 
decision-makers considering a proposal for the augmentation of water supply through 
infrastructure development (for example, dams and/or inter-basin transfers), should 
consider other options as well. These other options are, according to the second National 
Water Resources Strategy (DWA, 2013b), part of a water-mix designed to meet the 
increasing water needs in a sustainable and cost-effective manner. Maintaining this 
diversity of options for securing the limited, remaining supply is a necessity, as surface 
water infrastructure development will be insufficient to meet the growing water needs in 
South Africa (DWA, 2013b).  
 
A number of other water-mix options to enhance supply, for example groundwater 
management, desalination and IAP management, are presented in the National Water 
Resources Strategy 2 (DWA, 2013b) and in the Water for Growth and Development 
Framework: Volume 7 and its appendices (DWAF, 2009a; Le Maitre et al., 2009). These 
water supply enhancement options are discussed under 5.3 to give a broader context to 
IAP management, which is the focus of this chapter. A discussion of IAP management is 
presented under Section 5.2. 
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5.2 INVASIVE ALIEN PLANT (IAP) MANAGEMENT IN CATCHMENTS  
In this chapter, a specific catchment management-based alternative, namely the control of 
IAPs, is considered for the catchments of the four dams that were analysed in Chapter 
Four. The impact of IAPs on water availability in South Africa is an important consideration 
for any catchment with water infrastructure development plans because IAP management 
is a relatively inexpensive option to ensure that low flows in rivers are sustained (Le Maitre 
et al., 2002; Van Wilgen et al., 1997); it can lessen the impacts of soil erosion and fires (Le 
Maitre et al., 2002; Euston-Brown, 2000, Le Maitre et al., 1996); it increases yield (Marais 
& Wannenburgh, 2008; Le Maitre & Gorgens, 2003); the potential costs of not clearing 
IAPs are extremely high (Marais & Wannenburgh, 2008; Le Maitre et al., 2002); and it 
derives social benefits from creating jobs (Le Maitre et al., 2002).  
 
The Jan Dissels River in Clanwilliam (in the Western Cape), shown before and after the 
clearing of black wattles (Acacia mearnsii) and other invasive species by the Working for 
Water programme (WfW) in Figure 5.1, is an example of these benefits. Although no 
actual measurements were done, WfW estimates suggest that MAR would have been 
increased by at least 3 000 cubic metres per hectare per annum (C. Marais, personal 
communication, 3 April 2015), from this clearing. Furthermore, in-stream flow requirements 
in terms of the National Water Act (RSA, 1998) would have been enhanced and jobs 
created. To better understand the benefits of IAP management, the impact of IAPs and the 
use of IAP management as a catchment-based addition to the water-mix are now 
discussed.  
(Source: a & b - Zimmermann, 2014) 
 
Figure 5.1: The Jan Dissels River in a) 2000 (left) and b) 2013 (right) 
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5.2.1 The impact of IAPs on water in South Africa 
Besides their impacts on agriculture, forestry and human health, biological 
invasions are also widely recognised as the second-largest global threat (after 
direct habitat destruction) to biodiversity (Van Wilgen et al., 2008.) 
 
IAPs are plants that have been introduced into the country from other parts of the world, 
and have been able to outcompete and displace indigenous plants (IUCN, 2000). 
Technically, they can be plants introduced from one part of a country into another part in 
which they do not occur. Some of these plants use more water than the plants they 
displace, and can have other impacts. These could include accelerating runoff and 
erosion, which affect water security (Van Wilgen et al., 2008; Le Maitre, 2004). Many of 
these IAPs are introduced accidentally, but most of those that reduce runoff have been 
deliberately introduced, particularly by the forestry and nursery industries (Van Wilgen et 
al., 2008). Some of these IAPs have been deliberately introduced by the state or by 
forestry companies, as commercial plantations (for timber), and by the nursery industry for 
domestic garden use (such as ornamental plants like Lantana hybrids). For example, 
Acacia saligna, A. longifolia, A. mearnsii and A. cyclops were all introduced between 1827 
and 1858 for horticultural and botanic garden purposes and then disseminated for sand-
stabilisation, tannin and timber uses by the state; Pinus pinaster, P. radiata and P. 
halepensis were introduced by the state for timber during 1680s, 1865 and 1830 
respectively (Richardson et al., 1992). 
 
IAPs reduce the flow in all watercourses (Le Maitre et al., 2009; Görgens & Van Wilgen, 
2004; Le Maitre et al., 2002). Upstream, IAPs affect the quantity, quality and timing of 
water flows into a dam. Invasions downstream of dams influence releases needed from 
the dams, as well as for run-of-river abstractions. Furthermore, the water for the ecological 
Reserve (Rowlston, 2011) and supply to downstream users can be compromised by the 
water use of IAPs. This is especially important because riparian invasions, for example 
black wattles (Acacia mearnsii), use much more water than non-riparian invasions through 
higher rates of evapo-transpiration (Le Maitre et al., 2015; Van Wilgen & Richardson, 
2014; Dye & Jarmain, 2004). 
 
The impact of IAPs on evapo-transpiration and runoff has been the subject of intense 
research (see Chamier et al., 2012; Milton & Dean, 2010; Le Maitre et al., 2009; Everson, 
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et al., 2007; Görgens & Van Wilgen, 2004; Richardson & Van Wilgen, 2004). That there is 
an effect is beyond dispute. However, it is a more complex matter to model the effects of 
different types of IAPs at different stages of their growth, in different terrains (such as 
aspect, slope, availability of water, soil type) in order to understand them.  
 
The WfW programme has worked on an estimate that IAPs are currently using 
approximately seven per cent of South Africa‘s MAR annually (Van Wilgen et al., 2008; Le 
Maitre et al., 2000; Versfeld, et al., 1998). A more recent estimate has reduced this figure 
to about five per cent of MAR (Le Maitre et al., 2013). The DWS estimates that IAPs 
reduce yield by 695 million cubic metres per annum (DWA, 2013b). The reduction of 
available water by IAPs is particularly severe in the dry seasons, typically where the roots 
of the IAPs are able to access deeper water. When high evapo-transpiration rates occur, 
the IAPs affect the low-flows, which are particularly important for water security (Van 
Wilgen & Richardson, 2014; Dye & Jarmain, 2004; Görgens & Van Wilgen, 2004).  
 
IAPs do not only reduce the quantity of water. They also have been shown to affect water 
quality, wildfires, soil erosion, flooding, siltation, the productive use of land, the ecological 
functioning of natural systems, diseases, biological diversity, human wellbeing (for 
example, tourism, aesthetics, safety, property values), and more (Euston-Brown, 2000). 
Certain of these effects are most pertinent in water management decision-making, such as 
the reduction in water quality (see Chamier et al., 2012; Van Wilgen & De Lange, 2011; 
Richardson & Van Wilgen, 2004). 
 
Wildfires are particularly important, as the seeds of the invasive species are usually better 
able to withstand the intensity of the fires than the indigenous species they displace (Van 
Wilgen, 2009; Euston-Brown, 2000), and they use fire for germination. This means that 
each wildfire in an invaded area will lead to greater invasions, and worse fires in years to 
come (Chamier et al., 2012, Le Maitre et al., 2009; Van Wilgen, 2009). Longer periods 
without ground cover lead to acceleration of the rates of soil erosion. It has also been 
shown that the intensity of alien-fuelled fires can lead to changes in the chemical 
composition of soils, making them more water-repellent (Chamier et al., 2012; Le Maitre et 
al., 2009; Euston-Brown, 2000), leading to further erosion. An example of IAPs dominating 
a landscape can be seen in Figure 5.2, which shows pine trees invading the landscape 
(with gum and wattle trees in the foreground). 
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Figure 5.2: An example of IAPs dominating a landscape 
 
(Source: Marais, 2013) 
 
These additional impacts, such as water quality, wildfires, soil erosion and siltation, have 
not been the focus of this study, but are acknowledged as factors that should be 
considered by decision-makers when comparing alternative water supply options. 
 
5.2.2 IAP management as an addition to water-mix 
To enable the decision-makers to make informed decisions concerning water supply, they 
need to understand the impacts of IAPs may have on yield and in-stream flow 
requirements. The following are some questions that should be considered. To what extent 
can the management of IAPs in the catchments of existing dams improve water security? 
What are the long-term implications of not doing this clearing, given the propensity of 
invasive plants to spread and grow? What happens when the indigenous plants grow back 
(increasing transpiration of water), or when wildfires occur in the area? How do these 
cyclical events of fires and re-growth affect planning for water security? (Meijninger & 
Jarmain, 2014; Marais & Wannenburgh, 2008; Cullis et al., 2007; Blignaut et al., 2007; 
Görgens & Van Wilgen, 2004; Brooks et al., 2004; Le Maitre et al., 1996). It is thus critical 
to consider the implications of not clearing IAPs. 
 
The implications of not clearing IAPs include their spread, growth and reproduction, and 
the consequent effects on water quantity, quality and security (Chamier et al., 2012; Van 
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Wilgen et al., 2008; Le Maitre & Görgens, 2004; Richardson & Van Wilgen, 2004; Le 
Maitre et al., 2000). Modelling suggests that climate change will exacerbate the spread of 
many invasive species, but may decrease the invasiveness of other species and could 
perhaps lead to species that are currently not invasive becoming invasive (Schulze, 2012; 
McNeely et al., 2001).  Moreover, the levels of evapo-transpiration by invasive plants may 
increase as a result of climate change, thereby further threatening the long-term security of 
dams (Kgope et al., 2010). There was, however, insufficient IAP data available to analyse 
IAP spread in the dam catchments before the case study dams were built. Furthermore, in-
depth analysis of larger areas according to these questions is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, although clearly relevant for decision-making. 
 
Water resource planners need to understand the dynamics of IAP invasions. Clearing IAPs 
is not a once-off cost. The WfW programme takes an estimate that the follow-up clearing 
costs will be as much again as the initial clearing costs (C. Marais, personal 
communication, 3 April 2015). The seed banks of many invasive species are long-lasting 
(Van Wilgen, 2009) and once an area has been invaded, it will require almost permanent 
follow-up clearing. Furthermore, a wildfire can lead to a massive germination of invasive 
seeds, requiring an almost immediate clearing response if the gains are to be maintained. 
Timing of the clearing is particularly important. For example, it can be between three and 
twenty times less expensive to clear a light invasion than a heavy invasion (Marais & 
Wannenburgh, 2008). It has been shown that, as plants continue to invade watersheds, 
the costs to clear them increase disproportionately (Cullis et al., 2007; Larsen et al., 2001). 
 
The disproportionate increase in costs is influenced by a number of other factors including: 
growth of the invasion; the type of plant being cleared such as tree, creeper, shrub, and 
their related clearing methods; the location and ease of access to the invasion (for 
example, mountainous versus flat areas); density of the invasion; herbicide requirements; 
options for biological control; the number of follow-up clearings required; and secondary 
invasions by other species (Marais & Wannenburgh, 2008; Van Wilgen et al., 2008; 
Marais, et al., 2004; Richardson & Van Wilgen, 2004; Le Maitre et al., 2002). 
 
Other consequences of not clearing timeously have long-term costs, such as greater 
follow-up costs. For example, the seed banks of IAPs can be established in areas they 
might not otherwise have reached had clearing been done when the plants were 
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establishing themselves. They are difficult and expensive to clear, can last for decades, 
are germinated by fires (for example, Pinus and Hakea species), and may have 
allelopathic properties (for example, Eucalyptus species) that inhibit the growth of other 
species. Furthermore, an immediate response to control the spread of seedlings after a 
wildfire is difficult (Van Wilgen, 2009). Soil erosion will also worsen as the result of fires 
and poor land management with scouring of rivers, siltation, slippage and flooding as the 
consequences (Richardson & Van Wilgen, 2004; Euston-Brown, 2000; Richardson et al., 
1986). Soil erosion and the resulting siltation of downstream dams quickly becomes more 
expensive to manage. For example, Mount Fletcher Dam on the Thina River in the Eastern 
Cape, which was finished in 2008, lost 70 per cent of its full supply capacity by 2012 due 
to siltation from over-grazing, wildfires and IAPs (CSIR, 2013; Gordon & Muller, 2010). 
 
It is possible that a threshold will be reached where it is no longer feasible or affordable to 
clear the mountains of the IAPs (Richardson & Van Wilgen, 2004). If this threshold was 
reached, biological control would remain an opportunity, and would have to be considered 
along with possible consequences for the plantation industry (Van Wilgen & De Lange, 
2011; De Lange & Van Wilgen, 2010). It would be an ironic reminder of the consequences 
of not dealing with invasions timeously – namely that the forestry industry may be at risk 
for failing to take responsibility for invasions from their plantations. 
 
5.2.3 Criticisms of the theory and practice of IAP management 
There had been some scepticism regarding both the theory and the practice of the 
management of IAPs for water security benefits, particularly driven by researchers in the 
employ of the forestry industry (Grafton, 1997). The past practice of siting plantations 
around dams was an indication that there was a belief that ―trees bring rain‖ (Van Wilgen, 
2012). Precipitation recycling may be true in some localised ecosystems such as the 
Amazon, where evaporated water falls as rain (Eltahir & Bras, 1994). However, as early as 
1945, Professor Wicht had reported that plantations reduce stream flow (Van Wilgen, 
2012). With the advent of the WfW programme in South Africa in 1995, research was done 
demonstrating that plantations do impair water security (Scott et al., 2000; Van Wilgen et 
al., 1997), leading to a change in the payment for water for stream-flow reduction activities 
in the late 1990s (DWAF, 2002; Grafton, 1999).  
  
101 
 
Research results did not fully stop the questioning of the value of clearing of invasive alien 
species for water benefits, as was debated at the United States–South Africa Binational 
Commission meeting on IAPs in 2000, where all the evidence that was put forward 
indicated that IAPs do reduce water security (see Muller & Le Maitre, 2000). 
 
The challenge for scientists is that there are so many variables to consider, and testing for 
each is difficult and expensive. For example, one can do a paired-catchment study to 
compare invasions in one catchment to a lack of invasions in the other. But that can 
change from species to species of IAPs, and the situation is affected by other variables 
such as slope, soil, wetlands, age of the IAPs, the species they displace. 
 
Specialists in the DWS are now incorporating the management of IAPs into their 
considerations (DWA, 2013b). It would thus appear that it is no longer officially contested 
that IAPs impair water security.  
 
Hosking et al. (2002) analysed the water benefits of several WfW projects in the Eastern 
Cape, and concluded that they were not cost-effective. However, they used a discount rate 
of 10.1 per cent in their CBA calculations. The theoretical underpinning of their analysis is 
in stark contrast with the approaches advocated by Blignaut and Aronson (2008), quoting 
many other economists. Blignaut and Aronson (2008) postulate that a negative discount 
rate is appropriate in evaluating natural capital and the long-term implications of 
maintaining ecosystem services from the catchments (the opportunity costs of not 
restoring). While Hosking et al. (2002) acknowledge that their discount rate might not have 
been appropriate for such analysis, what may be an uncontrolled variable is the efficacy of 
the work that was done by WfW in these projects in the Eastern Cape. 
 
What appears to be of more substance is the criticism of the practices of the management 
of IAPs. It is clear that prioritisation is challenging for WfW (Van Wilgen et al., 2012), 
partially because of the multiple benefits from the work (employment, social development, 
fire management, biological diversity and other factors, rather than just water security).  
 
Follow-up clearing has been a problem in many areas for WfW, and ―lost hectares‖ have 
been reported, these being areas that revert to requiring initial clearing, owing to a failure 
to follow up timeously (C. Marais, personal communication, 3 April 2015). Although 
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landowner agreements have been put in place to ensure follow-up clearing by the 
landowners, this has not been monitored as carefully as it should have been (Marais, 
2015), and has been hampered by a lack of legislative powers until the recent publication 
of the Alien and Invasive Species Regulations (DEA, 2014b; DEA, 2014c). Careful and 
continuous monitoring, as can be seen from the clearing work done in the Bains‘ Kloof 
area (Figure 5.3), is necessary to avert such problems. The Bains‘ Kloof area, in the 
Western Cape, is shown in Figure 5.3 in July 2004 (left), when invaded by black wattle 
(Acacia mearnsii), and after clearing in April 2010 (right). The blue boundary lines indicate 
different land ownership (and responsibility for maintaining cleared areas, through 
landowner agreements). 
 
(Source: WfW programme, 2014) 
 
There have been many other areas of concern regarding best practices for the 
management of invasive alien species, including biosecurity (preventing the introduction of 
invasive alien species into the country), early detection of and rapid response to emerging 
species, failure to prioritise difficult-to-access areas (for example, mountains), failure to 
prioritise lightly infested areas, failure to always clear from high in a catchment downwards 
(to limit seed pollution), sub-optimal use of biological control, management of and 
response to wildfires, and, in particular, the failure to impose appropriate laws on the 
management of invasive alien species (DEA, 2014a; Preston, et al., 2000). These 
concerns also relate to the inadequacy of the budget for what needs to be done (C.Marais, 
personal communication, 3 April 2015). 
 
Another criticism of the theory and practice of the management of IAPs has been the 
importance of the utilisation of IAPs, notwithstanding any water impacts. This ranges from 
Figure 5.3: Bain’s Kloof before and after IAP clearing 
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the need for plantations – although they are meant to be permitted and managed within 
demarcated areas, so the criticism appears to be unfounded – to the need for shade and 
aesthetic benefits (but there are always non-invasive alternative species), to the need for 
utilisation especially by poor, rural communities. The last-mentioned criticism has had to 
be addressed by WfW. De Neergaard, et al, (2005) concluded that black wattle (Acacia 
mearnsii) is an important resource to poor, rural communities. Virtually all households in 
two rural communities in the Drakensberg used the black wattle as their primary heat 
source and for building materials. It also raised the concern that, without access to this 
biomass, the communities would resort to utilising indigenous species or even using cattle 
dung (with nutrient depletion impacts on the soil) (De Neergaard et al., 2005). However, 
the WfW programme has a policy that it does not clear IAPs being used by poor, rural 
communities, but rather maintains this source of materials in contained areas. This has 
been more formally developed in woodlot management through its emerging Working for 
Forests programme (C.Marais, personal communication, 3 April 2015). 
 
These performance-related challenges will always exist, for no operation can run without 
mistakes. It is therefore reasonable for decision-makers to question what the actual 
benefits will be from the management of IAPs, rather than the scientific projections of 
potential benefits. The WfW programme has a detailed information management system 
(Marais & Wannenburgh, 2008), and quantification of the outcomes of the work is possible. 
It is thought that, with the passing of the Alien and Invasive Species Regulations (DEA, 
2014b; DEA 2014c), there will be an improvement in the efficacy of the work. Already the 
laws have begun to be applied, with landowners in Grahamstown, Cape Town and George 
being served Directives to clear their land (Sishuba, 2015). 
 
Fundamental to this thesis is the concern that clearing of IAPs, even if well done, will not 
yield sufficient water to meet projected demands in many catchments. Part of this will 
relate to the water benefits from over 2.6 million hectares of land that has been cleared by 
WfW since 1995 (Khan, 2015). The premise for clearing obviously has more to do with 
what will be lost in future than with what will be gained right now. However, there are 
exceptions to this perspective, as is shown in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
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5.3 OTHER WATER-MIX OPTIONS 
In addition to the infrastructure development options (such as the construction of dams 
and inter-basin transfers) and IAP management, there are a number of other options in the 
water-mix that are available to decision-makers. These options as listed in Table 5.1 
include groundwater management, re-allocation of water rights, water re-use, water 
harvesting, demand-side management, wetland management, desalination and soil 
erosion/siltation management. All the options in Table 5.1 have been listed as water-mix 
options in the second National Water Resources Strategy (DWA, 2013b) and the Water for 
Growth and Development Framework: Volume 7 and its appendices (DWAF, 2009a; Le 
Maitre et al., 2009). 
 
Table 5.1: Additional water-mix options available to decision-makers 
Option Description 
Groundwater 
management 
This important water-mix option has been discussed under 2.3.3 and is 
not repeated here. 
Reallocation of 
water rights 
Reallocation of water-use rights occurs when water-use rights (the 
legal option to use a set quantity of water at a set quality level) are 
transferred from one use to another without changing the quantity of 
water demanded from the catchment. The only change is in how it is 
used. Usually water-use rights are transferred from a low-value use 
such as agriculture, to a higher-value use such as industrial or mining 
use. Water-use rights transfer from agriculture to mining was an option 
in the Olifants River Catchment feasibility study that was undertaken in 
2003 (DWAF, 2006).  
 
Potential negative considerations of the reallocation of water-use rights 
include the social impacts such as a loss of jobs, and the 
environmental impacts (for example, a possible increase in water 
pollution). Another potential negative consideration could be the 
additional conveyance costs to get the water to its new destination. 
Water re-use The first National Water Resources Strategy (NWRS – DWAF, 2004) 
identified water re-use as an important part of the water-mix. In terms 
of return flows, water re-use now accounts for about fourteen per cent 
of South Africa‘s water supply and its extent is expected to increase 
considerably over time (DWA, 2013b). As part of the second National 
Water Resources Strategy (DWA, 2013b), the DWS developed a 
national water re-use strategy because of its importance.  
 
Water re-use entails using water of varying quality, which may have 
been treated for a purpose other than the one it was used for in the 
first place, for example, re-using domestic water in mining processes 
(DWA, 2013b). Furthermore, water re-use can be planned or 
unplanned, can be directly or indirectly used, and can occur anywhere 
from local to national scale for a multitude of purposes, such as 
irrigation, mining and/or industrial use (DWA, 2013b).  
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Option Description 
Demand-side 
management 
This important water-mix option has been discussed in Textbox 3.1 
and is not repeated here. 
Wetland 
management 
Wetlands are an important part of riverine systems as they provide 
many ecosystem services (MEA, 2005). Wetlands absorb and slow 
down high flows of water; they are biologically diverse and they 
improve the water quality (for ecosystem functioning and for 
downstream users‘ benefits) through water filtering, the settling of 
sediments and the absorption of pollution (Le Maitre et al., 2009; MEA, 
2005). Wetlands are also more resilient than many other types of 
ecosystems and so long as they have not been permanently changed, 
they can be rehabilitated to a basic level of functioning (Driver et al., 
2012).  
 
Unfortunately wetlands are the most threatened ecosystem in South 
Africa, with only eleven per cent of all wetlands being well protected 
and 71 per cent having no protection at all (Driver et al., 2012). The 
impacts of IAPs, deliberate drainage for agricultural purposes, over-
pollution, flood damage in degraded catchments and through hardened 
surfaces, or desiccation through over-abstraction, are among the 
reasons for the decline in health of South African wetlands (Le Maitre 
et al., 2009). This degradation of wetlands has resulted in a substantial 
loss in biological diversity and ecosystem services (Palmer et al., 
2002) and these ecosystem services (such as pollution assimilation) 
are extremely expensive to substitute with technology (Constanza et 
al., 2007). 
 
Similar to the destruction by IAPs, the degradation or destruction of 
wetlands is another major consideration in catchment management. 
Historically, it is estimated that more than half of all wetlands have 
been lost (Driver et al., 2012). Of the roughly 300 000 that remain, 
Sixty-five per cent are classified as threatened, of which 48 per cent 
are critically endangered (DWA, 2013b). Rivers and wetlands are 
classified as endangered when hardly any of the river is still in good 
health (Driver et al., 2011). 
 
The Government, through the Department of Environmental Affairs‘ 
Working for Wetlands Programme, has invested in wetland 
management, albeit at a far more modest level (currently R80 million 
per annum) than IAP management (Le Maitre et al., 2009). It seems 
inappropriate that the management of wetlands could be such an 
important consideration in long-term water management, and yet we 
have so little documented research to guide decision-making on the 
relevant merits of investing in wetland management. 
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Option Description 
Water harvesting Similar to groundwater management, there are gaps in knowledge 
about water harvesting. These gaps mean that the full costs and 
benefits of water harvesting, at both local and national levels, are 
relatively unknown (Le Maitre et al., 2009). What is known is that water 
harvesting has had limited application at a national level (as it has little 
impact on total water resources), but that it does have important 
benefits at a local level (for example, rainwater tanks that harvest 
rooftop water runoff, and field water-harvesting). These benefits 
include fast-tracked and practical water access especially for the poor 
(and reduced vulnerability to the failure of, or lack of access to, large 
supply systems); storm-water control and harvesting (thereby reducing 
local erosion, flooding and downstream sedimentation impacts); and, 
cost-effectiveness at a local level (Le Maitre et al., 2009).  
 
The issues with water-harvesting include possible impacts on 
groundwater recharge and in-stream flow requirements (the level of 
impacts is uncertain due to gaps in the knowledge); the unclear 
impacts of climate change; how it can be implemented at a larger 
scale, and its impact on water quality (Le Maitre et al., 2009). 
Desalination Desalination consists of the treatment of seawater, brackish 
groundwater and water from acid mine drainage, to make it usable for 
industrial and domestic needs (DWA, 2013b; DWAF, 2009a). 
Desalination has a host of benefits including being close to the 
demand, having relatively short lead times (both for construction and 
expansion when compared to dams), it can be operated only when it is 
needed, and it has an almost unlimited supply (DWAF, 2009a). As the 
costs to supply water continue to rise and desalination technologies 
continue to improve, the relative cost of desalination improves.  
 
Desalination does however, also have drawbacks: it is one of the more 
expensive water supply options (largely because of high energy costs), 
it uses high levels of energy – which is a concern in South Africa‘s 
current (2014) lack of sufficient base-load energy supplies, and the 
highly saline waste water is difficult and costly to dispose of and can 
be harmful to the surrounding ecosystems. 
 
Furthermore, desalination is also only an option for limited, high-value 
or high assurance-of-supply use (domestic use, energy generation, 
industrial use), and it is far too expensive to distribute it to where it may 
be needed for agricultural purposes. As such, it is not an alternative to 
productive catchment supply. 
Erosion/siltation 
management 
This important water-mix option has been discussed in Section 2.2.2 
and is not repeated here. 
(Researcher‟s own construction from DWA, 2013b; DWAF, 2009a; Le Maitre et al., 2009) 
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The water-mix options presented in Table 5.1 vary geographically in effectiveness and 
cost due to climate, topography, land use and population density. An example, from Water 
for Growth and Development in South Africa: Version 6, (DWAF, 2007a), of the difference 
in marginal costs (per cubic metre, in 2007 rand values) for different options for the 
Inkomati Water Management Area (WMA) is shown in Figure 5.4.  
 
Figure 5.4: Marginal costs of alternative water-mix options for the Inkomati WMA 
 
(Source: DWAF, 2007a) 
 
In Figure 5.4, it is shown that for the Inkomati WMA, water loss control option has the 
lowest marginal cost, while inter-basin transfer option has the highest. (Note that there are 
additional costs that are seldom taken into consideration, such as the risk of the 
introduction of invasive fish and aquatic plants, from one system to another.)  
 
The rest of the water-mix options increase in cost, from efficient use of available supply to 
building additional infrastructure in the case of desalination. It is generally found that water 
conservation and water demand-management have the lowest marginal costs (DWAF, 
2007a). Note that the marginal costs shown in Figure 5.4 would differ in other water 
management areas and that the national marginal costs of different water source options 
could vary considerably (DWAF, 2007a). Water loss control, which differs by use, location 
and ability to apply controls, would be an example. What the above discussion shows is 
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that uncertainty is an important (and difficult) factor in water-mix choices and decision-
making. 
 
5.4 UNCERTAINTY 
There are many risks and uncertainties in the decision-making concerning water resource 
planning and management (DWA, 2013b; Loucks, 2011; Shamir, 2002). These risks and 
uncertainties accumulate during the process of bringing water to where it is needed, on 
time, at a reasonable cost and at a preferred quality and quantity (Loucks, 2011). Water is 
needed for multiple uses, some of which may compete with each other, and at the same 
time satisfy social and environmental requirements (for example, the Reserve). Added to 
this, water supply and demand are uncertain and variable; both depend on multiple factors 
such as the season, the climate, the weather, the population size, the water quality and the 
transport and purification costs. Furthermore, the social, environmental, ecological and 
economic impacts of a decision or series of decisions cannot be predicted with certainty 
(Loucks, 2011). 
 
The consequences of a decision or series of decisions can change quickly; they are 
complex and outcomes are often difficult to predict. A further issue with the impacts of 
water resource decision-making is that their effects are often long-lasting and extensive. 
Even the decisions made to meet the various demands and needs for water are 
themselves uncertain, given changes over time (Loucks, 2011). Uncertainty not only arises 
regarding natural sources but can also arise from lack of knowledge and/or understanding. 
It can thus be suggested that uncertainty is entrenched in the planning, management and 
decision-making of water resources, and explains a tendency of water engineers to err on 
the side of caution when selecting and implementing water-mix options.  
 
As previously discussed, one of the aspects of water resource planning and management 
where uncertainty occurs, is the management of IAPs. This uncertainty is based on all the 
factors listed above as well as on economic reasons such as estimations and predictions 
over time. IAPs are dynamic; they do not stand still. They may invade at varying rates 
depending on a number of factors, including the quantity of water available, climatic 
conditions, natural enemies, fires, the introduction of new species, climate change and 
other factors. They invade until they reach a maximum possible coverage, which in turn 
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has a peak impact upon MAR. This severity of the impact varies by species and 
circumstance.  
 
Le Maitre et al. (2013) have revised downwards the estimated current losses due to IAPs, 
to approximately 2.4 billion cubic metres (of which about one billion cubic metres is in 
riparian areas). Based on the estimated MAR for South Africa of 49.2 billion cubic metres 
(Middleton & Bailey, 2011), this represents a 4.9 per cent loss of MAR due to IAPs, which 
is down from the previous estimates of seven per cent (Versveld et al., 1998). What is 
pertinent is what can happen if nothing is done to control the invasions. Cullis et al. (2007) 
work on an estimate of sixteen per cent loss to IAPs, should clearing not be done. 
However, in specific catchments, it is possible for up to a 100 per cent loss of MAR to 
occur (D. Le Maitre, personal communication, 13 April 2015; Scott et al., 2000).  
 
The rate at which IAPs spread and densify is also uncertain. This is because IAPs have 
variable rates of spread. The variability depends on which species is invading, the 
condition of the land cover, the climate, the topography and the proximity to a permanent 
water source (riparian or non-riparian invasion) to name a few variables. In the absence of 
efforts to prevent invasions, it is a question of when, rather than if, an area will become 
fully invaded. The estimate of the average rate of spread is now double what was taken 
before (ten per cent versus five per cent), but within that there are highly variable rates by 
species and circumstance (Van Wilgen & Le Maitre, 2013).  
 
It would appear that any tendency to err on the side of caution in the provision of water 
from dams has, until recently, not been mirrored in any similar tendency to be 
precautionary about the impact of catchment degradation. This is perhaps also reflected in 
the Government‘s recent focus on Strategic Infrastructure Programmes (SIPs), where SIP 
18 is merely focused on water and sanitation infrastructure, but pays no attention to 
ensuring the supply of water, including through catchment management (Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group, 2013). 
 
 5.5 RESEARCH METHODS 
The cases presented in this chapter are the quaternary catchments of the four dams that 
are studied in Chapter Four. The four dams are the Inyaka, Nandoni, Berg River and De 
Hoop dams. Each case is analysed initially in terms of an extrapolation of the 2008 levels 
of IAP growth and the level of clearing done until 2013, and secondly, in terms of the 
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hypothetical impacts over 45 years of not clearing the IAPs. The IAPs are considered in 
terms of their impact on MAR and their cost to clear. The cost to clear includes both initial 
and follow-up clearing. All the clearing costs are shown in 2013 rand values, so that 
inflation is a controlled variable (Statistics South Africa, 2014).  
 
The data collection methods used in this chapter include documentation (see 3.4.1) and 
archival records (see 3.4.2). The core documents upon which this analysis is built, are: 
National Invasive Alien Plant Survey (Kotzé et al., 2010), Rates of spread in invasive alien 
plants in South Africa (Van Wilgen & Le Maitre, 2013) for the estimated rate of spread of 
various IAPs; Estimates of the impacts of invasive alien plants on water flows in South 
Africa (Le Maitre et al., 2013) for the estimated reduction in MAR by various IAPs; Water 
Resources of South Africa: 2005 Study (Middleton & Bailey, 2011) for the MAR estimates 
for the case studies and Forestry and streamflow reductions in South Africa: A reference 
system for assessing extent and distribution (Scott et al., 1998).  
 
The data analysis methods for this chapter are inter- and intra-case analysis (see 3.4.5) in 
which the differences and similarities between cases are analysed in order to find patterns 
in the costs and benefits of clearing IAPs (Collis & Hussey, 2009). The methodology and 
methods have been explained in more detail in Chapter Three. 
 
5.6 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
In reaching an informed decision on the importance of clearing IAPs in a catchment, 
especially the riparian area, the current level of IAP invasion is important in understanding 
what additional water (and other benefits) may ensue from bringing them under control 
and at what cost. More important, however, is understanding what will happen in terms of 
their spread and growth, and their impact on water security (and other impacts) in the long-
term if nothing is done to control them. The current impacts as well as hypothetical 
potential impacts of not clearing IAPs in the case study catchments based on data from 
the National Invasive Alien Plant Survey (Kotzé et al., 2010) are presented and discussed. 
 
The National Invasive Alien Plant Survey (NIAPS) was undertaken in 2007 and 2008 
(Kotzé et al., 2010). This survey looked at the levels of invasion in all of the water 
management areas in South Africa. An acknowledged limitation of the NIAPS study is that 
it was designed principally at a tertiary catchment level and not at the more detailed 
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quaternary level (Kotzé et al., 2010), while the focus in this chapter is on the quaternary 
level. The NIAPS also excluded all areas with a transformed land cover (for example, 
cultivated land, urban areas and commercial forest plantations), as these were assumed to 
be unlikely to become densely invaded. This is a pragmatic assumption; although it is well 
known that all such areas can indeed be invaded (noting, too, that the focus of the NIAPS 
was not just on the impact of IAPs on water). Examples of transformed land presented in 
Figure 5.5 show invasions by species such as famine weed (Parthenium hysterophorus, a 
species that is not known not diminish water quantity) and triffid weed (Chromolaena 
odorata, which has been found to have a substantial impact on water quantity). 
 
Figure 5.5: Famine weed (left) and triffid weed (right) invading transformed land 
 
(Source: Unknown) 
 
It should be noted that the Kotzé et al. (2010) study surveyed 215 species and groups of 
species, including the 28 most common and distinctive species and groups of species of 
IAPs in South Africa. Although this is only a proportion of the 2014 list of IAPs which has 
379 plant species (DEA, 2014b; DEA 2014c), it includes all the main high water-using 
species. Invasive aquatic plants such as water hyacinth (Eichhornia crassipes), which are 
known to have an impact on water quantity (Hill & Coetzee, 2008), were also not mapped 
(I. Kotzé, personal communication, 22 September 2014). 
 
In the hypothetical examples in this study, the 2008 levels of IAPs in the dam catchments 
were projected for 15, 30 and 45 years into the future (the planned lifespan of a dam), 
assuming that no control operations are carried out, to show the changes in MAR and cost 
to clear the IAPs. The level of invasions were extrapolated into the future with the help of 
Dr David Le Maitre (personal communication, 13 April 2015), as well as with guidance 
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from Mr Ian Kotzé (personal communication, 22 September 2014), Dr Christo Marais 
(personal communication, 3 April 2015) and Mr Andrew Wannenburgh (personal 
communication, 17 October 2014), and using data and assumptions from Le Maitre et al. 
(2013), Van Wilgen and Le Maitre (2013), Kotzé et al. (2010) and Middleton & Bailey 
(2008). The projections and calculations are shown in Appendix D.  
 
The assumption that no control measures will be taken to limit invasions is based on the 
fact that the clearing of IAPs is currently being done through WfW, by land-owners, and – 
very recently – through the application of the Alien and Invasive Species Regulations 
(DEA, 2014a). These actions provide no guarantee that a specific catchment will be 
cleared. The policy of WfW is that the budgets necessary to clear IAPs in such 
catchments, including invasive aquatic plants, ultimately should come from the Trading 
Accounts from the price of water. However, the present funding from this source is almost 
exclusively for invasive aquatic plants (C. Marais, personal communication, 3 April 2015) 
and there is no guarantee that it will be increased to cover other species. 
 
The estimates require projections of the current invasions, based on the NIAPS survey 
estimates of the initial densities and extent, which necessarily involves some errors and 
uncertainty and these will affect the projected invasions. (The errors will increase in 
magnitude, but they will not change as a proportion of the area, and thus offer no 
systematic bias.) They thus illustrate a potential magnitude of the negative impacts of 
allowing IAPs to spread and grow unhindered. These projections have to take two 
processes into account: firstly, the expansion of the invasion into new areas, and secondly, 
the increases in density in areas already occupied through ongoing invasion and fore-
prone IAP seedling recruitment from seed banks, especially following fires. 
 
This study assumed certain rates of spread and applied them uniformly. In reality, the 
situation is more complex. Certain areas, such as riparian areas, are more susceptible to 
invasions than others (Richardson et al., 2007; Decamps et al., 1995). Furthermore, the 
rate of spread will vary and be limited, in specific areas, by space and growth requirements 
of specific species (I. Kotzé, personal communication, 22 September 2014). For example, 
the black wattle (Acacia mearnsii) can invade almost anywhere in the terrestrial landscape, 
while the weeping willow (Salix babylonica – which may or may not be considered to be re-
listed as an invasive species) is strongly linked with water and will not spread naturally in 
113 
 
most non-riparian areas, thus limiting its potential rate of spread. What further complicates 
rates of spread is that the amount of water lost through invasions in riparian areas is 
estimated to be two to three times as high as the same species in non-riparian areas (Le 
Maitre et al., 2015; Everson et al., 2007; Dye & Jarmain, 2004; Görgens & Van Wilgen, 
2004). 
 
There are further factors that can influence the growth and rate of spread of IAPs, 
including susceptibility to invasion of the natural vegetation, the frequency and season of 
wildfires, climate and other environmental or habitat factors such as soil types. These 
factors range from extremely difficult to nearly impossible to quantify and doing so is 
beyond the scope of this study. They are likely also too complicated for the planning 
processes that should inform decision-making by a Minister. They are also unlikely to 
influence the fact that invasions and their impacts will inevitably increase to occupy the 
available areas. Following consultation with specialists advising on the methodology, they 
are assumed, therefore, to be constant for the purposes of this study (D. Le Maitre, 
personal communication, 13 April 2015; C. Marais, personal communication, 3 April 2015). 
The complexity of the factors discussed above is illustrated in Figure 5.6, which shows 
Pinus invasions in the Southern Cape Mountains, by demonstrating the spread of pine 
trees (left) and how mountainous areas can become densely invaded by pines (right), 
notwithstanding factors such as rainfall, slope, aspect and soils. 
 
Figure 5.6: Pinus invasions in the Southern Cape Mountains showing the 
complexity of factors, which influence invasions 
 
(Source: Van Wilgen, n.d.; Pretorious, 2012) 
 
In all four case studies, WfW has done varying degrees of IAP clearing. This clearing has 
included initial clearing as well as years of follow-up clearing, as is necessary because of 
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the long lasting seed banks (see 5.2.2). The size, cost to clear and the impact on MAR of 
the clearing is shown in Table 5.2. 
 
The cost of the clearing in the dam catchments by WfW, was calculated from the number 
of person-days (an ideal day‘s clearing work, done by one person) that have been worked 
in the specific catchment multiplied by the cost per person-day (R350 in 2013 rand values) 
(Table 5.2). This cost would be considerably higher for inaccessible areas such as the 
mountains where high-altitude teams need to abseil down to the invasive plants (C. 
Marais, personal communication, 3 April 2015). Although high-altitude teams are certainly 
needed in parts of the catchments of the four dams, estimating how this affects the costs 
was considered too difficult given the scope of this study. Therefore, this analysis used the 
average WfW cost of R350 per person-day in 2013 rand values (A. Wannenburgh 
personal communication, 17 October 2014).  
 
Normally an area that is invaded by alien plants will only be partially invaded (therefore 
having variable densities) and this is measured in total invaded (―uncondensed‖) hectares. 
The density of the invasion can range from one specimen per hectare to thousands of 
specimens of different species per hectare. For this reason, the total invaded area is not a 
useful measure of the long-term full invasion of the area. In order to simplify the 
calculations of invaded areas for modelling purposes, the invaded area is expressed as 
condensed hectares (the mathematically equivalent hectares with the density scaled to 
100 per cent canopy cover by IAPs). Using condensed hectares facilitates comparisons by 
standardizing the different densities of invasions in a given area (such as a catchment).  
 
In each case, the initial invaded area is what was estimated in 2008 by Kotzé et al. (2010). 
As shown in Table 5.2, the invasions are then projected forwards as if no further clearing 
had been done and expressed in condensed hectares and as a percentage reduction of 
MAR. It should be noted that only in the Berg River Dam proposal was there any provision 
made for the clearing of IAPs in the catchment. It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
the Minister did not factor in any clearing of IAPs (or any other catchment-management 
interventions) in the decision-making process. Thus it is reasonable to project future 
invasions as if no further clearing had been done. 
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The reduction in MAR by IAPs in 2013, together with an estimate of the total reduction by 
IAPs if the clearing work is not continued, are given as volumes and as percentage 
reductions of the MAR. The future level of impact is based on estimates of the current 
reductions for each of the quaternary catchments as calculated by the researcher and Dr 
Le Maitre, and based on data from Le Maitre et al. (2013). The reductions in the MAR 
could become exceedingly large as illustrated by the two catchments (Berg, De Hoop) that 
initially had relatively high levels of invasion. For the other two catchments the impacts are 
lower, but they too have the potential to reach similar levels of MAR reduction, given 
sufficient time.  
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Table 5.2: Data on the catchments, current and potential invasions, reductions in 
flows and the costs of IAP management for the selected cases. 
 (Source: Author‘s construction from: D. Le Maitre, personal communication, 13 April 2015; 
A. Wannenburgh, personal communication, 17 October 2014; Kotzé et al., 2010; and, 
Middleton and Bailey, 2008. Calculations are shown in Appendix D.) 
 
a.
Number of quaternary catchments associated with 
the dam
1 6 1 6
b. Total size of the dam catchment area (ha) 21 385 141 759 17 185 286 489
c.
Size of area with natural / semi-natural land cover 
(ha)
7 671 67 792 13 570 233 875
d.
Percentage of total area with natural / semi-natural 
land cover (ha)
35.87% 47.82% 78.96% 81.63%
e. Total MAR for the dam catchments (million m3/annum) 80.32              199.66            136.34            134.33               
f.
2013 hectares cleared to date (condensed 
hectares)
1 466 1 979 3 607 180
g.
Clearing & follow-up costs up to 2013, in 2013 
rands (Million ZAR)
R 64.73 R 68.58 R 72.58 R 23.61
h.
2008 levels of invasion by IAPs (uncondensed 
hectares)
0 11 038 1 175 173 638
i
2008 levels of invasion by IAPs (condensed 
hectares)
0 621 370 17 295
j.
Cost to clear 2008 invasions by IAPs in 2013 rands 
(Million ZAR)
R 0.00 R 10.76 R 4.13 R 286.85
k.
Cost-per-condensed-hectare to clear 2008 IAPs (in 
2013 rands)
R 0 R 17 338 R 11 162 R 16 586
l.
The 2008 impact of IAPs on MAR for dam
catchments (Million m3/yr)
-                 0.27                1.90                8                        
m.
The 2008 impact on MAR of these IAPs (as a %  of 
MAR)
0.00% 0.14% 1.39% 5.94%
n.
Estimated area of invasion by IAPs after 45 years 
(uncondensed hectares) 6 547             64 302           12 279           233 146            
o.
Estimated area of invasion by IAPs after 45 years 
(condensed hectares) 2 946             32 551           12 279           128 138            
p.
Estimated cost to clear catchments after 45 years 
in 2013 rands (Million ZAR)
R 38.75 R 564.56 R 136.99 R 2 125.25
q.
Estimated reduction in MAR after 45 years of
invasion (Million m3/yr)
13                   14                   63 59                      
r.
Maximum percentage of total MAR that might be
lost 31.93% 42.56% 70.28% 72.66%
s.
Estimated percentage of MAR lost after 45 years 
of invasion
16.12% 7.03% 46.22% 44.01%
De Hoop Dam 
Catchments
Inyaka Dam 
Catchments
Nandoni Dam 
Catchments
Berg River 
Dam 
Catchments
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It should be noted that, given that IAP seed banks persist for many years, the Inyaka 
Dam‘s 2013 level of invasion is most certainly greater than zero. The estimate from the 
NIAPS survey, which was conducted to be used at a tertiary level, may not be 
representative of the true state of invasions in this particular catchment. For this study an 
initial invaded area and density was assumed and this data was used for estimating the 
future cost to clear IAPs for the Inyaka Dam. 
 
It is apparent from Table 5.2 that WfW has already spent a total of approximately R208 
million on clearing IAPs in the four catchment areas. Without these expenditures, the initial 
invasions would have been far greater. The differences in invasions per catchment are due 
to the differences in terrain, species, amount of initial and follow-up clearing done 
(including the number of times), and variation in the efficacy of the clearing (Mugido et al., 
2014; Marias & Wannenburgh, 2008). Other factors include the proportion of the 
catchment that can be invaded (namely the proportion of natural or semi-natural land), the 
occurrence, severity and frequency of wild fires, and possible climate change impacts. 
 
A key consideration is the cost of clearing IAPs after 45 years of invasion (Table 5.2, p). 
These estimates are calculated using condensed hectares and are based on the WfW 
clearing rates per hectare in 2013 rand values. The variation in the costs depends largely 
upon the type of species present, for example, sprouting tree species cost R17 344 per 
hectare to clear, while non-sprouting tree species cost R11 156 per hectare – see 
Appendix D for the full list (Wannenburgh, 2014). In practice, the costs will also vary 
according to the location of the trees. Trees that are on steep slopes, or that need to be 
extracted from riparian areas, or that can cause damage when they are felled, or that are 
very large, or that must be removed or burnt owing to a fire risk, together with the number 
of follow-up clearings that are necessary, all increase the costs. Costs also reflect on the 
efficacy of the work. In a similar project run in the Eastern Cape, the efficacy of clearing 
teams was measured, and significant differences were found (Mugido et al., 2014). 
 
An additional key consideration is what proportion of the catchments of these dams could 
be invaded by alien plants, and what the consequent reduction in MAR would be. This 
study follows the assumption (Kotzé et al. 2010; Van Wilgen et al., 2008) that only areas 
with natural/semi-natural land cover can be invaded. Additionally different IAPs have 
different rates at which they will invade (see Appendix D), and areas in which they invade 
118 
 
(for example, riparian versus dry land). But they also have different impacts in terms of the 
MAR. The variation in the potential impacts of different taxa can be seen from this 
quotation from Le Maitre et al. (2013, p. 72): 
 
The taxa with the most extensive invasions and the greatest impacts on water 
resources are Acacia mearnsii (474 489 condensed ha, 34% of the total flow 
reduction), Pinus species (132 937 ha, 19%) and Eucalyptus species (273 573 ha, 
16%). Chromolaena odorata (101 992 ha, 7%), Hakea species (36 344 ha, 5%) and 
Solanum mauritianum (40 413 ha, 4%) also have important impacts on runoff. 
Together these taxa account for 85% of the total impacts on runoff.  
 
While focus may be centred more on the catchment areas above the dam, water needs 
below the dam must also be considered, especially in the riparian areas. More water may 
have to be released from the dam to compensate for the water lost to evapo-transpiration 
by the IAPs as well as to maintain the commitments to the ecological Reserve and to run-
of-river water users, such as rural communities and irrigated agriculture. 
 
If nothing is done to clear the IAPs, then theoretically, almost all the natural and semi-
natural areas can be invaded. Not only will this then mean that the initial clearing costs will 
have to be borne, but there will also be ongoing follow-up costs, possibly into perpetuity. 
These long-term costs could be massive, given that the seeds would have been spread, 
and (in many cases) germinated, by periodic fires. In mountainous areas, these follow-up 
costs would be financially crippling, which emphasises the necessity of decision-makers 
taking timeous steps to prevent the invasions in the first place.  
 
If areas are then fully invaded, this poses the question of what impact the invasion would 
have on the MAR. Plantations are meant to be kept out of riparian areas, off steep slopes, 
and out of wetlands and inappropriate soils (RSA, 1998), because of the reduction in MAR 
and other negative effects associated with planting these areas. Scott et al. (1998) 
analysed the impact of plantations on MAR in various catchments. They found that the 
extreme was planting 100% of the Mokobulaan catchment, on the Mpumalanga Province 
escarpment, with Eucalyptus (gum) species. This resulted in a 100 per cent reduction in 
the runoff and the river drying up. It also took five years for the river to start running again 
after felling owing to deep soil moisture and ground-water depletion.  
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To take the De Hoop Dam as an example, currently there are IAPs recorded on 173 638 
hectares (74 per cent) of the 233 875 hectares of natural and semi-natural land cover that 
can be invaded (Kotzé et al., 2010). If nothing is done to clear these IAPs, then in theory 
the entire natural and semi-natural land cover areas could be fully invaded. The relatively 
low densities of invasion in the catchment have caused a 5.84 per cent decrease in MAR. 
After 45 years of no IAP management, the reduction in MAR would increase to 44 per cent 
(Table 5.2, s). A further example taken from Scott et al. (1998) is that of rivers which have 
dried up completely as a result of evapo-transpiration losses caused by invasive species. 
This will vary from catchment to catchment, depending upon natural flows, as well as the 
total invadable area and factors such as topography, soil depths and fertility, ground-water 
recharge and rainfall intensity. For these reasons, it is important to examine each dam 
catchment in detail.  
 
The calculations for the hypothetical scenarios project the effect of IAPs on MAR 45 years 
into the future from the 2008 invasion levels as estimated by Kotzé et al. (2010). In the 
calculations, the rate of spread into uninvaded areas for the summer rainfall catchments 
uses an annual rate of spread for IAPs of ten per cent per year. The rate of spread for the 
Berg River Dam catchment (G10A), which is predominately invaded by Pinus species, has 
been calculated as fifteen per cent per year based on data from Van Wilgen and Le Maitre 
(2013). The rate of spread is modelled, in Figure 5.7, to decline from this percentage as 
the catchment becomes increasingly occupied – a trend that is found in many other 
studies of the spread of invaders (Le Maitre et al., 2002). 
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Figure 5.7: Increase in total area invaded in G10A 
 
(Source: Modelling by author and Dr Le Maitre using unpublished data from (D. Le Maitre, 
personal communication, 13 April 2015 and Kotzé et al., 2010)) 
 
In the calculations, the single variation is the densification rate. In the summer rainfall case 
studies (the Inyaka, Nandoni and De Hoop Dam catchments), densification rates are 
modelled to increase by one per cent and five per cent year. A conservative estimate has 
been deliberately taken, as advised by Dr le Maitre (D. Le Maitre, personal 
communication, 13 April 2015), because even such conservative estimates show how it is 
imperative that decision-makers to take invasions in catchments into consideration when 
considering augmentation of water supply through a dam or other similar options. More 
research is needed to understand the appropriate rates of densification (D. Le Maitre, 
personal communication, 13 April 2015) but these estimates are sufficient to show 
conclusively the wisdom of taking invasions of catchments into account when approving 
the building of dams. 
 
The densification in the Berg River Dam catchment (G10A) has been modelled to increase 
by one per cent per year, and by 40 per cent every fifteen years. These densification rates 
are used to simulate the rapid increase in density because of seedling recruitment after 
wildfires (Figure 5.8) (D. Le Maitre, personal communication, 13 April 2015; Le Maitre et 
al., 1996). What has been modelled is a conservative fire regime (every fifteen years) 
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based on Le Maitre et al. (1996). The rates of spread and densification are derived from 
the research conducted by Brown and Richardson (1986) and Rouget et al. (2001), 
together with assessments by Dr David Le Maitre (D. Le Maitre, personal communication, 
13 April 2015). 
 
Figure 5.8: Increases in density of invasion in G10A 
 
(Source: Modelling by author and Dr Le Maitre using unpublished data from (D. Le Maitre, 
personal communication, 13 April 2015 and Kotzé et al., 2010)) 
 
The decrease in MAR caused by the IAPs is calculated for the whole catchment, not just 
the section with natural/semi-natural land cover, because the impact on the water affects 
the runoff of the whole catchment. 
 
In the cases of the Inyaka Dam and De Hoop Dam, the calculations were split into riparian 
and dryland zones before being combined for catchment totals. This split was necessary 
because the reduction in MAR caused by IAPs in summer rainfall areas doubles for 
riparian zones compared to dryland zones (Le Maitre et al., 2013; Scott et al., 1998). To 
calculate the impact of IAPs on MAR, catchments are split between the riparian and 
dryland zones using a general rule from Scott et al. (1998) which states that the riparian 
zone covers about ten per cent of a catchment on average, and thus the dryland zone 
covers the remaining 90 per cent. The invasion in the Berg River Dam catchment does not 
occur in the riparian zone; therefore splitting the calculation becomes unnecessary.  
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While a rigorous analysis of the relationship between the spread and density of IAPs would 
be instructive, the actual values used in this modelling are intended to be conservative and 
illustrative, rather than precise. The purpose is to demonstrate the inevitable outcome of 
the rapid spread and densification of invasions in areas of natural/semi-natural land cover 
if no management is applied. Whether this happens sooner than 45 years or later, ought to 
be less important to a decision-maker than the fact that it will inevitably occur and that the 
long-term reduction in MAR would cancel out any action to augment water supplies with 
dams. Note that, in the view of experienced managers of invasive species, catchments 
exist where invasives have spread beyond the threshold of being able to be controlled 
through conventional management practices, and where only biological control may offer 
any hope for their long-term control (C. Marais, personal communication, 3 April 2015). 
Given the differences between the findings for the different catchments (Table 5.2) and the 
above discussion, it becomes important to look at each dam catchment in detail.  
 
Detailed discussions of the findings pertaining to the 2008 levels of IAPs, the IAP clearing 
that has already occurred and the estimated impacts of not managing IAPs for a 45-year 
period (the planning lifespan of a dam) are presented according to each dam catchment. 
The catchments are presented in chronological order of the construction of the dams to 
show what, if any, progress in the inclusion of IAP management as a condition of the 
decision to build the dam, has been made. 
 
5.6.1 Case 1: Inyaka Dam catchment 
The Inyaka Dam is found in the Marite River (in Mpumalanga) at the downstream end of 
the quaternary catchment X31E. The Marite River is one of the main tributaries of the 
Sabie River. Thus, X31E is located in the Sabie River catchment, which is part of the 
Inkomati-Usuthu Water management area (WMA).  
 
There are no other quaternary catchments upstream of X31E as it is located within the 
upper section of the Sabie River catchment, next to the border with the Olifants River 
catchment. Thus all the water that flows into the Inyaka Dam is from a single quaternary 
catchment. A map of the locations of the Inyaka Dam and quaternary catchment X31E are 
shown in Figure 5.9. 
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Figure 5.9: Location of Inyaka Dam and quaternary catchment X31E 
 
(Source: Van Den Berg et al., 2008) 
 
Quaternary catchment X31E falls predominantly into the north-eastern highlands 
ecoregion with the most western section covered by the northern escarpment mountains 
(Kleynhans et al., 2005). The settlement of Bushbuck Ridge is on the eastern edge, just 
north of Inyaka Dam. The catchment, shown in Figure 5.10, is largely covered by 
plantations intermingled with patches of degraded thicket and bushland. Small areas of 
grassland and woodland are also present. 
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Figure 5.10: Land cover in quaternary catchment X31E 
 
(Source: Van Den Berg et al., 2008) 
 
The plantations in Figure 5.10 consist of predominantly Pinus and Eucalyptus species and 
cover approximately 60 per cent of the catchment. They are not regarded as being 
‗invading‘ alien plants, despite being IAPs, as they are seen as a managed resource (Scott 
et al., 1998). In the National Alien Invasive Plant Survey (Kotzé et al., 2010), the 
plantations were classified as transformed land cover (along with other land cover such as 
built-up and agriculture areas) and are excluded from subsequent IAP calculations.  
 
Although X31E is largely covered by plantations, WfW has done significant clearing of 
IAPs. This clearing (as is shown in black in Figure 5.11) has occurred largely along the 
riparian areas of the catchment as well as in a few larger areas. WfW has spent R64.7 
million (in 2013 rand values) on clearing 1 466 (condensed) hectares of IAPs in the 
catchment. It would appear from the DWS data (in Table 5.2) that the threat of IAPs in the 
catchment of the Inyaka Dam is now negligible in theory, as a result of the clearing that 
WfW has done. 
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Figure 5.11: IAP clearing upstream of the Inyaka Dam in quaternary catchment X31E 
 
(Source: A. Wannenburgh personal communication, 17 October 2014) 
 
However, IAPs always require follow-up clearing. Responses to enquiries made to WfW 
did not indicate that measures were in place to ensure maintenance of follow-up clearing. 
The Alien and Invasive Species Regulations could be invoked for this purpose, however, 
since much of the land is under the control of Government authorities. The fact that the 
NIAPS did not record invasions at in 2007/8 (Table 5.2), is patently a temporary situation 
(Kotzé et al., 2010). It is highly likely that there are still large seed banks of IAP species in 
the area, and there will be an inevitable germination of these seeds, especially after fires in 
this fire-prone area. The existing plantations are also an important seed source. 
 
The calculations for the hypothetical scenarios for Inyaka Dam, looking 45 years into the 
future from 2008, were split into riparian and dryland zone calculations before being 
combined for the catchment total. The calculations are summarised using conservative 
densification rates of one per cent in Table 5.3 and five per cent in Table 5.4. It is assumed 
that the seeds from the seed bank will germinate quickly in the first year with no follow-up 
clearing taking place. 
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Table 5.3: Combined calculations using the 6 761 m3/ha/yr optimal Eucalyptus 
reduction (riparian) and the 3 268/m3/ha/yr optimal pine reduction (Dryland) at 
Inyaka. Densification rate = 1% 
Year 
Total 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction 
of MAR 
(million 
m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008 0 0 0 0 0% 0 - 
2023 2,652 442 5.77%   2.43 3.02%   6.67  3,084% 
2038 4,624 1,479 19.29%   7.05  8.77%  20.42  9,442% 
2053 6,547 2,946 38.42%  12.95  16.12%  38.75 17,919% 
(Source: Modelling by researcher and Dr Le Maitre using unpublished data from (D. Le 
Maitre, personal communication, 13 April 2015 and Kotzé et al., 2010)) 
 
It is estimated that the area invaded will increase from zero to 2 946 condensed hectares 
in 45 years, representing 38 per cent of the catchment (Table 5.3). Natural MAR would be 
reduced by sixteen per cent and the cost to clear would increase to nearly R39 million, an 
increase of 17 919 per cent, based on the cost to clear in 2009 (R 216 261), as the cost to 
clear in 2008 is officially zero. The higher densification rate in Table 5.4, results in these 
estimated reductions more than doubling. 
 
Table 5.4: Combined calculations using the 6 761 m3/ha/yr optimal Eucalyptus 
reduction (riparian) and the 3 268/m3/ha/yr optimal pine reduction (Dryland) at 
Inyaka. Densification rate = 5%  
Year 
Total 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction 
of MAR 
(million 
m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008 0 0 0 0 0% 0 - 
2023 2,652 2,100 27.39%  11.52  14.34%  31.68  14,650% 
2038 4,624 4,771 62.22%  22.73  28.30%  65.87  30,457% 
2053 6,547 6,547 85.38%  28.78  35.83%  86.11  39,819% 
(Source: Modelling by researcher and Dr Le Maitre using unpublished data from (D. Le 
Maitre, personal communication, 13 April 2015 and Kotzé et al., 2010)) 
 
The fundamental objective posed in this chapter is, however, to analyse the costs and 
benefits of IAP control in the context of the catchments for the water supply infrastructure 
schemes. In determining this objective, it could further be asked whether clearing IAPs to 
supply water as an additional option to the Inyaka Dam or as a concurrent option, would 
have been viable. Unfortunately, the level of IAPs, when the decision to build Inyaka Dam 
was made, is unknown as no data exists for that period.  
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The data in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 indicates that clearing the IAPs in the catchment 
would not have compensated for the potential yields and water security provided by the 
construction of the dam. However, if follow-up clearing is not continued, the estimations 
show that IAPs will reduce the security of the water supply. 
 
The IAP consideration did not feature in the planning documents for the building of the 
dam. The Minister could not, therefore, have considered this alternative when making the 
necessary decisions. It can, however, be argued that, because WfW was established in 
the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry of that time, the establishment of WfW 
contributed towards compensating for the lack of IAP consideration in the dam planning 
documents. As has been indicated, the seed banks of IAPs mean that there are future 
costs in keeping the land clear, and that a failure to do so will affect runoff and thus dam 
yields. Estimates for the 45-year scenario are between a sixteen per cent and a 36 per 
cent reduction in MAR. This figure will reach the 36 per cent level and go substantially 
higher in the long-term, if nothing is done. This cannot be afforded by those needing the 
future yields from this dam. The analysis suggests that long-term management of IAPs 
ought to have been built into a strategy that included building the dam, at the time when 
this decision was made. Although it may be important to establish whether the effect will 
be noticeable within more or less than 45 years, the most important consideration is the 
necessity of managing invasions to prevent them reaching levels where the costs to clear 
become exceedingly high, and where the seed banks then impose similarly high long-term 
follow-up costs. ―A stitch in time saves nine‖, as the old adage goes, is patently 
appropriate. 
 
5.6.2 Case 2: Nandoni Dam catchment 
The Nandoni Dam is located in Limpopo Province, on the Luvuvhu River. It is located in 
quaternary catchment A91F and has five further quaternary catchments upstream: A91A 
to A91E (Figure 5.12). 
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Figure 5.12: Location of the Nandoni Dam and the upstream quaternary catchments,  
 
(Source: Van Den Berg et al., 2008) 
 
As shown in Figure 5.12, the six quaternary catchments are all located in the Limpopo 
WMA. While the total catchment area of Nandoni Dam (169 233 hectares) is many times 
bigger than the Inyaka Dam (21 386 hectares) or Berg River Dam (17 185 hectares) 
catchments, it is still much smaller than the De Hoop Dam catchment (286 489 hectares).  
 
The land cover in the six quaternary catchments, as shown in Figure 5.13, is varied, with 
only 48 per cent of the catchment considered to have natural/semi-natural land cover and 
thus to be invadable (Table 5.2). The limited area of natural (untransformed) vegetation 
may account, along with the clearing that has been done in the catchment, for the failure to 
record invasions in the lower Nandoni Dam catchments (A91D to F) in Figure 5.14. Much 
of the invasion in A91A and B (shown in yellow, in Figure 5.14) corresponds with the 
thicket and bushland land cover (in Figure 5.13) and consists principally of Eucalyptus, 
Jacaranda, Opuntia and Cereus species. Only the Eucalyptus and Jacaranda species are 
considered to reduce the MAR in the catchment.  
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Figure 5.13: Land cover in the quaternary catchment upstream of the Nandoni Dam 
 
(Source: Van Den Berg et al., 2008) 
 
Figure 5.14: IAP clearing (in black) upstream of Nandoni Dam 
 
(Source: Wannenburgh, 2014) 
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WfW has cleared IAPs in all six quaternary catchments (shown in black in Figure 5.14). In 
total, WfW has spent R69 million (in 2013 rand values) clearing 1 979 condensed hectares 
of IAPs. As a result, the equivalent of 621 condensed hectares of IAPs remains, with an 
estimated clearing cost of eleven million rand and reduce MAR by 0.13 per cent (Table 
5.5). The calculations for the hypothetical scenarios for Nandoni Dam, looking 45 years 
into the future from 2008, are summarised using conservative densification rates of one 
per cent in Table 5.5 and five per cent in Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.5: Using the 431 m3/ha/yr estimated for optimal Eucalyptus at Nandoni. 
Densification rate =1% 
Year 
Total 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction 
of MAR 
(million 
m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008     11,038  621 0.92% 0.27 0.13% 10.76 - 
2023     31,061  6,406 9.45% 2.76 1.38% 111.10 1,032% 
2038     53,868  19,189 28.31% 8.27 4.14% 332.81 3,092% 
2053     64,302  32,551 48.02% 14.03 7.03% 564.56 5,245% 
(Source: Modelling by researcher and Dr Le Maitre using unpublished data from (D. Le 
Maitre, personal communication, 13 April 2015 and Kotzé et al., 2010)) 
 
It is estimated, in Table 5.5, that the area invaded will increase to 32 551 condensed 
hectares in 45 years, representing 48 per cent of the catchment and the cost to clear 
would increase to nearly R565 million, a cost increase of over 5 000 per cent. Natural MAR 
would, however, only be reduced by seven per cent because firstly 52 per cent of the 
catchment is considered transformed land and is not invadable; and secondly, the 
relatively low estimated flow reduction caused by the IAPs, which reflects the relatively dry 
conditions in the catchment (Table 5.2; Kotzé et al., 2010). The higher densification rate in 
Table 5.4 results in these estimated reductions nearly doubling. Given a longer time 
period, these estimates would be closer to those of the Inyaka Dam and other catchments. 
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Table 5.6: Using the 431 m3/ha/yr estimated for optimal Eucalyptus at Nandoni. 
Densification rate =5% 
Year 
Total 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction 
of MAR 
(million 
m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008     11,038  621 0.92% 0.27 0.13% 10.76 - 
2023     31,061  25,042 36.94% 10.79 5.41% 434.32 4,035% 
2038     53,868  53,868 79.46% 23.22 11.63% 934.26 8,680% 
2053     64,302  64,302 94.85% 27.71 13.88% 1,115.23 10,362% 
(Source: Modelling by researcher and Dr Le Maitre using unpublished data from (D. Le 
Maitre, personal communication, 13 April 2015 and Kotzé et al., 2010)) 
 
Similar to the Inyaka Dam catchment, Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 show that clearing IAPs in 
the catchment would not have compensated for the potential yields and water security 
provided by constructing the dam. However, if follow-up clearing is not continued, the 
estimated negative effects of IAPs will again be a major water security problem. The 
projected loss of 13.88 per cent of MAR to invasions – and an even higher level when fully 
invaded, whatever the time period – is an important loss to be borne in a dry area, and one 
that may exacerbate any decrease in water security from climate change (Kgope et al., 
2010). By making the right choice, decision makers can avoid the cost-to-clear escalating 
from an estimated R11 million to R1.1 billion. 
 
Like the Inyaka Dam case, the IAP considerations did not feature in the planning 
documents for the building of the Nandoni Dam and the Minister could not, therefore, have 
considered this alternative when making the necessary decisions. As with the Inyaka Dam, 
this analysis suggests that IAP control should have featured in the planning considerations 
and in the overall system strategy of which the building of the Nandoni Dam was a part. 
This would be even more justified as an argument, if the other catchment management 
impacts were to be factored into the planning considerations, as they should have been. 
Proposing to build a dam – with minimal consideration of measures for its long-term 
optimal viability – does not put a Minister in a position to make a fully informed decision. 
 
5.6.3 Case 3: Berg River Dam catchment 
The Berg River Dam is found on the Berg River in the Western Cape, in the middle of a 
single quaternary catchment, G10A (Figure 5.15). G10A is located in the Berg River 
catchment which is part of the Berg-Olifants WMA. The Berg River is one of the main 
sources of water for the City of Cape Town and the surrounding areas. 
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Figure 5.15: Location of the Berg River Dam within quaternary catchment G10A 
 
(Source: Van Den Berg et al., 2008) 
 
G10A is largely covered by a mix of low fynbos and shrub land, as well as cultivated land 
and plantations. A small amount of thicket, bushland and urban land cover are also 
present, as shown in Figure 5.16. Since the land cover data were collected in 2000 (Van 
Den Berg et al., 2008), much of the plantation areas has been cleared, as a condition of 
building the Berg River Dam (C. Marais, personal communication, 3 April 2015).  
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Figure 5.16: Land cover in the quaternary catchment G10A 
 
(Source: Van Den Berg et al., 2008) 
 
WfW has extensively cleared IAPs in G10A, having spent R72.6 million (in 2013 rand 
values), clearing the equivalent of 3 607 condensed hectares (shown in black in Figure 
5.17). An estimated 370 condensed hectares of IAPs remain in G10A and are 
predominantly Pinus species, although the seed banks of other IAPs remain in the soils. 
The remaining invasion is estimated to cause a 1.4 per cent reduction in MAR and cost 
R4.1 million to clear. The densification in the Berg River Dam catchment has been 
modelled to increase by one per cent per year, but by 40 per cent every fifteenth year, to 
simulate the rapid increase in density because of seedling recruitment after wildfires (D. Le 
Maitre, personal communication, 13 April 2015; Le Maitre et al., 1996). As a result of the 
use of episodic densification, a five per cent densification rate per year is considered to be 
too high and therefore has not been modelled. 
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 Figure 5.17: IAP clearing (in black) around the Berg River Dam 
 
(Source: Wannenburgh, 2014) 
 
The reduction of MAR by Pinus species in G10A is estimated to be about 5 132 cubic 
metres per condensed hectare per annum (D. Le Maitre, personal communication, 13 April 
2015, based on Le Maitre et al., 2013). This is relatively high because of the exceptionally 
high rainfall that is experienced in the mountains of this catchment (more than 2 500 
millimetres per year).  
 
Table 5.7: Using the optimal pine reduction of 5 132 m3/ha/yr at Berg. Densification 
rate = 1% 
Year 
Total 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction 
of MAR 
(million 
m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008     1,175  370 2.99% 1.90 1.39% 4.13 - 
2023     5,929  3,777 30.47% 19.38 14.22% 42.13 1,020% 
2038   11,204  11,204 90.40% 57.50 42.17% 124.99 3,027% 
2053   12,279  12,279 99.07% 63.01 46.22% 136.99 3,318% 
(Source: Modelling by researcher and Dr le Maitre using unpublished data from (D. Le 
Maitre, personal communication, 13 April 2015 and Kotzé et al., 2010)) 
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It is estimated in Table 5.8, that the area invaded will increase to 12 279 condensed 
hectares in forty five years, representing 99 per cent of the invadable area. The cost to 
clear would increase to R137 million, a cost increase of over 3 300 per cent, and natural 
MAR would be reduced by 46 per cent. The cost to clear increases from low amounts – 
where land is not invaded and only requires periodic maintenance treatments for new 
invaders – to extremely high amounts when the land is densely invaded, given the 
inevitability of wildfires that will lead to massive seed germination periodically. Quite 
clearly, decision-makers need to ensure that everything possible is done to stop 
catchments from being invaded in the first place. 
 
From a decision-making perspective, the Minister would need to be informed of the 
immediate and long-term clearing costs and water benefits from the clearing (especially in 
areas where additional yield is needed), in order to best decide on what combination of 
water-mix options to use. This is especially so when longer-term considerations may be 
factored into the decision-making, when both dam construction and IAP clearing are given 
the go-ahead. This was the case in Berg River project and to a lesser extent in Phase 2A 
of the Olifants River Catchment Resources Development Plan (when De Hoop Dam was 
built), where partial clearing was required (DWAF, 2005). 
 
An important difference in the case of the Berg River Dam is that the DWS and its 
implementing agent (the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA)) committed themselves 
to ensuring that the catchment around the dam was cleared at the time of the decision by 
the then Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, Mr Ronnie Kasrils, to go ahead with the 
dam. They have largely kept their word, with R15 million (paid over five years) of the 
agreed R21.35 million (to have been paid over eight years) having been paid over to WfW 
to implement the work, run the necessary training, and perform the initial and the follow-up 
clearing (N. Oliver, personal communication, 23 October 2014). The planned clearing and 
follow-up work was completed at a cost lower than what was originally budgeted. 
 
However, those who were promoting conservation alternatives were seeking more than 
just the clearing of the catchment of the Berg River Dam (C. Marais, personal 
communication, 3 April 201). They were arguing for the clearing of all catchments for all 
existing dams supplying the City of Cape Town. Their logic was that all options affecting 
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overall security of supply should be addressed, rather than looking at just one catchment 
in isolation. The IAP clearing that has been done in these catchments is shown in black in 
Figure 5.18. The main argument was that the long-term implications of not clearing 
catchments would be that invasions would spread, and the long-term clearing costs would 
be significantly higher. The existing IAP seed bank ensures that long-term follow-up work 
will be required.  
 
Figure 5.18: IAP clearing in the catchments of dams that supply Cape Town with 
water  
 
(Source: Wannenburgh, 2014) 
 
The estimates provided by this study (Table 5.8) demonstrate that the authorities have no 
option but to control IAPs in the catchments. These are the ―water factories‖ (Nel et al., 
2013) that will determine whether existing agriculture and other users will have enough 
water, let alone any new developments requiring water. Thus, the analysis in this case 
appears different from the other three dams selected, in that the Berg River Dam was 
primarily an augmentation of supply of water to the City of Cape Town, which was already 
served by other dams that themselves had IAPs in their catchments.  
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Looking at the catchments of the dams supplying Cape Town, the key questions would be 
whether the water released by the clearing of the catchments of these dams would exceed 
the quantity yielded through the Berg River Dam, and what proportion of the water 
released by the clearing of the catchments would be able to be stored in the dry months. 
Another factor would be the higher evaporation rates in the dry summer months, and what 
influence that might have on actual yield. In summary, the question to ask is: would it 
make more sense to clear the existing catchments of dams, from a yield perspective as a 
result of the enhanced runoff (especially in low-flow periods), than to build a dam at the 
cost and capacity of the Berg River Dam. 
 
Those arguing for clearing the catchments maintain that clearing IAPs is not a direct 
comparison with the volume of water at the time of the decision (to build the dam), but that 
it must also take into consideration future invasions and their long-term effects on water 
supply security as well as on water quality (Marais & Wannenburgh, 2008; Larsen et al., 
2001; Le Maitre et al., 2000; Van Wilgen et al., 1997).  
 
What complicates the Berg River Dam situation, unlike for example the Inyaka Dam, is that 
the catchments are largely the responsibility of the authorities. State money is going to 
have to be found to do this clearing work, and these costs will escalate significantly if IAPs 
are allowed to spread, grow and dominate in an area. Any delays in clearing in the 
mountainous areas potentially result in exponential increases in the long-term costs, given 
the difficulties in clearing high-altitude areas. 
 
When water is stored in dams, it is for the use of downstream or water transfer 
beneficiaries. Although the bulk of the water from the Berg River Dam is for the City of 
Cape Town (which has a higher assurance of supply than for agricultural use), part of the 
storage is for the water-users situated down-river. The dam releases water to meet the 
needs of the Ecological Reserve, as well as for farmers and others utilising run-of-river 
abstraction downstream. However, these needs could have been met, and exceeded, by 
clearing IAPs in the riparian areas of the river (and indeed elsewhere in the catchments 
flowing in to the river below the dam), especially since at a national level there is little 
difference between reliable yield and demand for water. Nationally, reliable yield is 
estimated to be 13 227 million cubic metres per annum and demand is estimated to be 
12 871 million cubic metres per annum (DWA, 2013b). 
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In this scenario, the authorities could then either build a dam and release amounts of water 
needed by downstream farmers and other run-of-river users - or they could achieve a 
similar result by clearing the IAPs from the riparian areas downstream of the dam. Marais 
and Wannenburgh (2007) calculated that the volume of water (yield) secured through the 
clearing of IAPs would be 34.4 million cubic metres (61% of the yield of Berg River Dam), 
at a cost of R 116 million including follow-up costs, or just over seven per cent of the total 
cost of R1.6 billion for the Berg River Dam). There is corroboration of significant impacts 
on yield from the work done by Van Wilgen et al. (1997) in the Theewaterskloof Dam 
catchment and Larson et al. (2001) in the George catchments.  
 
The yield from clearing of IAPs is less certain than from building a dam and it would take 
longer to implement – but it would then create more and longer-lasting jobs (given the 
need for follow-up clearing). Furthermore, the cost of the impact of not clearing increases 
rapidly. As an example, photographs taken in a small area of the Outeniqua Mountains 
(Figure 5.19), show how Pinus species can dominate catchments. Once established to 
these levels, the initial and especially the follow-up clearing costs are extremely high 
(given the need to abseil to get to the plants, and the transport costs), and fire becomes a 
major factor in the costs to address the invasions. A fire in the Soetkraal area, to the south 
of the area photographed in Figure 5.19, was estimated to cost WfW about R10 million in 
follow-up costs, as their capacity to respond to IAP regrowth following unexpected fires is 
limited (Marais, 2015). 
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Figure 5.19: Pines dominating catchments in a small area of the Outeniqua 
Mountains in the southern Cape 
 
(Source: Pretorius, 2012) 
 
There would also be considerations for the water that would flow out to sea (and then the 
ecological benefits of estuarine requirements for fresh water). While these considerations 
are complex, they do suggest that the real trade-offs between the provision of water 
through the Berg River Dam and the conservation benefits of the control of IAPs for the 
benefits of the users, were not fully thought through. 
 
To these costs and considerations must be added the additional costs and benefits of the 
different options. The clearing of IAPs can have significant conservation and biodiversity 
benefits. Many jobs would be created that target the National Development Plan goals of 
combatting inequity, poverty and unemployment (National Planning Commission, 2012). 
Further benefits include: fewer wildfires, a reduction in erosion, siltation and flooding, and 
an improvement in water quality (Le Maitre et al., 2002). Additionally, there are tourism 
and recreational benefits of control of IAPs; canoeists have lost their lives on the Berg 
River by being trapped under IAPs and drowning. If one option has many more positive 
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externalities than another, these should surely feature in the decision-making of the 
authorities. 
 
A strong likelihood exists of finding a biological control agent against pine trees (Figure 
5.20), and indeed, two inadvertently introduced species are already affecting pines, 
namely the sirex wasp (Hurley, 2010) and the pitch canker fungus disease (Wingfield et 
al., 2008). However, the implications for the forestry industry of releasing these agents 
would be significant. As the availability of fresh water will inevitably override the benefits of 
the forestry industry, it may be surmised that this option will have to be faced by the 
authorities in years to come. Given that the forestry industry is worth billions of rand and 
provides many sustainable jobs, this is not a decision that can be lightly taken. 
Management of IAPs remains, however, as one of the externalities which should have 
featured in the decision-making regarding the building of the Berg River Dam, as this 
consideration could have helped to place a figure on the opportunity cost of first building 
the dam before securing the catchments in terms of IAPs. 
 
Figure 5.20: Dense invasions of Hakea sericea and Pine trees 
 
(Source: Van Wilgen, 2014) 
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5.6.4 Case 4: De Hoop Dam catchment 
The De Hoop Dam is located on the Steelpoort River in Limpopo Province. It is located at 
the northern edge of quaternary catchments B41E and B41F, as shown in Figure 5.21. 
Added to these are a further four quaternary catchments spread over both Limpopo and 
Mpumalanga Provinces – B41A to B41D – that feed into the dam. The six quaternary 
catchments are all located in the Olifants WMA. The De Hoop Dam catchment is the 
biggest case study in terms of total catchment area. 
 
Figure 5.21: Location of the De Hoop Dam and the upstream quaternary catchments 
 
(Source: Van Den Berg et al., 2008) 
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The De Hoop Dam catchment has a variety of land cover types, the most abundant of 
which is natural (unimproved) grassland, seen in beige, in Figure 5.22. Upstream of the 
dam (B41C, B41E and the lower half of B41F) the natural vegetation is largely thicket, 
bushland, and forests and woodland – all of which can be invaded. Further upstream from 
the dam (B41A, B41B and the upper half of B41F), the land cover is largely made up of 
natural grassland (able to be invaded) and cultivated land (assumed to be transformed and 
thus not invadable). Quaternary catchments B41A, B41D and B41E contain some urban 
land cover, while B41A also contains the majority of the forest plantations in the De Hoop 
catchment, which are largely Eucalyptus and Pinus species (Kotzé et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 5.22: Land cover in the quaternary catchment upstream of the De Hoop Dam 
 
(Source: Van Den Berg et al., 2008) 
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Of the four cases in this research, the De Hoop catchment has the highest proportion of 
invadable land, as 82 per cent is classified to be natural/semi-natural land cover. De Hoop 
catchment is invaded predominantly by Eucalyptus and Wattle in the riparian zones and 
Pinus and Wattle in the dryland zones. De Hoop catchment has by far the most extensive 
invasions (17 295 condensed hectares) and the highest cost to clear (R 287 million) and 
the least amount of IAP clearing (Figure 5.23). 
 
Figure 5.23: IAP clearing (in black) upstream of De Hoop Dam 
 
(Source: Wannenburgh, 2014) 
 
In total, WfW has spent R2.4 million (in 2013 rand values) clearing the equivalent of 180 
condensed hectares of IAPs. This is a surprisingly small amount to have spent on such an 
important catchment, given the water quality problems in the Olifants catchment (Ashton 
and Dabrowski, 2011).  
 
Like the Inyaka catchment case, the calculations for the hypothetical scenarios, looking 45 
years into the future from 2008, were split into riparian and dryland zone calculations 
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before being combined for the catchment total. The calculations are summarised using 
conservative densification rates of one per cent in Table 5.8 and five per cent in Table 5.9.  
 
Table 5.8: Combined calculation using the 844/m3/ha/yr optimal Eucalyptus 
reduction (riparian) and the 408/m3/ha/yr optimal pine reduction (Dryland). 
Densification rate = 1% 
Year 
Total 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction 
of MAR 
(million 
m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008  173,638       17,295  7.39%   7.98  5.94%    206.06  - 
2023  217,916       54,393  23.26%  25.10  18.68%    648.04  314% 
2038  230,380       92,061  39.36%  42.48  31.62%  1,096.83 532% 
2053  233,146  128,138  54.79%  59.12  44.01%  1,526.66 741% 
(Source: Modelling by researcher and Dr David Le Maitre, using unpublished data from (D. 
Le Maitre, personal communication, 13 April 2015 and Kotzé et al., 2010)) 
 
It is estimated, in Table 5.9, that the area invaded will increase to 128 138 condensed 
hectares in 45 years, representing 55 per cent of the catchment. Natural MAR would be 
reduced by 44 per cent and the cost to clear would increase to R1.53 billion, a cost 
increase of 741 per cent. The higher densification rate used in Table 5.10, results in these 
estimated impacts nearly doubling. 
 
Table 5.9: Combined calculation using the 844/m3/ha/yr optimal Eucalyptus 
reduction (riparian) and the 408/m3/ha/yr optimal pine reduction (Dryland). 
Densification rate = 5% 
Year 
Total 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction 
of MAR 
(million 
m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008 173,638       17,295  7.39%    7.98  5.94%    206.06  - 
2023 217,916       54,393  23.26%   85.43  63.59%  2,205.82  1070% 
2038 230,380       92,061  39.36%  106.30  79.13%  2,744.77  1332% 
2053 233,146      233,146  99.69%  107.58  80.08%  2,777.74  1348% 
(Source: Modelling by researcher and Dr David Le Maitre, using unpublished data from (D. 
Le Maitre, personal communication, 13 April 2015 and Kotzé et al., 2010)) 
 
Like the Inyaka and Nandoni cases, clearing the IAPs in the catchment would not have 
compensated for the potential yields and water security that were provided by the 
construction of the dam. However, if follow-up clearing is not continued, estimates suggest 
that IAPs will cause a major water security problem. Unlike the Inyaka and Nandoni cases, 
however, IAP management has appeared in the De Hoop Dam planning documents, albeit 
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briefly, as no evidence of a deep, analytical consideration of non-infrastructure-based 
options could be found. 
 
It is clear from the above analysis that the authorities cannot allow IAPs to spread, densify 
and grow as is projected. The water losses are not affordable, and the cost-to-clear 
budgets – increasing to over R2.8 billion in time (whether or not over 45 years) – are 
prohibitive. It patently makes sense to have a strategy for clearing and maintaining the 
catchment in a cleared state, at the time of commissioning the dam. Not to do so makes as 
little sense as not budgeting for operational and maintenance costs for the dam itself. 
Once again, then, it can be concluded from this analysis that the Minister at the time was 
not put in a position to make an informed decision, and to ensure that a comprehensive 
strategy for long-term water security in the area was sought, rather than a simple plan to 
build a dam. 
 
5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The second objective of this research project is to analyse the costs and benefits of IAP 
management as a water supply option. To achieve this objective IAP management was 
discussed as a general concept, within the context of a range of water-mix options. Then 
the current and potential future costs and effects of IAP management were analysed within 
the context of the four case study catchments. 
 
As a first and very clear finding, the results show that the clearing of IAPs in these 
catchments would not have provided anywhere near the amount of water that has been 
secured through the building of each of the dams. Even the Berg River Dam case, where 
other catchments could be cleared, would not provide the yields that the planners had 
deemed necessary. From this respect, the Ministers could be said to have made informed 
decisions to go ahead with the dam, albeit only based on this one alternative, the clearing 
of the IAPs in the catchments of the dams. It can also be argued that, without a dam to 
catch the enhanced MAR from clearing the IAPs, the benefits of clearing would be diluted 
further. Nevertheless a comparison of the management of IAPs in all four cases ought to 
have been provided to the Minister at the time, to enable him to have made a fully 
informed decision. There is no evidence, however, that this was done. Notwithstanding this 
fact, the pivotal argument needs to relate to what will happen to yield in the future, if 
clearing is not done. 
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A second, and more relevant finding, is that if the clearing of IAPs is not done, and they 
are allowed to spread to their full potential, the IAPs can reduce the MAR and yield 
substantially in the long-term (46 per cent of MAR in the Berg River Dam case). Areas that 
are not currently invaded will become invaded, demanding extreme long-term 
management. Wildfires, which are natural and necessary for ecosystem functioning in fire-
adapted systems at certain times, will exacerbate the spread of IAPs. Moreover, the cost 
of controlling the IAPs grows exponentially, and can reach a threshold where it is no longer 
affordable to control them (given their copious and long-lived seed banks). The evidence 
suggests that clearing of IAPs from catchments (especially riparian areas) is essential for 
long-term assurance of water supply and the need for this clearing should have been 
factored into water supply decision-making from the outset. 
 
A major conclusion of this chapter is that water resource planning is not just for immediate 
needs, but for long-term, sustainable supply. That being the case, the management of 
IAPs ought to have been a critical consideration by the Ministers when taking decisions 
regarding all four of the case-study dams. The estimated long-term reduction in MAR by 
IAPs, if they are not controlled, far outweighs the increase in MAR and the yield from 
constructing a dam. What is more, climate change effects, while difficult to quantify, are 
likely to exacerbate the situation (Midgley et al., 2005).  
 
In the case of the Berg River Dam, a specific budget to clear IAPs in the catchment was 
agreed to, after representation by WfW. This was not done in the subsequent decision to 
build the De Hoop Dam, and nor was it done in the two prior decisions, for the Nandoni 
and Inyaka dams. These four cases demonstrate the need to secure budgets for the long-
term conservation of the supply of water through IAP management and other water-mix 
options. Furthermore, the cases demonstrate the need for legal enforcement of IAP 
management.  
 
Options to regulate IAPs have been possible through the Conservation of Agricultural 
Resources Act (Act No. 43 of 1983), the National Water Act (Act No. 36 of 1998), the 
Mountain Catchment Areas Act (Act No. 63 of 1970) and the recent Alien and Invasive 
Species Regulations (DEA, 2014a), in terms of the National Environmental Management: 
Biodiversity Act (No. 10 of 2004). It would also make sense for decision-makers to require 
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a legal enforcement of the control of IAPs, to protect the catchments from the water loss 
and many other negative impacts of IAPs. Yet this, too, has never been done. 
 
What becomes increasingly obvious is that the potential of using catchment management 
options to improve water resources management has not been effectively realised within 
the decision-making mechanisms regarding water supply in South Africa. Nor is there any 
comprehensive retrospective analysis that has been done in South Africa on the efficacy of 
the management of catchments for water security, notwithstanding a slew of work related 
to organisations like the Working for Water programme in particular (for example, 
Meijninger & Jarmain, 2014; Le Maitre et al., 2013; Marais & Wannenburgh, 2008, Blignaut 
et al., 2007; Everson et al., 2007; Görgens & Van Wilgen, 2004; Marais et al., 2004; Le 
Maitre & Görgens, 2003; Le Maitre et al., 2000 Van Wilgen et al., 1997). Ministers have 
clearly not been put in a position to make informed decisions regarding dams in South 
Africa, in comparison to investments in alternatives, including with respect to catchment 
management. 
 
It is finally concluded that the various Ministers were not put in a position to make fully 
informed decisions for optimal water security in the long-term, when approving each of the 
four dams that form the case studies for this research. 
 
In the following chapter, (Chapter Six) the decision to build De Hoop Dam is considered. 
The decision to build is examined through an analysis of the decision-making that took 
place, using the rational decision-making model (Zindiye, 2012) as a framework. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EVALUATING THE DECISION TO BUILD THE DE HOOP DAM 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapters Four and Five, four dams (Inyaka, Berg River, Nandoni and De Hoop) 
together with their catchments were discussed and analysed in terms of the costs and 
benefits of constructing the dams, and of clearing the IAPs from the dam catchments 
(linking to the first two objectives of this study). In Chapter Six, the third objective – 
evaluating the quality of the decision-making process in which the decision to build De 
Hoop Dam was made using a decision-making model – is discussed.  
 
As discussed in Chapters Four and Five (under 4.4. and 5.6.4), the De Hoop Dam is 
located on the Steelpoort River as Phase 2A of the Olifants River Water Resources 
Development Project (hereafter referred to as ORWRDP Phase 2A). The De Hoop Dam 
was planned, designed and built by the DWS to supply water for domestic and industrial 
(mining) purposes. At the end of 2014, the construction of De Hoop Dam was 99 per cent 
complete. The De Hoop Dam was expected to cost R1.744 billion (in December 2012 rand 
values); by December 2014 it had cost R3.1 billion (in December 2012 rand values). Some 
of the reasons for the cost (and time) overruns include: the economic recession of 
2008/2009 which stifled the development of mines (which were supposed to pay half the 
De Hoop Dam costs); the demand for infrastructure development capacity leading up to 
the 2010 Soccer World Cup; unanticipated rainfall impacts that delayed construction; 
construction labour force strikes; foundation excavations needing to be much greater than 
anticipated (and subsequently concrete usage nearly doubling); and conservative design 
decisions (for example, using roller compacted concrete rather than rock fill in the left 
embankment) (Cloete, 2014).  
 
In addition to the cost increases, the estimated yield for the De Hoop Dam was re-
evaluated. When the building of this dam was authorised (in the record of implementation 
decisions report (DEAT, 2005)) the estimated yield was stated as 80 million cubic metres 
per annum (DWAF, 2006b). The estimated yield was recalculated (on new information, 
including better water use information), as part of the Olifants Reconciliation Strategy, as 
66 million cubic metres per annum (DWA, 2010). This represents a 17.5 per cent decrease 
in the estimated yield of De Hoop Dam. The decrease in estimated yield and the near 
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doubling of costs indicate a large gap between the original estimates and the actual 
outcomes. These gaps suggest that making a retrospective analysis of the decision-
making process related to the building of the De Hoop Dam (Figure 6.1) is worthwhile. 
 
Figure 6.1: Releasing of water from the De Hoop Dam. 
 
(Source: GCIS, 2014) 
 
In the decision to build the De Hoop Dam, the DWS (as well as other sections of the South 
African Government, notably Cabinet) had to make many decisions of varying magnitude, 
importance and consequence. Chapter Six focuses on evaluating the decision to build De 
Hoop Dam by firstly considering the ORWRDP Phase 2A decision-making documents 
(DWAF, 2006a; 2006b; DEAT, 2005; 2006) and associated documents, and secondly, by 
analysing the views and opinions of ten key people involved in managing different aspects 
of the planning and construction of the De Hoop Dam. Decision-making models and other 
components of the decision-making process (Zindiye, 2012) are discussed in the following 
section. 
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6.2 DECISION-MAKING MODELS 
One of the fundamental aspects of all levels of management is decision-making. Decision-
making ranges from routine (of little consequence, for example, ordering office supplies), 
to key decisions with importance and major consequences (for example, what type of dam 
wall to build and where to build it). Decision-making is the outcome of a process which is 
essential in all stages of the lifecycle of any project. The decision-making process 
essentially includes: understanding and explaining a problem, collecting information, 
determining alternative solutions and selecting a response and reviewing the decision-
making (Zindiye, 2012, Turpin & Marais, 2004). However, decision-making is rarely a 
straightforward process because of the uncertainty embedded in decisions made in the 
present, with assumptions about the future. Impacts envisaged and assumptions made are 
affected by multiple internal and external forces which the decision-makers may have little 
or no control over. In attempting to account for this uncertainty, decision-making is often 
supported by a decision-making model (or models). There are many different models of 
decision-making, some of which are listed in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: A selection of decision-making models 
Decision-making model References 
The rational model Zindiye, 2012; Turpin & Marais, 2004 
The bounded rationality model Zindiye, 2012; Turpin & Marais, 2004 
The political model Zindiye, 2012; Turpin & Marais, 2004 
Simon‘s sequential model Paul et al., 2015  
Mintzberg, Raisinghani & Theroret‘s iterative model Paul et al., 2015 
March and colleagues‘ anarchical model Paul et al., 2015 
Single objective management model (with bee algorithm) Paul et al., 2015 
The multiple perspectives model Turpin & Marais, 2004 
The garbage can model Turpin & Marais, 2004 
(Source: Researcher‘s own construction) 
 
All the models listed in Table 6.1 have limitations. For example, the single objective 
management model (Paul et al., 2015) cannot deal with more than one objective, and in 
the garbage can model (Turpin & Marais, 2004), any decision that is made, is completely 
dependent on the people who make up the decision-making group. Furthermore, some of 
the models, such as the single objective management model, are not commonly used. 
Zindiye (2012) presents the rational, bounded rationality and political models in relation to 
management in South Africa.  
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In the context of this study, solutions to the problem of water scarcity are actively searched 
for, to accomplish the goal of maintaining a positive water balance (i.e. ensuring, as far as 
possible, that water supply is greater than demand). For these reasons, a decision-making 
model is needed that can evaluate the following criteria: the problem, goal setting 
(including multiple objectives as well as environmental forces), and the process of finding, 
assessing and choosing solutions. None of the four models discussed in Paul et al. (2015) 
is detailed enough to be able to evaluate all of these mentioned criteria. Furthermore, the 
garbage can model (Turpin & Marais, 2004), does not solve all the problems as it ends 
abruptly when a decision is made. The multiple perspectives model (Turpin & Marais, 
2004) focuses on collecting as many stakeholder views of the problem as possible at the 
expense of the other criteria listed above. The rational, bounded rationality and political 
models, however, are able (to varying degrees) to evaluate the above-mentioned criteria 
and are thus discussed further. Additionally, no empirical evidence of these decision-
making models being applied in other water resource-related studies has been found. 
 
6.2.1 Rational decision-making model 
The rational decision-making model describes a set of seven steps that improve the 
likelihood that a group or individual‘s decision-making will be reliable and logical (Zindiye, 
2012). The rational model aims to achieve the greatest number of goals with the given 
limitations and does not focus on the appropriateness of the goals themselves (Zindiye, 
2012).  
 
The rational model has the following limitations: not all the steps are always followed in 
order or at all (especially in non-routine decisions); decision-makers are expected to know 
the alternative options and their various impacts (these can be difficult to quantify in 
uncertain conditions); and in reality, human decision-making only comes close to the 
rational model (Zindiye, 2012:261-264; Turpin & Marais, 2004). On the other hand, the 
rational model has these advantages: it is a logical sequence of steps; it promotes 
alternatives with the greatest utility; it takes internal and external forces into consideration; 
and it maximises goal attainment within the given restrictions (Zindiye, 2012:261-264; 
Turpin & Marais, 2004). 
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The seven steps of the rational model are affected by internal and external influences, 
such as stakeholder desires or changes in commodity prices such as concrete (Figure 
6.2).  
 
Figure 6.2: The rational decision-making model 
 
(Source: Zindiye, 2012:261) 
 
The seven steps are cyclical in nature (Figure 6.2). The process starts with perceiving 
(called ‗noticing‘), defining (‗interpreting‘) and understanding (‗incorporating‘) a problem. 
‗Noticing‘ involves identifying environmental forces that are contributing to the problem, for 
example a dam collapsed. The identified environmental forces are then assessed as to 
whether they are root (for example, the dam was structurally unsound) or symptomatic 
causes (for example, there was above average rainfall before the dam collapsed) of the 
problem in the ‗interpreting‘ stage. Lastly, ‗incorporating‘ relates the problem and root 
causes to the goal setting of Step Two (for example, what goals can dam builders set to 
make sure the new dam is structurally sound) (Zindiye, 2012). 
 
The second step is to set goals that solve the problem though eradicating the root causes. 
Under conditions of uncertainty, setting specific goals can be extremely difficult because 
there is often insufficient information on which to judge the acceptability of the goals. When 
uncertainty is present, alternative goals are compared and evaluated by the decision-
makers and the best option based on the available information is chosen (Zindiye, 2012). 
After setting the goals, Step Three is to search for alternative solutions to achieve the 
goals. Alternative solutions are produced through a variety of methods including additional 
research, data-gathering, calling upon experts and brainstorming sessions. If no 
alternative solutions are found, then the decision-makers may need to go back to Step 
Two and revise the goals that were set.  
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After a range of alternative solutions has been acknowledged in Step Three, the solutions 
are contrasted and assessed in Step Four (Figure 6.2). The criteria for contrasting and 
assessing the solutions depends on the specific components of the decision-making 
process (i.e. the type of problem, the type of decisions and the goals) and the nature of the 
decision to be made. For example, when deciding how to supply more water to an area, 
dams and other alternatives can be compared using URVs (refer to section 4.2.6).  
 
The DWS uses a range of criteria and analyses (known collectively as multi-criteria 
analysis – see section 4.2.7), to contrast and assess alternative water-mix solutions, in 
order to best provide water to an area. After the alternative solutions are contrasted and 
assessed, decision-makers must choose a solution or solutions (Step Five). Choosing a 
solution can be difficult when the problem is unusual and ambiguous (non-programmed – 
such as deciding on the best option for providing additional water to an area) as the levels 
of risk and uncertainty are high. After choosing a solution or solutions, they need to be 
implemented (Step Six). If a solution cannot be implemented for some reason – for 
example, if it is not supported by the majority of stakeholders – the next best solution 
should be examined and, if supported, should then implemented (Zindiye, 2012). 
 
The seventh and final step of the rational process is to review and control the problem(s) 
and the decision-making. Controlling the implementation process and following up the 
implementation by assessing the results is essential, because the goal will not be achieved 
through implementation alone (Zindiye, 2012). Reviewing the problem and implementation 
of the solution may lead to reviewing the goal (if not successfully implemented) or 
redefining the problem and starting the rational process again (Zindiye, 2012). Added to 
this, the internal and external environmental forces which influence every step of the 
rational process, are continuously changing (think of the petrol price), and these changes 
may require the problem and/or goals to be redefined. 
 
Some shortcomings of the rational model are: it is not always necessary to utilise all of the 
above-mentioned steps when making routine decisions, since they are normally made 
under conditions approaching certainty; and the steps are often not followed in order or not 
at all in the case of adaptive or innovative decision-making (Zindiye, 2012; Turpin & 
Marais, 2004; Cohen & Bailey, 1997). Instead, the bounded rationality or political decision-
making models are sometimes applied (albeit not always consciously). A further 
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shortcoming summarised by Zindiye (2012) is that, at most, human decision-making only 
approaches the principle of rationality, which is why people sometimes use the bounded 
rationality or political models instead.  
 
6.2.2 Bounded rationality decision-making model 
The bounded rationality model focuses attention on the shortcomings of rationality (and 
the rational model) and gives a better view of the decision-making processes that many 
people use routinely, as shown in Figure 6.3 (Zindiye, 2012; Turpin & Marais, 2004).  
 
Figure 6.3: The bounded rationality decision-making model 
 
(Source: Zindiye, 2012:264) 
 
The bounded rational model is based on three human tendencies that commonly occur 
during decision-making (Figure 6.3). First, when a problem occurs, people perform limited 
searches for suitable goals and alternative solutions (Zindiye, 2012; Turpin & Marais, 
2004). People will then search until they find a solution that they deem to be acceptable, 
not necessarily the best alternative solution or goal. The next tendency is that people often 
have incomplete or poor information about the problems they are trying to solve, and the 
external forces that influence the decision-making (Zindiye, 2012; Turpin & Marais, 2004). 
Thirdly, the bounded rationality model recognises that people have information-processing 
biases. Examples of these biases are the availability bias (overestimating how often an 
event transpires based on how many times a decision-maker has personally experienced 
it) and the concrete information bias (where personal experience can overshadow other 
information such as statistical suggestions). Together, these three human tendencies lead 
to decision-making, known as a satisficing decision, which is acceptable but not ideal 
(Zindiye, 2012). When stakeholder power is more apparent, the political decision-making 
model is more apt. 
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6.2.3 Political decision-making model 
The political model focuses attention on decision-making that often occurs in governmental 
problem solving (Zindiye, 2012). Decision-making in the political model as shown in Figure 
6.4 is shaped by influential stakeholders, both internal and external, who try to express 
problems to best benefit themselves (Turpin & Marais, 2004).  
 
Figure 6.4: The political decision-making model 
 
(Source: Zindiye, 2012:266) 
 
In the political model (Figure 6.4), it is likely that disagreement will occur over what goals 
to set and whether they are conflicting or not (Turpin & Marais, 2004). The influence of 
stakeholders may be one-sided or relatively equal between a few key stakeholders. In 
cases where a stakeholder has the majority of the influence, the decision-making will likely 
reflect the stakeholder‘s own goals (Turpin & Marais, 2004). When the influence is 
relatively equal between stakeholders, discussions and compromises regarding goals may 
occur (Zindiye, 2012).  
 
As with the setting of goals, there is often disagreement over alternative solutions and 
whether to search for them or not. Disagreements between stakeholders often result in 
insufficient searching for alternative solutions. Solution disagreement also occurs because 
stakeholders view information as having influence (or power) and so they use or withhold 
information to best achieve their own goals, sometimes at the expense of others (Turpin & 
Marais, 2004). Furthermore, political decision-makers (especially when influence is one-
sided) occasionally pursue self-serving goals that are short-termed, constrained and 
ethically contentious (Zindiye, 2012). 
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6.2.4 Selection of decision-making model as a framework 
The DWS has long been driven by supply-side thinking without a deep consideration of 
DSM options (DWA, 2013b; DWAF, 2004; DWAF, 1986). This is evident from the fact that 
over 5 000 dams (with walls of over five metres or a capacity greater than 1 000 000 cubic 
metres) have been built and registered in South Africa over the past century by the DWs 
and others (DWS, 2014). Although DSM options have been acknowledged, there has only 
been limited implementation as they are regularly considered not to be viable options by 
water decision-makers due to possible lack of knowledge, understanding and base line 
supply-side information, with which to compare DSM options (Rabe et al., 2012). In the 
second National Water Resources Strategy (DWA, 2013b), DWS has put effort into 
promoting water conservation and water demand management, calling it an essential part 
of ensuring that enough water for current and future demand exists. Evidence of 
successful and continued implementation of DSM by DWS is yet to be seen.  
 
Nevertheless, the supply-side focus would bias decision-making by the DWS, in terms of 
which solutions are taken seriously and which solutions are considered at only a basic 
level to satisfy regulations. In the governmental decision to build De Hoop Dam, it is 
evident that politics, and therefore to some degree the political decision-making model, 
played a role. Despite this, the political and bounded-rationality models, due to their 
numerous limitations discussed above, will not be used as a framework to analyse the 
decision to build the De Hoop Dam. Rather, the rational model is used as a framework in 
this chapter.  
 
Over and above the limitations of other decision-making models, the rational model was 
selected because: it is most likely to result in a group or individual‘s decision-making being 
reliable and logical; it is a logical step-by-step process; the limitations of the rational model, 
such as the steps not being followed in order when innovative decisions are made, are not 
as severe as those of the bounded rationality or political models; and because the rational 
model actively takes external forces into account at every step (Zindiye, 2012). However, 
in following the logical process of the rational model, aspects of the bounded rationality 
and political models may influence some of the steps because, as Zindiye (2012) 
suggests, human decision-making at best only approaches the principle of rationality. 
  
157 
 
The seven steps of the rational model are used as a framework to evaluate the quality of 
the decision-making process used in building the De Hoop Dam. With each step, the 
decision-making that resulted in the decision to build the De Hoop Dam is compared to the 
definition, as outlined by Zindiye (2012:262-263), using interview findings and related 
documentation, to support the comparison. 
 
6.3 RESEARCH METHODS 
The data collection methods used in this chapter are documentation (see section 3.3.1) 
and semi-structured, in-depth interviews (see section 3.3.3). The data analysis methods 
used in this chapter are intra-case analysis (see section 3.3.5), content analysis (see 
section 3.3.6) to analyse the interviews and decision-making process (see section 3.3.7). 
The interview guide (list of questions) is presented in Appendix E. The research design, 
methodology and methods relevant to this study have been explained in more detail in 
Chapter Three. 
  
6.4 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
This study was undertaken in 2013 when the dam construction was nearly complete; it 
recognised that the decision to build the dam was driven by supply-side thinking without a 
deep consideration of DSM options. The study has reviewed the economic costs and 
benefits of the dam (in Chapter Four) and of IAP management (as a management water-
mix option in Chapter Five).  
 
In this chapter the quality of the decision-making process in building De Hoop Dam is 
interrogated with reference to interviews as well as to DWS and other documents (listed in 
section 6.4.1) which relate to the decision to build this dam. The interview guide was 
constructed with the assumption that there is a need for additional water supply in the 
catchment. 
 
The findings are presented in the following manner: interviewees‘ perceptions of the 
decision-making model appear in section 6.4.2; findings relating to interviewees‘ 
perceptions of the decision-making process according to the rational decision-making 
model are discussed in section 6.4.3. A reflection on the interview questions is then 
presented in section 6.4.5. 
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6.4.1 Documents relating to the decision to build De Hoop Dam 
Documentation together with the results of interviews with key participants (data collection triangulation), is used to construct a 
narrative of evidence concerning the decision-making involved in building De Hoop Dam. In the documentation, principal references 
list additional documents that could not be individually sourced and are therefore termed secondary documents in Table 6.2. These 
secondary documents, by their titles, provide evidence of attention to particular decision-making steps. 
 
The principal and secondary documents relating to the decision to build De Hoop Dam are listed in Table 6.2, and are linked to the 
relevant step(s) of the RDMM shown in Figure 6.2. The RDMM steps are as follows: Step 1: define and diagnose problem; Step 2: 
set goals; Step 3: search for alternative solutions; Step 4: compare solutions; Step 5: choose a solution; Step 6: implement chosen 
solution; and Step 7: follow-up and control. Furthermore, Table 6.2 provides comments on how and why each document relates to 
the relevant RDMM step(s). Principal documents are labelled D1 to D8 and secondary documents are labelled D1.1, D1.2 and so 
on. 
 
Table 6.2: Timeline of relevant documents relating to decision to build De Hoop Dam, the Olifants River Water Resources 
Development Project (ORWRDP) Phase 2A, in relation to the relevant steps of the rational decision-making model (RDMM) 
Date Principal 
reference 
Secondary document Comments  Relevant 
RDMM 
step(s) 
1991 Aston, 2000 
(D1) 
(D1.1) Water Resources Planning of 
the Olifants River Basin - Study of 
Development Potential and 
Management of the Water Resources 
D1.1 provides the earliest evidence that DWS spent time defining future problems, as 
well as proposing future goals and alternative solutions. It describes the culmination 
of a six-year desktop study commencing in 1985 to create a river basin management 
plan for the Olifants River basin. D1.1 is also briefly mentioned in D2 as part of a list 
of Olifants River basin planning investigations (DWAF, 2006a). 
1, 2, 3 
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Date Principal 
reference 
Secondary document Comments  Relevant 
RDMM 
step(s) 
2000 Aston, 2000 
(D1) 
(D1.2) Pre-feasibility Study on Bulk 
Water Supply in the Middle Olifants 
and Steelpoort River Area 
D1.2 provides further evidence of DWS assessing the water supply situation and 
searching for alternative water resource development solutions in the Steelpoort 
River area of the Olifants River basin. It also indicates that alternative solutions were 
assessed. D1.2 is also briefly mentioned in D2 as part of a list of Olifants River basin 
planning investigations (DWAF, 2006a). 
1, 2, 3, 4 
2001 DWAF, 
2006a (D2) 
(D2.1) Olifants - Sand Water Transfer 
Scheme: Feasibility of Further 
Phases 
D2.1 provides additional evidence that alternative solutions were considered by 
DWS. It forms part of a list of Olifants River basin planning investigations. 
3 
2003 DWAF, 
2006a (D2)  
(D2.2) Olifants River Water 
Resources Development Plan Study: 
Water Requirements assessment 
study for future economic 
development in the Dikolong Corridor. 
D2.2 provides evidence of an analysis of the (potential) mining water needs in the 
Steelpoort Catchment and surrounding areas. It updates the water supply needs and 
planning goals of the Olifants River basin. 
1, 2 
2003 DWAF, 
2006a (D2) 
(D2.3) A Strategy to Secure Water in 
Support of Social and Economic 
Development in the potential area to 
be supplied from the Middle Olifants 
River catchment 
D2.3 provides further evidence of DWS defining and refining the water supply needs 
and goals to satisfy those needs. 
3 
2003 (14 
February) 
Mbeki, 2003 
(D3) 
 D3 is the 2003 State of the nation address of the [former] president of South Africa, 
Thabo Mbeki. D3 is the first public announcement that a dam would be built on the 
Olifants River system (See quote below). Officially setting a major goal. D3 is also 
briefly mentioned in D2 (DWAF, 2006a). “This investment will include … a dam on 
the Olifants River in the Limpopo Province to provide water for platinum mining and 
agriculture” (Mbeki, 2003) 
2 
2004 June DWAF, 
2006a (D2) 
(D2.4) Memorandum to Cabinet  D2.4 is the memorandum from the Minister of Water and Sanitation to Cabinet with 
key project recommendations. It provides evidence of DWS presenting their chosen 
solution for approval. 
5 
2004 (9 June) DWAF, 
2006b (D4) 
(D4.1) Cabinet Resolution D4.1 provides evidence that De Hoop Dam was to be built on a fast-track premise 
(planning and design occurred concurrently). Environmental authorisation was still 
needed at this point, after which construction would be able to start. D4.1 thus 
provides evidence of a solution being chosen and conditionally approved. 
5, 6 
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Date Principal 
reference 
Secondary document Comments  Relevant 
RDMM 
step(s) 
2005 (21 
November) 
DEAT, 2005 
(D5) 
 D5 is the Record of decision (ROD) for ORWRDP (Phase 2): Infrastructure 
development. It provides evidence of the permission and conditions (from the 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism) that allowed DWS to build the De 
Hoop Dam. D5 is also referred to extensively in D7 (Couzens & Dent, 2006) and 
briefly in D4 (DWAF, 2006b). Mining is not mentioned in the RoD as a reason for the 
project. The first reason given refers to the rural communities‟ needs.  
6 
2006 Feb 
(started 
September 
2005) 
DWAF, 
2006b (D4) 
 D4 is ORWRDP Dam on the Steelpoort River at De Hoop (Phase 2A): Record of 
Implementation decisions. It provides evidence of the official handover of Phase 2A 
from DWS‟s planning directorate to their construction directorate. D4 represents the 
official start of the design and building phases of the De Hoop Dam. 
6 
2006 August 
(started July 
2005) 
DWAF, 
2006a; (D2) 
 
 
D2 is ORWRDP Summary report on detailed planning stage. It provides evidence 
that the DWS spent time defining: the anticipated need for additional water in the 
Olifants River Catchment; how alternative solutions (to meet this need) were 
searched for, considered and rejected; and how De Hoop Dam became the chosen 
solution. D2 is also briefly mentioned in D4 (DWAF, 2006b). 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
2006 (16 
October) 
DEAT, 2006 
(D6) 
 
 
D6 is Revised Record of decision for ORWRDP (Phase 2): Infrastructure 
development. It provides evidence that shows that environmental considerations (and 
appeals) were given required reflection. D6 is also referred to extensively in D7 
(Couzens & Dent, 2006).  
5, 6 
2006 (31 
December) 
Couzens & 
Dent, 2006 
(D7) 
 
 
D7 is an academic paper. Its title is Finding Nema: The National Environmental 
Management Act, the De Hoop Dam, Conflict Resolution and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in Environmental Disputes. It provides evidence of the flaws in the 
environmental impact assessment and record of decision processes. It extensively 
discusses the failings of D5 (DEAT, 2005) and the remedial Steps of D6 (DEAT, 
2006) to rectify the lack of attention given to stakeholders‟ views and environmental 
factors, such as the ecological Reserve not being given serious consideration in D5. 
5, 6 
2010 
(November) 
DWA, 2010 
(D8) 
 D8 is the Development of a reconciliation strategy for the Olifants River Water Supply 
System: Yield Analysis of the De Hoop and Flag Boshielo Dams. It provides evidence 
that DWS followed up on some of the information used in the decision to build De 
Hoop Dam. The document details how the estimated yield of the De Hoop Dam was 
reassessed and reduced from 80 to 64 million cubic metres. 
7 
(Source: Researcher‘s own construction)
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6.4.2 Findings relating to interviewees’ perceptions of decision-making model use 
Interviewees were requested to indicate which model (or models, if any) they thought were 
used in the decision to build De Hoop Dam (ORWRDP Phase 2A). A summary of their 
responses is shown in Table 6.3, after which the findings are discussed in relation to the 
three decision-making models discussed in sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. The discussion 
draws on responses to the interview question 6b. 
  
Question 6b:  In your opinion, which model of decision-making best fits the decision-
making that has occurred during the building of De Hoop Dam? (Diagrams of the three 
models, listed below, were shown to the interviewees for this question): 
 
i. Rational Decision-Making Model (RDMM) 
ii. Bounded Rationality Decision-Making Model (BRDMM) 
iii. Political Decision-Making Model (PDMM) 
 
Table 6.3: Interviewee perceptions of decision-making models used during 
ORWRDP Phase 2A 
Interviewee Project stage involvement Model(s) perceived to be used 
P1 Implementation Rational model 
P2 Implementation Bounded rationality model 
P3 Implementation Rational model – planning 
Bounded rationality and political models – implementation 
P4 Planning Rational model with political pressure 
P5 Implementation Political model – „major decisions‟ 
Rational model – „engineering decisions‟ 
P6 Planning Mix of all three models 
P7 Planning Rational model – planning 
Political model – implementation 
P8 Implementation Rational model 
P9 Planning Rational model with political model „a close second‟ 
P10 Planning Rational model 
(Source: Researcher‘s own construction) 
 
What Table 6.3 shows is that there is little consistency when the interviewee perceptions 
of the decision-making models used are split by interviewees‘ project involvement. The 
interviewees involved in the planning stage (P4, P6, P7, P9, and P10) all agreed that the 
rational decision-making model was present for at least one of the project stages. Four of 
the five planning-based interviewees added that political pressure/decision-making was 
present. While interviewees involved in the implementation stage (P1, P2, P3, P5 and P8) 
also indicated that the rational model was used, only two of the implementation-based 
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interviewees indicated that political pressure was present. Two of the implementation-
based interviewees added that the bounded rationality model was the best fit. 
 
The reason why the planning-based interviewees lean more towards the rational and 
political models is that planning decisions are often politically driven and need acceptance 
from political bodies to go ahead (for example, Cabinet). Then, once a political decision is 
made, the planning directorate can begin the planning process The implementation 
decisions, meanwhile, are more engineering-based and less political in nature (so long as 
the project is completed). This can be seen in the following quotations: 
 
 None of the models fit from inception/conception to operations (P3). 
  
[Decisions are made by a] government department, therefore the political decision-
making model occurs when major decisions are made. For most engineering 
decisions a rational decision-making model route is proposed (P5). 
 
Furthermore, the frequent occurrence of interviewees (six of ten) indicating that more than 
one model of decision-making was present, appears to be due to the lack of interaction 
between project stages, and to the stages overlapping each other. This is portrayed in the 
following quotations: 
 
There is no mechanism in decision-making for revising the planning decisions 
during construction … once the planning and decisions have been made, the details 
are cast in concrete in a record of implementation decisions for another branch of 
DWA to design and construct. So interaction by default is not there. (P3). 
 
Implementation (for example, design) occurred before planning was finished and 
appeals took close to a year to resolve (P4). 
 
There was a disconnect between the planning and construction of De Hoop Dam 
(P7). 
 
163 
 
The De Hoop Dam project differed from other projects from the start in that there 
was continuous time pressure, due to an accelerated work programme. This meant 
that processes that usually follow each other were done in parallel (P10). 
 
From the above quotations, it is apparent that there is a time pressure, a lack of 
retrospective decision-making analyses, and a lack of interaction between people working 
on different sections of the project (at times concurrently). This lack of interaction is partly 
why interviewees have such varied perceptions of which decision-making models were 
used during ORWRDP Phase 2A. Nevertheless, most interviewees perceived the rational 
decision-making model as the model that was used in making the decision to build De 
Hoop Dam. 
 
6.4.3 Findings relating to the decision-making process according to the RDMM 
Findings relating to the seven steps of Zindiye‘s (2012) RDMM are now presented, 
drawing from the documentation (Table 6.2) and responses to interview questions, as 
shown in the interview guide (Appendix E). In each step, a primary question is answered 
from responses to specific questions from the interview guide and relevant documents 
from Table 6.2. The RDMM steps are: Step 1: define and diagnose problem; Step 2: set 
goals; Step 3: search for alternative solutions; Step 4: compare solutions; Step 5: choose a 
solution; Step 6: implement chosen solution; and Step 7: follow-up and control (Zindiye, 
2012).  
 
6.4.3.1 Step 1: Defining and diagnosing the problem 
The primary question arising from the first step in the RDMM is ―Why do we need an 
additional water supply in the Olifants River basin?‖ The following documents (D1.1, D1.2, 
D2.2 and D2) shown in Table 6.2 produced between 1991 and 2006 provide evidence of 
an ongoing process of addressing the aforementioned question. The questions (1, 1a and 
1c) from the interview guide, relevant to addressing this step, were stated as follows: 
 
Question 1: Please can you explain how the need for additional water yield in the 
Steelpoort Catchment was identified?  
 
Question 1a: Which directorate and/or position in the DWA were responsible for identifying 
this need? 
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Question 1c: How was the extent of the need for additional water assessed? 
 
Interviewees had varied opinions concerning how the need for additional yield in the 
Olifants River Catchment was identified. The interviewees involved in planning (P4, P6, 
P7, P9 and P10) indicated that the need was identified through various strategic 
assessments, run by the DWS, over the last 30 years. Evidence from the documents 
(D1.1, D1.2, D2.2 and D2) shown and commented on in Table 6.2 also supported this 
finding. The DWS knew that there was a need to improve (and increase) water access to 
rural communities and platinum mines expressed a need for additional supply. These 
points are highlighted in the following quotations: 
 
 The Department of Water and Sanitation was approached by mining houses with 
plans for new mines. This was a big trigger of the need for additional yield in the 
area. The site [where De Hoop Dam is built] has been known [to DWS] for years as 
one of the best sites in the area. One of the big known problems was the road [the 
R555] that ran through the dam basin (P6). 
  
The mines were quick to exaggerate how much water they needed. They didn’t pay 
attention to the costs initially. The penny dropped and the mines reviewed how 
much water they needed. The mines didn’t want to divulge their mining schemes 
(and water needs) because competing mines were at the DWS meetings. Therefore 
it took a long time for the mines’ actual requirements to come to light (P6). 
 
 [The extent of the need for additional water was measured] through increasing 
population numbers, unit consumption rates, and the mining companies 
approaching DWA and motivating their need for water (P7). 
 
There is a lot of potential mining in the area. National development plan identified 
unlocking the mineral belt of the north as one of its objectives. With the 
development of mining in the area there were new mines applying for water. There 
was also the issue of improving service delivery to rural communities, as many rural 
communities in the area don’t have sufficient access to water (P7). 
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 DWS did their own assessments over time and were quite certain of the need to 
develop the resource in the Mid-Olifants River catchment (P10). 
 
 The Directorate of Options Analysis was responsible for identifying the need for 
additional yield in the catchment. Other units within the Chief Directorate of 
Integrated Water Resource Planning and the Limpopo DWA regional office were 
also involved (P10). 
 
In the first step of the rational model, Zindiye (2012) proposes that three skills are needed 
to define and diagnose a problem, namely ‗noticing‘, ‗interpreting‘ and ‗incorporating‘. The 
first of these is noticing, which identifies environmental forces that are contributing to the 
problem. In the case of the De Hoop Dam, the need for additional water in the Olifants 
Basin (and within that, the Steelpoort River Catchment) illustrates the skill of noticing. 
While Question 1 does not ask specifically about the forces contributing to the problem, it 
does ask how the need for additional water was identified. As is evident from the 
quotations from P6 and P10 above, the interviewees indicated that DWS knew, through 
their Chief Directorate of Integrated Water Resource Planning, that they would have to 
augment water supply in the Steelpoort River Catchment, and lower reaches of the 
Olifants River because of increasing demand for water. DWS knew about the need for 
increased domestic water supply from their own detailed assessments (P9). DWS also 
knew about the mining water needs because the mining companies engage with them 
regarding future water requirements.  
 
The DWS is not a business; it is a government department and as such, there are many 
different people involved in the different stages of decision-making throughout a project. In 
the context of a government decision, knowing which directorate is responsible at this 
stage is important, so that inter-directorate communication can be acknowledged. 
 
The second skill is interpreting, which assesses the environmental forces identified during 
the noticing phase as root causes, and those which are symptomatic. The interviewees 
were not asked to split up the environmental forces into causes and symptoms because 
the researcher assumed that there were two main root causes. Drawing from the 
responses as indicated in the previous section and as evident from the ORWRDP project 
166 
 
documents (for example, D2 and D6), the need for additional domestic water and the 
requests for additional mining water were the root causes. 
 
The third skill is incorporating, which relates the problem(s) and causal environmental 
forces to the goal setting of the second step. Even though this skill was not explicitly dealt 
with in the interview guide, the interviewees allude to the incorporating skill (for example, 
P6 and P7, above and D1.2 and D2.2) when they indicated that the need for additional 
domestic and mining water (the problems) led the DWS to undertake a project to increase 
the water supply in the Olifants River Catchment (the goal).  
 
Furthermore, to effectively diagnose and define problems, many questions should be 
posed (Zindiye, 2012). According to interviewee P9, a detailed assessment was 
undertaken by DWS to define the future water needs in the catchment. Undertaking a 
detailed assessment implies that many questions were asked. Additionally, DWS had to 
ask numerous questions to establish how much water the platinum mines actually needed 
as the mines did not readily divulge this information accurately since competitors were 
present at the same DWS meetings. 
 
Interviewees were asked who was responsible for identifying the water yield problems in 
the catchment.  
 
6.4.3.2 Step 2: Setting goals 
The primary question rising from the second step in the decision-making process is, ―What 
is the additional supply (in the Olifants River basin) needed for?‖ Documents D1.1, D2.2, 
D2, and D3 (Table 6.2) produced between 1991 and 2006, provide evidence of a process 
that was undertaken and updated by the DWS to address the above-mentioned question. 
However, the interview guide was constructed with the assumption that there was already 
a need for additional water supply in the catchment and thus interview questions focused 
on reviewing the goals post construction, i.e. establishing whether the goals were achieved 
or not. 
 
Nevertheless, some of the interviewees‘ responses referred to goals. The primary goal 
was to increase the yield in the Olifants River Catchment so that water supply would equal 
or exceed demand (for example, P5 below). Secondary goals were set when the specific 
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solution (the dam) was chosen, such as P5, below. Two of the main secondary goals dealt 
with the finishing date and cost of the project, such as P3 below. 
 
 The accelerated construction was allocated R120 million to achieve partial 
impoundment by 2009 and only realised this in 2013 (P3). 
 
The main goal, finishing the dam, will be achieved. The social goals as described by 
the social compact (De Hoop charter) were broadly achieved. Some goals, such as 
50 per cent of the workforce must be females, were not achieved (P5). 
 
While the goals have been influenced by many different stakeholders (for example, public 
consultations, SANParks and mining companies), the final recommendations rested with 
the DWS. The goals were recommended by DWS through a chain of command, resulting 
in the Minister of DWS presenting them to Cabinet for approval, for example, D2.4 and 
D4.1 (Table 6.2). 
 
6.4.3.3 Step 3: Searching for alternative solutions 
The primary question arising from the third step in the decision-making process is, “How 
could the forecasted increase in demand for water be met?‖ Documents D1.1, D1.2, D2.1, 
D2.3 and D2 (Table 6.2) produced between 1991 and 2006, provide evidence that the 
DWS searched for alternative solutions. The questions (3a, 3b, 3d and 3e) from the 
interview guide, relevant to addressing this step, were stated as follows: 
 
Question 3a: Were other infrastructure-based alternatives (such as other dams or inter-
basin transfers) considered? 
 
Question 3b: If so, what were they? 
 
Question 3d: Were other non-infrastructure-based alternatives (such as demand-side or 
catchment management) considered? 
 
Question 3e: If so, what were they? 
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The questions pertaining to infrastructure referred to alternatives such as dams and inter-
basin transfers, while the non-infrastructure-related questions referred to alternatives such 
as DSM and catchment management solutions to better understand the different options 
that were investigated. All the interviewees agreed that infrastructure-based alternatives 
were considered. The interviewees‘ perceptions of the consideration of infrastructure-
based alternatives are highlighted in the following quotations: 
 
 A site at Rooipoort on the Olifants River was the main alternative [to De Hoop 
Dam]. All the other potential sites were eliminated at a very early stage of the field 
study (P4).  
 
[Infrastructure-based] options considered included: development of surface water 
resources; development of groundwater resources, and the transfer of water from 
the Vaal catchment. Development of surface water considered the following 
options: a possible new dam at a location named Rooipoort on the Olifants River; a 
possible new dam on the farm De Hoop, on the Steelpoort River; the possible 
construction of a new dam at Groenvlei on the Sterk River or a dam on the 
Lephalala River, as secondary options (P9). 
 
From the above quotations (P4, P9), it is evident that a number of infrastructure-based 
alternative solutions were investigated. Most of these alternatives were in the form of 
potential new dams. Of all the potential infrastructure-based solutions, only the De Hoop 
and Rooipoort dam sites were considered sufficiently viable for the DWS to perform 
feasibility studies on them. Some non-infrastructure-based solutions were also 
investigated. 
 
All but one interviewee (P1 below) agreed that non-infrastructure-based alternative 
solutions were considered in the decision-making process. However, interviewee P1 
indicated that no non-infrastructure-based alternatives were considered because no 
feasible non-infrastructure-based options existed. The rest of the interviewees perceived 
that a number of non-infrastructure-based alternative solutions were investigated (at least 
in initial options analysis). According to the interviewees (P4, P7 and P10 below), the need 
for additional water was greater than any non-infrastructure-based solutions could 
consistently provide. P4, P7 and P9 (below) list examples of non-infrastructure 
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alternatives, which they indicated were considered. These points are highlighted in the 
following quotations: 
 
No, because no feasible non-infrastructure-based options existed (P1). 
 
Water use efficiency was a key aspect. The development need made clear that 
infrastructure was needed in the catchment. When mining houses first approached 
the DWA, they were told to go and have a look at invasive alien plant eradication 
and whether they could buy out or transfer the irrigation water rights to industrial 
use. The extent of the need is so big that water resource development was taken 
forward as the best option (P4). 
 
 Water demand management, reallocation of water rights, water re-use and the 
eradication of invasive alien plants were all considered (P7). 
 
 Water conservation and demand management is a key non-infrastructure measure 
that is to be implemented. It will only contribute a small portion of the water needed, 
however (P7). 
 
 A number of management options were considered including: water conservation 
and demand management; re-use of effluent; leasing of water; re-allocation of 
water; allocations not fully utilised; the assurance of supply optimisation; and the 
leasing of water rights from currently dormant irrigation enterprises downstream of 
Flag Boshielo Dam as an interim measure (P9). 
 
 The quantity of water demand-side management would have saved would have 
been realistically insufficient (P10). 
 
As is evident from the above statements, a wide range of non-infrastructure-based 
alternative solutions were considered, many of which re-used or altered the use of existing 
water supplies (IAP management would increase the water supply somewhat and DSM 
which would decrease the demand for water). However, no evidence of a deep, analytical 
consideration of non-infrastructure-based options could be found. These responses (for 
example, P4 above) indicate how little IAP management was considered as one part of a 
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water supply solution, despite the possible detrimental long-term water security 
consequences, as discussed in Chapter Five, of not implementing IAP management.  
 
There is evidence of a mine – the Blue Ridge platinum mine – in the Olifants River basin 
which, in 2009 (three years after the De Hoop decision), agreed to clear and maintain an 
area of IAPs upstream of the Loskop Dam in order to receive an allocation of water from 
the fully subscribed Loskop Dam (DWAF, 2009b). The mine was then licensed to receive 
most of the additional yield (from the Loskop Dam) that was made available through the 
IAP clearing (DWAF, 2009b). This was the first time that the DWS acknowledged that IAP 
clearing is a way to secure water for mining activities. 
 
6.4.3.4 Step 4: Comparing and evaluating the alternative solutions 
The fourth step of the rational decision-making model is to compare and evaluate the 
alternative solutions. The primary question pertaining to this is, ―Which is the best option to 
meet supply and why?‖ The following documents (D1.2 and D2) shown in Table 6.2 and 
produced between 2000 and 2006, provide evidence of an ongoing process of comparing 
and evaluating alternative solutions. The questions (3c, 3f and 4) from the interview guide, 
relevant to addressing this Step, were stated as follows: 
 
Question 3c: Why, in your opinion, were these alternative infrastructure-based solutions 
not selected? 
 
Question 3f: Why, in your opinion, were these non-infrastructure-based solutions not 
selected? 
 
Question 4: How were the alternative infrastructure-based and non-infrastructure-based 
solutions compared and evaluated? 
 
Based on Step 4, interviewees indicated how alternative infrastructure- and non-
infrastructure-based solutions were compared and evaluated, and why most of the 
infrastructure-based solutions (question 3c) and non-infrastructure-based (question 3f) 
were not selected. The various methods and assessments that were used to compare and 
evaluate alternative solutions (such as URVs, CBAs and social-environmental analyses) 
are highlighted in the following quotations: 
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 The focus is on infrastructure development as a substantive job creator in the short 
term (P3). 
 
 URVs, engineering and economics assessments and other socio-economic and 
environmental factors are all put into a decision-making framework and from there a 
final decision is made (P4). 
 
Evaluations were not done in the ‘handbook prescribed’ way. Some options were 
shot down politically (for example, buy out of irrigation rights). Only two options 
compared economic, social and environmental impacts. These options were the two 
dam sites, De Hoop and Rooipoort (P6). 
 
In addition to the cost of water resource developments, account was also taken of 
the cost of conveying the water to users, for equitable comparison of the overall 
cost associated with the respective options (P9). 
 
Preliminary design and cost estimation were performed for the water resource 
development options, all to the same level of detail and using the same design 
standards and norms as well as the same basis for costing, to ensure the unbiased 
comparison of options (P9).  
 
 DWA also looked at the engineering, social, environmental, and political aspects. 
They also consulted with various other decision-makers and stakeholders through 
an intensive public participation process. A decision on the size of the project was 
also based on a comparison of the optimum scheme against the next best water 
augmentation option as it was known that future water resource development 
options in the area are limited (P10). 
 
From the above quotations, it is evident that the interviewees perceived that many of the 
alternative options were eliminated early on in the selection process for a variety of 
reasons including political influence (P6 above). As an example, the practice of buying 
irrigation water rights and transferring them for mining or domestic use was shut down 
politically because of the expected social impact (i.e. loss of agricultural jobs) it would 
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cause. The selection process was finally narrowed down to two alternative solutions (the 
De Hoop and Steelpoort dams), which were compared and evaluated using a wide range 
of criteria such as financial cost and engineering feasibility, as well as potential socio-
economic and environmental impacts. 
 
6.4.3.5 Step 5: Choose among alternative solutions 
The fifth step of the rational decision-making model entails choosing an alternative solution 
to implement. Choosing a solution is immensely difficult, especially since the problem of 
insufficient water supply is complex, multi-faceted and has high levels of risk and 
uncertainty. The primary question arising from the fifth step is, ―How was the choice to 
build the dam, from amongst the alternative solutions, made?‖ Documents D2.4, D4.1, D2, 
D6 and D7 (Table 6.2) produced between 2004 and 2006, provide evidence of an 
alternative solution being chosen. The questions (1b, 2, 2b, 3c, 3f, 5 and 5a) from the 
interview guide, relevant to addressing this step, were stated as follows: 
 
Question 1b: When was a supply side measure selected? 
 
Question 2: Which directorate and/or position in the DWA recommended the decision to 
build the De Hoop Dam? 
 
Question 2b: When was the decision to build De Hoop Dam made?  
 
Question 3c: Why, in your opinion, were these alternative infrastructure-based solutions 
not selected? (The alternative infrastructure-based solutions mentioned here are the same 
as the ones mentioned in Step 4.) 
 
Question 3f: Why, in your opinion, were these non-infrastructure-based solutions not 
selected? (The alternative non-infrastructure-based solutions mentioned here are the 
same as the ones mentioned in Step 4.) 
 
Question 5: How was the De Hoop Dam chosen from among all the alternative solutions? 
 
Question 5a: What processes where used in choosing a solution to fulfil the need for 
additional yield?  
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When questioned about how the De Hoop Dam was chosen from amongst the all the 
alternative solutions and what processes were used in making this choice, interviewees‘ 
replied with a range of reasons and processes. These reasons and processes are 
highlighted in the following quotations: 
 
 [De Hoop Dam was chosen because of] the location (most practical option) and the 
cost (cheapest) (P1). 
 
 The last stage compared the De Hoop Dam site to the Rooipoort site. De Hoop 
Dam site had better hydrology because it was more undeveloped. From a social 
point of view Rooipoort had many rural communities in the potential dam basin and 
more irrigated land that would be lost. From a cost constraint point of view, 
additional conveyance would be needed at the De Hoop site but not at Rooipoort; 
however, the De Hoop Dam was still more economical (P4). 
 
 Water balancing, taking into account hydrological risks and water demand 
projections were used. There is a risk that there would be serious shortages, in the 
Olifants Catchment, during a drought. Projecting water quantities by nature is 
uncertain. These hydrological uncertainties had to be addressed and the risks 
managed (P6). 
 
 In building the very large dam wall, only a few 300 millimetres holes are drilled in 
the ground as part of the planning phase of the foundations, which lead to 
uncertainties. There were economic uncertainties and risks from labour actions and 
changes in steel prices. In the dam basin there were opportunity costs in terms of 
potential mineral resources and specific, important vegetation, which was relocated. 
There were social and political risks in removing graves and relocating families from 
the dam basin (P7). 
 
 From the investigations it is apparent that a dam at De Hoop will be able to yield 
more water, at a substantially lower unit cost and at an earlier date than a dam at 
Rooipoort. Constructing a dam at Rooipoort will have significant social impacts (the 
loss of 313 houses, 124 businesses, 8 schools and 583 graves), as well as the loss 
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of irreplaceable fertile communal land in the dam basin. Furthermore the 
construction of a dam at De Hoop is also the only option that would enable the 
supply of water to Jane Furse and the Nebo Plateau (P9). 
 
 The ‘do nothing’ option would not have helped the situation either. The dam is a 
must in my view (P10). 
 
Through the discarding of many alternative solutions for various reasons such as location 
(P1), financial, social and environmental costs (P1, P9), hydrology (P4), potential yield 
(P9) and water balancing (P6), the DWS were left with two options from which to choose a 
solution. These two solutions were the De Hoop (Steelpoort River) and Rooipoort (Olifants 
River) dam sites. According to the statements of interviewees P9 and P4 above, planning 
analyses showed that there are many reasons why De Hoop site was regarded as the 
better of the two. These reasons include: social impacts (more people lived in the 
Rooipoort Dam basin than in the De Hoop Dam basin); hydrological aspects (there are 
already seven large dams on the Olifants River and none on the Steelpoort River); 
environmental impacts (the Rooipoort site was found to have a smaller impact than the De 
Hoop site); and financial impacts (the De Hoop Dam option was estimated to be cheaper, 
despite the additional conveyance needed). Overall the De Hoop site was considered to 
be the superior option (P1, P4, P9, above).  
 
6.4.3.6 Step 6: Implement the selected solution 
The sixth step in the rational decision-making process is the implementation of the 
selected solution. The primary question arising from the sixth step is, ―How did dam 
building commence and thereafter proceed?‖ The following documents (D2, D4, D4.1, D5, 
D6 and D7) shown in Table 6.2 and produced between 2004 and 2006, provide evidence 
of the implementation of the selected solution. A question (6a) from the interview guide, 
relevant to addressing this step, was stated as follows: 
 
Question 6a: Which directorate and/or position in the DWA has been responsible for 
making decisions during the building of the dam? 
 
In the case of the De Hoop Dam, Step 6 includes the planning, design and construction of 
the De Hoop Dam. Step 6 began once Cabinet approved the go-ahead of the dam (in mid-
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2004) and it will end when construction is completed (in 2015). When questioned about the 
possible strengths and weakness of decision-making during construction, and about who 
in the DWS was responsible for the decision-making during construction, the interviewees 
indicated that there had been a number of strengths and weaknesses and that this was a 
sensitive topic. Furthermore, interviewees indicated that the DWS‘s National Water 
Resources Infrastructure Chief Directorate was responsible for decision-making during 
construction (P5 below). The interviewees‘ perceptions of the implementation of De Hoop 
Dam are highlighted in the following quotations: 
 
There have been differences of opinion between the designer, contractors and 
engineers. There were unnecessary additions to the scope of the project; this had 
major implication on the time and cost of the project. A major risk is the lack of 
planning and difference of opinions between the civil and mechanical departments 
(P1). 
 
 It was intended that the Project should be conducted like a private sector contract to 
prove that DWA Construction Management could perform like a private contractor. 
This was wishful thinking, because in reality it was not possible for ‘a government 
department’ to perform in the same way as a private sector construction company, 
due to the dysfunctional bureaucracy. The employment of labour had to follow 
stringent DWA processes with political requirements, whereas a private contractor 
would hire according to the skills level required. The decision for government bodies 
(in-house) to handle the relocation and compensation process was not successful 
(P2). 
 
 The construction slows down more and more and more, knowing that in this 
environment, employment won’t be terminated. This is reflected in the rate of 
construction where the last four per cent of work has taken two to three years to 
complete. Note that there is no penalty for in-house constructions being slow, 
wasteful or anything else (P3). 
 
The decision to go to full supply capacity was challenged following the revised 
hydrology, for which a smaller dam capacity would be required; however top 
management rejected this proposal to facilitate avoiding early labour redundancy 
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associated with construction to avoid a perception being created of inept planning 
components (P3). 
 
There were problems with the foundations, and consequently excavations had to be 
much deeper than planned. There has also been an overburden in quarry areas 
and a larger area has been opened for construction materials. There are no ways of 
checking inefficiencies. The roller compacted concrete method of pouring concrete 
took longer than expected and contributed to cost overruns (P4). 
 
 By using a department construction unit, one can start construction easily, 
immediately (no contracts or tenders needed). Also construction was a constructor’s 
market at the time (contractors’ resources were all in use for example, 2010 
stadiums and Gautrain). By using an internal team, once they got the job they didn’t 
have the required skills on site for a successful implementation. If decent people 
were on the site, the contract would have finished two years ago. Departmental 
construction means a lot of interference from top management (for example, a two-
week strike compared with an eight-week strike) (P5). 
 
[Decision-making during construction rests with] construction management, civil 
engineering and infrastructure development, which are all part of National water 
resources infrastructure chief directorate (P5). 
 
 This is a sensitive topic. Government insisted in building the dam themselves, so 
there was no tendering process. The end result of this was that the De Hoop Dam 
took twice as long to build compared with private company estimates. Government 
was the contractor and the controlling authority which meant that they controlled the 
budget and timeframe and that they could hide design errors and oversights (P7). 
 
 Infrastructure- and water-resource-wise [De Hoop Dam] is the right decision. 
Implementation by government was the wrong decision. Had another option been 
implemented by government it would also have gone over budget (P7). 
 
The main goal of De Hoop Dam starting to store water has occurred. However, 
there are no means to supply the water to users as the conveyance is lacking (P4). 
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The DWS built the De Hoop Dam themselves through their Chief Directorate of National 
Water Resource Infrastructure (P5 above). DWS built the dam themselves firstly, to prove 
that they could compete with the private sector firms (P2 above), and secondly, because 
there was an abundance of construction work available (for example, the 2010 World Cup 
stadiums and the Gautrain) and few private sector firms large enough to undertake such 
big projects (P5, above). The DWS expected the cost of the project to escalate, if they 
contracted a private firm to build the dam because of this shortage of available private 
sector capacity. The interviewees indicated that while the De Hoop Dam should have been 
built, it should not have been built by the DWS (P1, P2, P7 above). Additionally, a proposal 
to build a dam (with a smaller capacity and therefore fewer jobs) that was based on 
revised hydrology was rejected by DWS because they did not want their planning to be 
perceived as inexpert, through having to implement early job dismissals (P3 above). 
Furthermore, interviewees thought that construction by the DWS meant that the dam was 
slower and more expensive to build than if it had been contracted out to the private sector 
(P5 and P7 above).  
 
The De Hoop Dam will be finished nearly five years after the initially planned finishing date 
in 2010, and nearly three years after the revised, planned date in 2012. Furthermore the 
cost of the De Hoop, as discussed in Chapter Four, increased from an estimated R1.744 
billion (in 2012 rand values) to an actual cost of R3.030 billion (in 2012 rand values). This 
represents an increase of 174 per cent. Some of the other perceived reasons for the 
increase in costs include: the 2008/2009 economic recession, which stifled the 
development of mines in the area which were expected to sign agreements to pay a 
portion of the costs; the foundations needing to be deeper than expected and 
subsequently a large amount of additional concrete being needed (P4 above); 
unanticipated rainfall events which impacted on construction; worker strikes taking longer 
than would have been the case if the project had been undertaken by a private firm (P5 
above); and the slowing rate of construction towards the end of the project (P3 above) as 
well as the granting of bonuses to accelerate construction. 
 
In addition, the estimated yield of the dam was reassessed as part of a reconciliation 
strategy for the Olifants River basin (D8: Table 6.2, DWA, 2010). The original yield 
estimate for De Hoop Dam (calculated as part of the feasibility study) was 80 million cubic 
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metres per annum. The reassessment (based on updated hydrological models and inflow 
data) estimated the yield to be 66 million cubic metres per annum (representing a 
decrease of 17.5%). A separate study, namely the Olifants Water Availability Assessment 
Study (DWAF, 2010) which made slightly different assumptions, estimated the yield to be 
64 million cubic metres per annum. The DWS now assumes the figure of 66 million cubic 
metres to be correct as it was calculated using the most up-to date estimates. 
 
These underestimated costs and overestimated benefits (yield) are largely different from 
the estimates that the decision to build the dam was originally based on. This difference is 
in line with Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2014), Ansar et al. (2014) and Flyvbjerg (2009, 
2005), all of whom state that cost overruns and overestimation of benefits occur in large 
infrastructure projects. Flyvbjerg (2005) even has a formula for megaproject approval 
which states that project approval (which makes the idea look good on paper) is equal to 
underestimated costs plus overestimated benefits plus undervalued environmental impacts 
plus overvalued economic development. Flyvbjerg‘s formula fits the De Hoop Dam 
decision in addition to the above-mentioned issues, since it was found that the 
environmental impact assessment and approval process were inadequate (D7: Table 6.2, 
Couzens & Dent, 2006) and many of the jobs that were expected to boost economic and 
social development have not yet materialised. Ansar et al. (2014) add that large dams 
have detrimental environmental and social impacts. Finally, Couzens and Dent (2006, D7: 
Table 6.2) and Flyvbjerg (2005) comment that after implementation has begun, 
infrastructure development creates a momentum that is hard to halt.  
 
In building the De Hoop Dam, the DWS struggled with a project of larger scope than 
anything they had previously undertaken. It has been demonstrated through the issues 
raised in the preceding paragraphs that the DWS decision-making regarding the building 
phase of the De Hoop Dam project was unsatisfactory. 
 
A further finding relating to the implementation is that, while nearly half the yield from the 
De Hoop Dam is allocated for rural community use, the water will take a long time to reach 
the communities and may not reach them at all (D2, D8, in Table 6.2). Although the dam is 
storing water in 2015, the bulk pipelines to transport the water are not yet complete (P4 
above). Furthermore, the bulk pipelines do not run directly to the communities (D4, D5 in 
Table 6.2). Rather it is the responsibility of the local municipalities, and thus a political 
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decision, to build the additional, smaller pipelines from the bulk pipelines to these 
communities. 
 
6.4.3.7 Step 7: Follow-up and control 
The seventh step of the rational decision-making model is to control implementation, and 
then to follow up and evaluate the results. If acceptable results have not been achieved 
from the evaluation of the implementation, the problem and/or goals made need to be 
redefined, or the whole decision-making process repeated. One of the common reasons 
for implementation not being acceptable is that the impacts of environmental forces 
continue to change during the decision-making process (Zindiye, 2012).  
 
The primary question arising from the seventh step is, ―How was the decision evaluated in 
terms of the goals set?‖ Document D8 (Table 6.2) produced in 2010, provides some 
evidence of follow-up and control. The questions (7, 7a, 7b, 7c, 7d 8, 8a and 8b) from the 
interview guide, relevant to addressing this step, were stated as follows: 
 
Question 7: Have any decision-making processes been evaluated? 
 
Question 7a: To date, has the building of De Hoop Dam been on course to achieve all the 
goals that were planned, in their specified time frames? 
 
Question 7b: If not, then which goals were not on course to be achieved as planned and 
why not? 
 
Question 7c: What goals were achieved and how? 
 
Question 7d: Have any decisions been retrospectively analysed? 
 
Question 8: My understanding is that Phase 2A (building De Hoop Dam) was forecast to 
cost approximately R1.744 billion (in December 2012 rand values). To date, it has cost 
R3.03 billion (in December 2012 rand values). How can this difference be explained in 
terms of the decision-making process? 
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Question 8a: Do you think a different decision-making process would have been followed if 
the cost-to-date (the actual cost) of the project had been projected as the estimated cost? 
 
Question 8b: Given your answer in 8a, do you think a different decision would then have 
been made? 
 
The interviewees indicated that while the implementation was controlled, little follow-up 
and evaluation of the results had occurred. This was partially due to the fact that when the 
interviews took place in 2014, the building of the dam was not yet complete. These points 
are highlighted in the following quotations: 
 
The decision to sign an acceleration agreement possibly had a detrimental effect on 
the contractor’s decisions. Acceleration to provide early delivery of water did not 
make sense when the delivery pipeline and water treatment works were not in 
place. In reality the contractor was unable to accelerate the works in accordance 
with the milestones in the agreement (P2). 
 
 The accelerated construction was allocated R120 million to achieve partial 
impoundment by 2009 and only realised this in 2013 (P3). 
 
 The post-planning decision is influenced by ambitious implementation acceleration, 
so as to solicit glamour and personal shine on individuals for having created at least 
a perception of service delivery to come, and creation of some job opportunities. 
The implications of this acceleration are incomplete or incompetent detailed 
implementation planning and programming for the site-specific option selected. The 
contractor thus starts construction without detailed knowledge of the end product 
and it’s to be achieved. Added to this, is the use of an aged or geriatric approved 
professional persons (or APPs for short) to lead the design for large dams as 
required by law results in ultraconservative designs and insensitivity to cost (P3). 
  
 There is no mechanism in decision-making for revising the planning decisions 
during construction … once the planning and decisions have been made, the details 
are cast in concrete in a record of implementation decisions for another branch of 
DWA to design and construct. So interaction by default is not there (P3). 
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 Construction of the De Hoop Dam and its conveyance systems are running late and 
are far behind. The main reasons are that an off-funding model is being used (50% 
of the budget from the fiscal and 50% supposed to be off-budget from mining). The 
water supply agreements have, however, not been completed. There are multiple 
potential water users at different stages of development and they are not ready to 
make investment decisions and the difficulty to get commitments upfront (P4). 
 
 Planning and programming by contractors could have been more proactive. It was 
not on the top of their priorities to get the job done (P5).  
 
 The DWA should have been more hardnosed with the mines to lessen the risks. 
While it is accepted that government must take decisions in faith when building 
infrastructure; too much risk was shifted to the state (P6). 
 
 Completion time and adherence to budget are not on track to be achieved as 
planned. Self-control by government lacked certain administration arrangements, 
for example relocation of people living in the dam basin. There was poor 
management by government (P7). 
 
From the above quotations (P2, P3, P4, P5 and P7), it is apparent that the control of 
implementation was less than ideal. Time and budget goals were not met, despite 
monetary incentives being made to accelerate construction (P3, P5 above). Some further 
issues were: the use of inefficient designs from older decision-makers who may be set in 
their ways; implementation being started before detailed implementation planning was 
finished; not getting funding support from the mines and a lack of interaction between 
DWS directorates (P3, P4, P6 above).  
 
An example of the lack of inter-directorate interaction which came to light from the 
interviews, is that the interviewees involved in the building of the De Hoop Dam (P1, P2, 
P3, P5 and P8) did not know much about the early decision-making in the project during 
the planning stage. These interviewees routinely suggested approaching the DWS 
Planning Directorate: Options Analysis, to obtain the relevant information.  
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The issues raised in the previous two paragraphs, show that control of implementation was 
less than ideal. However, they do not discuss the second part of the seventh RDMM step, 
which focuses on follow-up evaluations. Interviewees‘ perceptions of the follow-up 
evaluations to date, of ORDRDP Phase 2A, are now highlighted in the following 
quotations: 
 
 I haven’t seen any evidence of decisions being retrospectively analysed. Maybe it is 
too early yet as the project is not complete (P2). 
 
 There is not adequate reflection on [these] decisions by people in power (P3). 
 
 Yes, the hydrology has been revised post-decision and the interviewee believes 
that the demand has/is being re-evaluated, especially since the platinum price has 
plummeted by about 35 per cent between 2006 and 2014 (P3). 
 
 The job creation has been only partially achieved because the mining development 
predicted did not realise, and so substantive job creation resulting from the dam 
development hasn’t happened to date. However, for a relatively small group of local 
labour, there has been employment for longer than anticipated for more persons 
typically associated with such a construction project (peaking at 1200 persons) 
(P3). 
 
 There is no mechanism in decision-making for revising the planning decisions 
during construction (P3). 
 
The main goal of De Hoop Dam starting to store water has occurred. However, 
there are no means to supply the water to users as the conveyance is lacking (P4). 
 
 I am not aware of any decisions that have been retrospectively analysed. Looking at 
planning there is one thing that is different; a reassessment of the river after 
planning was done and construction was underway. The reassessment caused 
some rethinking of distribution of the piping. Even given the reassessment 
information, the decisions would not have changed (P7). 
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The interviewees indicated that there has been insufficient follow-up and evaluation of the 
decision-making process in the implementation of De Hoop Dam (P2, P3, P7 above). This 
is partially because the project has not yet been finished and partially because it is 
perceived that after the planning stage it is not possible for a decision to be revised (P2, 
P3 above). So far there has only been a review of hydrology (P7 above) through a yield 
analysis that resulted in a 17.5 per cent decrease in estimated yield (D8: Table 6.2).  
 
Interviewees were questioned whether they thought that, had the decision-makers known 
what they now know about the cost overruns, decrease in estimated yield and slow 
implementation of new mines, a different decision would have been made regarding the 
chosen solution. The interviewees indicated that a different decision would not have been 
made, as highlighted in the following quotations: 
  
No, a different decision would not have been made because the comparison is 
done at the same time with the same unit costs, rates for various infrastructure 
options, so the same errors in cost estimates would have surfaced in the 
comparison in the feasibility study (P3). 
 
No, a different decision would not have been made. Extra water was needed in the 
catchment and De Hoop Dam was still the best decision at the time based on the 
available information. If we knew what we know now, the scope of the project may 
have changed after 2008 when the mines pulled out and potential demand dropped. 
For example, the dam could have been built in two phases – a smaller dam initially 
and a wall raising at a later date (P5). 
 
How do you decide what to build where? It is very difficult. There are many aspects 
to consider, especially over time and it is not clear-cut (P6). 
 
The interviewees agreed that a different solution would not have been chosen, but that the 
scope of the project may have changed, for example building the dam in two stages or a 
smaller dam (P5 above). Interviewees also indicated that water supply decision-making 
has high levels of uncertainty and risk, leading to difficult decision-making and complex 
decisions needing to be made (P6 above).  
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From the evidence provided by the interviews and documentation presented within the 
seven steps of the RDMM, it is apparent that while the goal of building the De Hoop Dam 
will certainly be achieved, some of the smaller goals were not achieved. It is also evident 
that decision-making process did not follow the steps of the RDMM in sequential order, 
and in some cases, not at all: for example, the seventh step has not yet been adequately 
followed. On this issue, Zindiye (2012) explains that when making adaptive or innovative 
decisions, like the decision to build the De Hoop Dam, the seven steps are rarely followed 
in order and sometimes steps may even be ignored. Zindiye (2012) summarises this by 
suggesting that at most, human decision-making only approaches the principle of 
rationality.  
 
Part of the seventh step of the RDMM entails reflecting on the decision-making process. 
Consequently, a self-critique of the questions in the interview guide (Appendix E) is now 
presented. This reflection provides a chance to acknowledge the shortcomings of the 
interview guide. 
 
6.4.4 Reflection on the interview questions 
In hindsight, while the questions covered the different stages of the decision-making 
process according to the rational decision-making model, they were not as clear and 
specific as they could have been. The research questions would have been better 
structured and more to the point if the researcher had had a better understanding of what 
he wanted to ask, how the questions fitted into the research and why they were worth 
asking. An example of the lack of clarity is in Questions 2 and 2a where the focus should 
have been specifically on goals rather than on recommendations (which is a less specific 
term).  
 
Furthermore, some of the questions may have seemed to be repetitive. For example, one 
question asked how De Hoop Dam was chosen as the selected solution and another 
asked what processes were used in choosing an alternative solution. The difference in the 
questions could have been made clearer. Similarly, clarity regarding the questions relating 
to uncertainty and risks in different aspects of the decision-making process would have 
helped. 
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6.4.5 Discussion 
The findings have shown that, while the DWS did follow a logical decision-making process 
in their recommendation to build De Hoop Dam, their decision-making process did not 
appear to have included all the components or steps of the RDMM (Zindiye, 2012). In 
particular, there appeared to be limited evidence of following up and controlling 
implementation (Step 7). Although construction has yet to be officially completed, and thus 
only interim analyses could be expected, this appears to have been the tendency for such 
schemes. 
 
Although the decision-making process was articulated by the interviewees, the 
seriousness with which the range of solutions appears to have been taken, was clearly 
limited. There were suggestions that the size of the dam was inflated, possibly owing to 
vested positions taken by mining interests arguing for this capacity. However, it was also 
articulated that the global financial crisis in 2008, as well as unfavourable foundation 
conditions, were reasons for adjustments that have been made. Another area of concern 
articulated was the focus on using internal capacity in the Department, which was felt to 
have led to an inflation of the costs.  
 
The reality is that the actual cost of the dam was almost twice what was estimated, and the 
yield was recalculated to be significantly lower than originally proposed to the Minister. 
Even so, evidence suggests that, if the actual cost and yield of De Hoop Dam had been 
known at the start of the project, a different solution would not have been chosen. 
However, the scope of the project may have changed. This is partially because, logically, 
there were fewer viable alternative options to the De Hoop Dam, in comparison to, for 
example, the Berg River Dam case, which had far greater demand-side management and 
wider conservation of supply alternative options. 
 
The DWS appears to continue to deal with water balance issues through prioritising 
infrastructure development. Considering that more than 95 per cent of South Africa‘s 
surface water has already been allocated, and that much of the remaining surface water is 
far from priority demand, there is limited potential for future water supply infrastructure 
development (Claassen, 2010). It must be mentioned that DWS is trying to broaden the 
base of water-mix alternatives which they consider, collaborate on and implement, 
especially concerning water re-use, evidence of which is present in DWS strategies (DWA, 
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2013b; DWAF, 2004). Despite this, however, DWS continues to build large dams and 
inter-basin transfer schemes (DWS, 2014, DWS, 2013b), and has had limited success and 
investment in alternatives such as demand-side management interventions, conservation 
of supply (catchment management) options, or conjunctive use of ground water (Hedden & 
Cilliers, 2014; Herold, 2009). For the De Hoop Dam, for example, it was clear from the 
interview responses that virtually no investments were planned for such alternative or 
concurrent options. 
 
Two of the main reasons for the DWS‘s continued focus on water-infrastructure 
development are their concern with water security, and with control. Large dams increase 
the year-round water supply security (countering low flows), by holding more water than 
the equivalent average MAR. De Hoop Dam, which holds three times the MAR, is an 
example of this. Added to this fact, DWS has markedly more control over infrastructure 
development projects than over other alternative solutions. For example, when 
desalination is chosen to increase water supply in an area (for example, Durban), DWS 
has to collaborate and share decision-making power with provincial and local 
governments, as well as with other groups. Having control over which alternatives are 
considered, and how the chosen alternative is implemented, gives the DWS more power 
and reduces some of the uncertainty surrounding these alternatives 
 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, the third objective of the study, namely evaluating the decision to build De 
Hoop Dam using the rational decision-making model (RDMM), was addressed. The 
literature concerning decision-making models was first discussed and the reasons for 
choosing the RDMM were presented. Thereafter the decision to build De Hoop Dam 
(ORWRDP Phase 2A), was evaluated using the seven steps of the RDMM (Zindiye, 2012). 
Each step was interrogated using an analysis of documents and semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews relating to the De Hoop Dam project.  
 
The first conclusion from this chapter is that, while the DWS did not follow the RDMM, it 
did follow a logical decision-making process in reaching the decision to build the De Hoop 
Dam. Evidence of some of the steps, for example, the following up and controlling of 
implementation (Step 7) was limited. Construction has yet to be officially completed and 
thus only interim analyses could be expected. 
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The second conclusion drawn from the interviews is that the decision to build the De Hoop 
Dam was based on sub-optimal evidence. Fast-tracking procedures and actions 
happening simultaneously resulted in planning and design of the dam occurring 
concurrently. This rush, and the fact that former President Mbeki announced that the De 
Hoop Dam would be built during the initial phase of planning, meant that it was difficult to 
include any other options concurrently or together with the De Hoop Dam.  
 
A logical framework for decision-making would have sought to evaluate all competitive 
options, and develop the optimal water-mix recommendation for the Minister‘s 
consideration. The interview process suggests that the decision to build the dam would still 
have been taken, even if this had been done. The analysis of invasive alien plants in the 
catchment, from Chapter Five, appears to corroborate this, for the additional yield potential 
is relatively small. 
 
The planners in DWS did themselves investigate the potential benefits of clearing invasive 
alien plants in the catchment of the Olifants River, concluding that it would have released 
sufficient water to enable the proposed Blue Ridge platinum mine to go ahead (DWAF, 
2009b). There is clearly a degree of understanding and willingness to explore such 
options, in the DWS. 
 
What Chapter Five has shown through the calculations of the potential impact of Invasive 
alien plants on the water security of De Hoop Dam is that in order to ensure the long-term 
value of the dam, there is a need to implement additional measures, which should be part 
of the final planning. Interventions such as the management of invasive alien plants, and 
the erosion problems (mentioned in Chapter Two) will have to be made. What is also 
known, and should have been known by the decision-makers, is that the sooner the work 
is done on such alternatives, the less expensive it will be in real terms.  
 
The following chapter (Chapter Seven) provides a general conclusion to the whole thesis. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main purpose of this study was to evaluate the costs and benefits of selected water 
supply options and of the decision-making associated with those options. Specifically, this 
study sought to analyse the expected and actual unit reference values (URVs) as well as 
the impacts and costs of invasive alien plant management on four dams (the Inyaka, 
Nandoni, Berg River and De Hoop dams) and their catchments. Additionally, the decision-
making process that led to the decision to build De Hoop Dam (the most recently built case 
study) was analysed using the rational decision-making model as a framework. In doing 
so, this study set out to understand the decision-making processes followed to enable the 
Minister of Water and Sanitation to make informed decisions regarding long-term water 
security in different parts of South Africa. From these analyses a number of conclusions 
can be drawn. 
 
The first major conclusion is that, given the difficulty that was experienced in obtaining 
water-resources data from the Department of Water and Sanitation, the maintenance of 
data on water resources is problematic. Obtaining expected and actual construction costs 
as well as operational and maintenance (O&M) costs for the four cases from the 
Department of Water and Sanitation turned out to be extremely challenging, as data was 
often not readily available, or, in the case of the Inyaka Dam‘s O&M costs, incomplete. 
Furthermore, there is a possibility that not all incurred costs were reflected in the actual 
costs. Whether this is true, and whether it would have further increased the actual costs, 
cannot be speculated upon. But it may well reflect on how retrospective analysis is not 
being optimally used to help to inform Ministers in their decision-making. 
 
A second important conclusion is that there is considerable variation between the 
estimated costs (at the time that the decision to build the dams was taken) and the actual 
costs of building the dams. In addition to the capital costs, the unit reference value 
analysis used Department of Water and Sanitation O&M guidelines costs in all four cases, 
and additional Department of Water and Sanitation O&M cost data in the Nandoni and 
Berg cases. The URV analyses, using an eight per cent discount rate, revealed that in 
both the Inyaka (27 per cent less expensive than planned) and Nandoni (twelve or 35 per 
cent less expensive depending if O&M guideline costs or data costs were used) cases the 
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actual cost was less than expected. In the Berg River case, the actual cost was 21 per 
cent more than expected when O&M guideline costs were used; but fourteen per cent less 
than expected when available O&M data costs were used. This was possibly due to the 
big difference between the O&M costs from the guidelines and the data. The De Hoop 
Dam URV calculation was the highest by a long way (74 per cent more expensive than 
estimated); however this was further exacerbated in real terms by an eighteen per cent 
decrease in estimated yield. 
  
A third pertinent conclusion is that the URV analysis is a limited tool in that it does not 
adequately take the long-term costs and benefits of different options into consideration. 
The clearest example of this limitation is that yield does not grow with interest and 
therefore, in reality, cannot be discounted to a present value. Nevertheless it was found 
that, at an eight per cent discount rate, and in December 2012 rand values, the actual cost 
of water is getting more expensive in real terms. URVs estimated that the cost of water per 
cubic metre was: R1.13 from Inyaka Dam, R0.50 to R0.67 from Nandoni Dam, R2.00 to 
R2.82 from Berg River Dam and R3.79 from the De Hoop Dam. 
 
A fourth important conclusion is that externalities were, at best, a limited consideration in 
the costs of the four cases. Other than for the Berg River Dam (and the De Hoop Dam to a 
limited degree), none of the estimates included an in-depth analysis of the catchment 
management alternatives or supplementary actions as an option for the conservation and 
enhancement of water supply. None of the proposals to the relevant Minister included a 
budget for a concurrent DSM intervention, although this was mentioned in the case of the 
Berg River Dam. None of the proposals looked at the conservation of supply in terms of 
aspects such as leaks, aging distribution infrastructure and other aspects of unaccounted-
for water. 
 
A fifth conclusion is that the clearing of invasive alien plants alone, i.e. not in combination 
with other catchment management interventions and demand-side management, could not 
compensate for the level of yield achieved through building each one of the dams. In terms 
of the immediate needs for water security, then, the clearing of invasive alien plants in the 
catchments of the four dams was not remotely a competitive option, and the Minister was 
put in a position to make an informed decision, in each case, in that regard. 
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A sixth, and major, conclusion is that a failure to clear invasive alien plants in the 
catchments will reduce water security in the long-term. For example, over a period of 45 
years, the invasions in the catchments of the Berg River Dam could, if not controlled, lead 
to a potential 46 per cent reduction in the mean annual runoff. Potential reductions in the 
mean annual runoff of the other cases are modelled to be: a 44 per cent reduction De 
Hoop Dam, a sixteen per cent reduction for the Inyaka Dam, and a seven per cent 
reduction for the Nandoni Dam. The variation in the projections is caused by the 
differences in catchment conditions such as low initial invasions in the Inyaka and Nandoni 
cases. Given more time the invasions would continue to increase in size and density. It is 
thus postulated that it makes no sense to be concerned about long-term water security in 
the form of building a dam, and yet have no immediate strategy to deal with the threat from 
invasive alien plants to being able to fill the dam and meet the Reserve requirements 
(RSA, 1998). It is also clear that any delay in the control of invasive alien plants will have 
greater costs than immediate control, in real terms, and that it therefore makes sense to 
undertake the interventions for control immediately. In other words, the Ministers did not 
make informed decisions in this regard, other than for the Berg River Dam.  
 
A rider to the above conclusions is that decisions should also be made in the context of 
other costs and benefits, seeking to optimise the outcomes, and their impacts. In this 
regard, the implication of creating jobs given the prioritization of unemployment, inequity 
and poverty in the National Development Plan (National Planning Commission, 2012), and 
the adverse effects of invasive alien plants, such as loss of ecosystem services and 
biodiversity, and the related increased risks of flooding, disease, erosion, and siltation, 
should have been put into the decision-making equation. If two options can achieve similar 
long-term outcomes, but the one has considerably higher associated benefits, then this 
ought to be part of decision-making in the long-term interests of governance and the 
allocation of limited resources. 
 
A seventh conclusion is that, while the Department of Water and Sanitation did not follow 
the rational decision-making model, it did follow a logical decision-making process to reach 
the decision to build the De Hoop Dam. Evidence of some of the rational decision-making 
model steps, for example, the following up and controlling of implementation (Step 7) was 
limited. A rider here is that construction has yet to be officially completed and thus only 
interim analyses could be expected. Although the decision-making process was articulated 
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by the interviewees, the seriousness with which the range of solutions appears to have 
been taken, was clearly limited. There were suggestions that the size of the dam was 
inflated, possibly owing to vested positions taken by mining interests arguing for this 
capacity. However, it was also articulated that the global financial crisis in 2008, as well as 
unfavourable foundation conditions, were reasons for adjustments that have been made. 
Another area of concern articulated was the focus on using internal capacity in the 
Department, which was felt to have led to an inflation of the costs. The reality of the 
decision is that the cost of the dam was almost twice what was originally estimated, and 
the yield was recalculated to be significantly lower than originally proposed to the Minister. 
 
An eighth argument is made, that there is little evidence of retrospective analysis by the 
Department of Water and Sanitation, in terms of understanding the full costs and benefits 
of dams that have been built, and learning lessons that can enable Ministers to make more 
informed decisions in the future. This is a problem in many infrastructure projects, as was 
highlighted in Chapter Four. 
  
The final conclusion is that the Ministers have clearly not been put in positions to make a 
fully informed decision regarding each of the dams analysed in this research. There are 
major investments being made regarding dams, for long-term water security, but 
insufficient effort being made to address the conservation of the supply of water through 
the management of the catchments, as shown through the consideration of the clearing of 
invasive alien plants. 
 
Balancing water demand and supply in South Africa involves high levels of uncertainty. It 
is thus recommended that, in future decision-making, the DWS needs to investigate the 
incorporation of multiple alternative options into an overarching solution, rather than to 
adopt a single solution, as it has tended to do. Furthermore, the DWS needs to ensure that 
decision-makers are put into a position to make as fully informed decisions as may be 
feasible, and which take short- and long-term considerations into account.  
 
This study has retrospectively compared the expected and actual costs of building 
selected dams (using URV analysis), as well as the current and estimated potential costs 
and impacts of IAPs on water supply of the dam catchments. There were other important 
interventions (notably erosion and siltation, ground-water options, and especially demand-
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side management) that were not possible in this study, but are pertinent considerations 
that decision-makers should interrogate. It is hoped that this study will lead to further 
studies to improve the decision-making and management of water supply in South Africa. 
 
 
 
 
END NOTE 
 
Figure 7.1: Pine trees invading in the Langeberg Mountains in the Western Cape 
 
(Source: Blignaut, 2015) 
 
The dead pine in the centre of Figure 7.1 was ring-barked by the author in 2007. At the 
time, it was a lone pine. Some of the seed pollution, probably from this lone specimen, can 
be seen, notwithstanding follow-up weeding in 2009. If not controlled, these swiftly-
multiplying pines, high up in a mountain catchment, would soon deplete the natural runoff. 
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APPENDIX A  
Guidelines for the economic life, and annual operational and maintenance costs 
Component 
Economic 
Life 
Annual Maintenance and 
Operational Costs (excluding 
energy) 
Dams, tunnels and siphons   
Civil works 50 years 0.25% per annum 
Mechanical and electrical 30 years 4.0% per annum 
Pipelines and canals   
Civil works 50 years 0.25% per annum 
Mechanical and electrical 30 years 4.0% per annum 
Pumping stations   
Civil works 50 years 0.25% per annum 
Mechanical and electrical 30 years 4.0% per annum 
Hydroelectric power stations   
Civil works 75 years 0.25% per annum 
Mechanical and electrical 50 years Guidance to be obtained from Eskom 
(Source: DWAF, 1996b) 
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APPENDIX B 
Consumer price index (CPI) history from 1960 onwards (December 2012 = 100%) 
 
(Source: Statistics South Africa; 2015) 
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APPENDIX C 
Unit reference value (URV) calculations 
The tables presented in this appendix are structured as follows in this example: 
 
Explanations: 
 
‗Capital‘ Capital cost of the dam.  
‘O&M’ Operational and maintenance costs are split into civil works (0.25% of capital cost/year) and mechanical / electrical 
components (4% of capital costs/year), which need to be replaced every 30 years. 
‘Yield’  the annual amount of useable water from the dam. 
‘URV’  Unit reference value is the cost, in rands, of a cubic metre of water. 
‘Calc’  Calculation  
‘Mil ZAR’ Number in millions of rands 
‘Mil m3’ Million cubic metres of water 
‘6%’, ‘8%’ and ‘10%’ Discount rates used to bring the costs back to a present value. 
‘y1’ Year one (in this example the dam took seven years to build and thereafter O&M costs are calculated for a further 45 years).  
‘y38’ 30 years after the end of the construction of the dam (in this example y38) the O&M for mechanical and electrical components 
is 10% of capital cost to fund the replacement costs of these components.    
Unit 6% 8% 10% y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 … y37 y38 y39 … y50 y51 y52
Capital Mil ZAR 584 545 509 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
O&M 1 Civil Mil ZAR 28 22 18 2 2 2 … 2 2 2 … 2 2 2
O&M 2
Mechanical / 
electrical Mil ZAR 460 359 291 29 29 29 … 29 73 29 … 29 29 29
Total Mil ZAR 909 767 668 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 31 31 31 … 31 75 31 … 31 31 31
Yield Mil m3 637 499 406 41 41 41 … 41 41 41 … 41 41 41
Calc: 1.43 1.54 1.64
Estimated Cost (in Millions of Rands) 732
URV: Estimated
Estimated URV Calculation
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1. Inyaka Dam calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
Unit 6% 8% 10% y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 … y37 y38 y39 … y50 y51 y52
Capital Mil ZAR 584 545 509 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
O&M 1 Civil Mil ZAR 28 22 18 2 2 2 … 2 2 2 … 2 2 2
O&M 2
Mechanical / 
electrical Mil ZAR 460 359 291 29 29 29 … 29 73 29 … 29 29 29
Total Mil ZAR 909 767 668 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 31 31 31 … 31 75 31 … 31 31 31
Yield Mil m3 637 499 406 41 41 41 … 41 41 41 … 41 41 41
Calc: 1.43 1.54 1.64
Estimated Cost (in Millions of Rands) 732
URV: Estimated
Estimated URV Calculation
Unit 6% 8% 10% y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 … y37 y38 y39 … y50 y51 y52
Capital Mil ZAR 428 399 373 77 77 77 77 77 77 77
O&M 1 Civil Mil ZAR 21 16 13 1 1 1 … 1 1 1 … 1 1 1
O&M 2
Mechanical / 
electrical Mil ZAR 337 263 214 21 21 21 … 21 54 21 … 21 21 21
Total Mil ZAR 666 562 490 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 23 23 23 … 23 55 23 … 23 23 23
Yield Mil m3 637 499 406 41 41 41 … 41 41 41 … 41 41 41
Calc: 1.05 1.13 1.21
Actual Cost (in Millions of Rands) 537
URV: Actual
Actual URV Calculation
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2. Nandoni Dam calculations 
 
 
 
 
Unit 6% 8% 10% y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 … y37 y38 y39 … y50 y51 y52
Capital Mil ZAR 662 617 577 119 119 119 119 119 119 119
O&M 1 Civil Mil ZAR 32 25 20 2 2 2 … 2 2 2 … 2 2 2
O&M 2
Mechanical / 
electrical Mil ZAR 521 407 330 33 33 33 … 33 83 33 … 33 33 33
Total Mil ZAR 1030 869 757 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 35 35 35 … 35 85 35 … 35 35 35
Yield Mil m3 1444 1131 921 93 93 93 … 93 93 93 … 93 93 93
Calc: 0.71 0.77 0.82
Estimated Cost (in Millions of Rands) 830
URV: Estimated
Estimated URV Calculation
Unit 6% 8% 10% y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 … y37 y38 y39 … y50 y51 y52
Capital Mil ZAR 581 542 507 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
O&M 1 Civil Mil ZAR 28 22 18 2 2 2 … 2 2 2 … 2 2 2
O&M 2
Mechanical / 
electrical Mil ZAR 458 357 290 29 29 29 … 29 73 29 … 29 29 29
Total Mil ZAR 904 763 665 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 31 31 31 … 31 75 31 … 31 31 31
Yield Mil m3 1444 1131 921 93 93 93 … 93 93 93 … 93 93 93
Calc: 0.63 0.67 0.72
Actual Cost (in Millions of Rands) 729
Actual URV Calculation 1 (based on DWS guidelines)
URV: Actual 1
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Nandoni Dam calculations continued… 
 
 
  
Unit 6% 8% 10% y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 … y37 y38 y39 … y50 y51 y52
Capital Mil ZAR 581 542 507 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
O&M Mil ZAR 50 36 27 1 2 2 … 3 73 3 … 3 3 3
Total Mil ZAR 614 563 521 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 1 2 2 … 3 73 3 … 3 3 3
Yield Mil m3 1444 1131 921 93 93 93 … 93 93 93 … 93 93 93
Calc: 0.43 0.50 0.57
Actual Cost (in Millions of Rands) 729
y8 y9 y10 y11 y12 y13
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
0.77 0.79 0.85 0.88 0.93 0.98
0.41 1.77 1.99 1.73 2.48 2.65
0.53 2.23 2.35 1.96 2.68 2.71Actual (Mil ZAR) in Dec 2012 Rands
Actual (Mil ZAR)
Consumer Price Index (CPI)
DWS O&M Costs
Actual URV Calculation 2 (based on DWS data) 
URV: Actual 2
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3. Berg River Dam calculations 
 
 
 
Unit 6% 8% 10% y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 … y34 y35 y36 … y47 y48 y49
Capital Mil ZAR 1133 1083 1037 327 327 327 327
O&M 1 Civil Mil ZAR 51 40 32 3 3 3 … 3 3 3 … 3 3 3
O&M 2
Mechanical / 
electrical Mil ZAR 822 641 520 52 52 52 … 52 131 52 … 52 52 52
Total Mil ZAR 1824 1584 1414 327 327 327 327 56 56 56 … 56 134 56 … 56 56 56
Yield Mil m3 866 678 552 56 56 56 … 56 56 56 … 56 56 56
Calc: 2.11 2.34 2.56
Estimated Cost (in Millions of Rands) 1308
URV: Estimated
Estimated URV Calculation
Actual URV Calculation 1 (based on DWS guidelines)
Unit 6% 8% 10% y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 … y34 y35 y36 … y47 y48 y49
Capital Mil ZAR 1371 1310 1254 396 396 396 396
O&M 1 Civil Mil ZAR 61 48 39 4 4 4 … 4 4 4 … 4 4 4
O&M 2
Mechanical / 
electrical Mil ZAR 994 775 629 63 63 63 … 63 158 63 … 63 63 63
Total Mil ZAR 2206 1915 1710 396 396 396 396 67 67 67 … 67 162 67 … 67 67 67
Yield Mil m3 866 678 552 56 56 56 … 56 56 56 … 56 56 56
Calc: 2.55 2.82 3.10
Actual Cost (in Millions of Rands) 1582
URV: Actual 1
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Berg River Dam URV calculations continued… 
 
 
 
  
Unit 6% 8% 10% y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 … y34 y35 y36 … y47 y48 y49
Capital Mil ZAR 1371 1310 1254 396 396 396 396
O&M Mil ZAR 88 64 49 3 4 7 … 4 158 4 … 4 4 4
Total Mil ZAR 1440 1357 1287 396 396 396 396 3 4 7 … 4 158 4 … 4 4 4
Yield Mil m3 866 678 552 56 56 56 … 56 56 56 … 56 56 56
Calc: 1.66 2.00 2.33
Actual Cost (in Millions of Rands) 1582
y5 y6 y7 y8 y9
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
0.771 0.793 0.846 0.882 0.926
2.262 3.409 5.581 5.553 3.514
2.934 4.299 6.597 6.296 3.795
Actual URV Calculation 2 (Based on DWS data)
DWS O&M Costs
Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Actual (Mil ZAR)
Actual (Mil ZAR) in Dec 2012 Rands
URV: Actual 2
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4. De Hoop Dam URV calculations 
 
 
 
 
Unit 6% 8% 10% y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 y11 … y38 y39 y40 … y51 y52 y53
Capital Mil ZAR 1354 1253 1163 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218
O&M 1 Civil Mil ZAR 67 53 43 4 4 4 … 4 4 4 … 4 4 4
O&M 2
Mechanical / 
electrical Mil ZAR 1096 855 694 70 70 70 … 70 174 70 … 70 70 70
Total Mil ZAR 2084 1743 1507 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 74 74 74 … 74 179 74 … 74 74 74
Yield Mil m3 1020 799 651 66 66 66 … 66 66 66 … 66 66 66
Calc: 2.04 2.18 2.32
Estimated Cost (in Millions of Rands) 1745
Estimated URV Calculation: Yield = 66 Million m3
URV: Estimated
Unit 6% 8% 10% y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 y11 … y38 y39 y40 … y51 y52 y53
Capital Mil ZAR 2352 2177 2021 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 379
O&M 1 Civil Mil ZAR 117 92 75 8 8 8 … 8 8 8 … 8 8 8
O&M 2
Mechanical / 
electrical Mil ZAR 1903 1485 1205 121 121 121 … 121 303 121 … 121 121 121
Total Mil ZAR 3620 3029 2618 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 129 129 129 … 129 311 129 … 129 129 129
Yield Mil m3 1020 799 651 66 66 66 … 66 66 66 … 66 66 66
Calc: 3.55 3.79 4.02
Actual Cost (in Millions of Rands) 3031
Actual URV Calculation: Yield = 66 Million m3
URV: Actual
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De Hoop Dam URV calculations continued… 
 
 
 
 
Unit 6% 8% 10% y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 y11 … y38 y39 y40 … y51 y52 y53
Capital Mil ZAR 1354 1253 1163 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218
O&M 1 Civil Mil ZAR 67 53 43 4 4 4 … 4 4 4 … 4 4 4
O&M 2
Mechanical / 
electrical Mil ZAR 1096 855 694 70 70 70 … 70 174 70 … 70 70 70
Total Mil ZAR 2084 1743 1507 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 74 74 74 74 179 74 74 74 74
Yield Mil m3 1236 969 789 80 80 80 … 80 80 80 … 80 80 80
… …
Calc: 1.69 1.80 1.91
Estimated Cost (in Millions of Rands) 1745
Estimated URV Calculation: Yield = 80 Million m3
URV: Estimated
Unit 6% 8% 10% y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 y11 … y38 y39 y40 … y51 y52 y53
Capital Mil ZAR 2352 2177 2021 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 379
O&M 1 Civil Mil ZAR 117 92 75 8 8 8 … 8 8 8 … 8 8 8
O&M 2
Mechanical / 
electrical Mil ZAR 1903 1485 1205 121 121 121 … 121 303 121 … 121 121 121
Total Mil ZAR 3620 3029 2618 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 129 129 129 129 311 129 129 129 129
Yield Mil m3 1236 969 789 80 80 80 … 80 80 80 … 80 80 80
… …
Calc: 2.93 3.13 3.32
Actual Cost (in Millions of Rands) 3031
URV: Actual
Actual URV Calculation: Yield = 80 Million m3
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APPENDIX D 
Appendix D shows projections of invasive alien plant (IAP) growth, over a 45 year period, if 
no management of IAPs takes place. Only the calculations with a densification rate of one 
per cent are shown. In the Inyaka and De Hoop cases the projections are split into riparian 
and dryland calculations, after which these calculations are combined in summary tables 
that show both densification rates (one and five per cent). Assumptions for the calculations 
appear at the bottom of each table. 
 
1a. Inyaka Dam - riparian calculation 
Year 
Total 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Density of 
invasion 
(maximum 
= 1) 
Condensed 
area 
invaded (ha) 
Annual 
expansion 
of total 
area (ha) 
Cost to clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
Reduction in 
mean annual 
runoff (MAR) 
(Million m
3
) 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 1069.0 0.010 10.7 1069.0  0.18 0.07 
2010 1122.4 0.060 67.3 53.4  1.17 0.46 
2011 1175.6 0.110 129.3 53.2  2.24 0.87 
2012 1228.5 0.160 196.6 52.8  3.41 1.32 
2013 1280.7 0.210 268.9 52.2  4.66 1.82 
2014 1331.9 0.260 346.3 51.3  6.01 2.34 
2015 1382.0 0.310 428.4 50.1  7.43 2.90 
2016 1430.8 0.360 515.1 48.8  8.93 3.48 
2017 1478.0 0.410 606.0 47.2  10.51 4.10 
2018 1523.5 0.460 700.8 45.5  12.15 4.74 
2019 1567.2 0.510 799.3 43.7  13.86 5.40 
2020 1608.9 0.560 901.0 41.7  15.63 6.09 
2021 1648.6 0.610 1005.6 39.7  17.44 6.80 
2022 1686.2 0.660 1112.9 37.6  19.30 7.52 
2023 1721.6 0.710 1222.4 35.5  21.20 8.26 
2024 1755.0 0.760 1333.8 33.4  23.13 9.02 
2025 1786.3 0.810 1446.9 31.3  25.09 9.78 
2026 1815.5 0.860 1561.3 29.2  27.08 10.56 
2027 1842.7 0.910 1676.8 27.2  29.08 11.33 
2028 1868.0 0.960 1793.2 25.3  31.10 12.12 
2029 1891.4 1.000 1891.4 23.4  32.80 12.79 
2030 1913.0 1.000 1913.0 21.6  33.18 12.93 
2031 1932.9 1.000 1932.9 19.9  33.52 13.07 
2032 1951.3 1.000 1951.3 18.3  33.84 13.19 
2033 1968.1 1.000 1968.1 16.8  34.13 13.31 
2034 1983.5 1.000 1983.5 15.4  34.40 13.41 
2035 1997.6 1.000 1997.6 14.1  34.65 13.51 
2036 2010.5 1.000 2010.5 12.9  34.87 13.59 
2037 2022.3 1.000 2022.3 11.8  35.07 13.67 
2038 2033.0 1.000 2033.0 10.7  35.26 13.74 
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Year 
Total 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Density of 
invasion 
(maximum 
= 1) 
Condensed 
area 
invaded (ha) 
Annual 
expansion 
of total 
area (ha) 
Cost to clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
Reduction in 
mean annual 
runoff (MAR) 
(Million m
3
) 
2039 2042.8 1.000 2042.8 9.8  35.43 13.81 
2040 2051.6 1.000 2051.6 8.9  35.58 13.87 
2041 2059.7 1.000 2059.7 8.1  35.72 13.93 
2042 2067.0 1.000 2067.0 7.3  35.85 13.97 
2043 2073.6 1.000 2073.6 6.6  35.96 14.02 
2044 2079.6 1.000 2079.6 6.0  36.07 14.06 
2045 2085.1 1.000 2085.1 5.4  36.16 14.10 
2046 2090.0 1.000 2090.0 4.9  36.25 14.13 
2047 2094.5 1.000 2094.5 4.5  36.33 14.16 
2048 2098.5 1.000 2098.5 4.0  36.40 14.19 
2049 2102.1 1.000 2102.1 3.6  36.46 14.21 
2050 2105.4 1.000 2105.4 3.3  36.52 14.23 
2051 2108.4 1.000 2108.4 3.0  36.57 14.25 
2052 2111.1 1.000 2111.1 2.7  36.61 14.27 
2053 2113.5 1.000 2113.5 2.4  36.66 14.29 
       Assumptions 
      Time step formula used to calculate growth in total area invaded 
 
       Nt = Nt-1+r(1-Nt-1/K)Nt-1  
    Nt is area invaded at time t 
    Nt-1 is area at previous time step 
    
       Rate of spread (r) 
   
10% 
 Maximum invadable area in ha (K) 
  
2135.5 
 Mean initial density 
   
1% 
 
       Density increase per year 
  
5% 
 
       Total mean annual runoff (MAR) (Middleton & Bailey, 2008): 
 Total MAR (million m3/yr)  
  
80.32 
 Total MAR (m3/yr) assuming riparian vol. = 10% of MAR         8,031,830  
 
       Total costs to clear per condensed ha in 2013 rands (Wannenburgh, 2014): 
 Sprouting tree spp. 
   
R 17,344 
 
       Estimated optimal riparian reduction in MAR (Le Maitre et al., 2013): 
 Eucalyptus species (m3/ha/yr) 
  
6761 
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1b. Inyaka Dam - dryland calculation 
Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Density of 
invasion 
(maximum 
= 1) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
Annual 
expansion 
of total area 
(ha) 
Cost to clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
Reduction in 
mean annual 
runoff (MAR) 
(Million m
3
) 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 276.6 0.010 2.8 276.6  0.03 0.009 
2010 302.9 0.060 18.2 26.3  0.20 0.06 
2011 331.5 0.110 36.5 28.6  0.41 0.12 
2012 362.7 0.160 58.0 31.2  0.65 0.19 
2013 396.6 0.210 83.3 33.9  0.93 0.27 
2014 433.4 0.260 112.7 36.8  1.26 0.37 
2015 473.3 0.310 146.7 39.9  1.64 0.48 
2016 516.6 0.360 186.0 43.3  2.07 0.61 
2017 563.4 0.410 231.0 46.8  2.58 0.75 
2018 614.0 0.460 282.5 50.6  3.15 0.92 
2019 668.6 0.510 341.0 54.6  3.80 1.11 
2020 727.4 0.560 407.3 58.8  4.54 1.33 
2021 790.6 0.610 482.3 63.2  5.38 1.58 
2022 858.3 0.660 566.5 67.8  6.32 1.85 
2023 930.9 0.710 660.9 72.5  7.37 2.16 
2024 1008.3 0.760 766.3 77.4  8.55 2.50 
2025 1090.7 0.810 883.5 82.5  9.86 2.89 
2026 1178.3 0.860 1013.3 87.6  11.31 3.31 
2027 1271.0 0.910 1156.6 92.7  12.90 3.78 
2028 1368.9 0.960 1314.2 97.9  14.66 4.29 
2029 1472.0 1.000 1472.0 103.0  16.42 4.81 
2030 1580.0 1.000 1580.0 108.0  17.63 5.16 
2031 1692.9 1.000 1692.9 112.9  18.89 5.53 
2032 1810.3 1.000 1810.3 117.5  20.20 5.92 
2033 1932.1 1.000 1932.1 121.8  21.56 6.31 
2034 2057.9 1.000 2057.9 125.7  22.96 6.72 
2035 2187.1 1.000 2187.1 129.2  24.40 7.15 
2036 2319.3 1.000 2319.3 132.2  25.88 7.58 
2037 2454.0 1.000 2454.0 134.7  27.38 8.02 
2038 2590.6 1.000 2590.6 136.5  28.90 8.47 
2039 2728.3 1.000 2728.3 137.7  30.44 8.92 
2040 2866.6 1.000 2866.6 138.3  31.98 9.37 
2041 3004.7 1.000 3004.7 138.1  33.52 9.82 
2042 3142.0 1.000 3142.0 137.3  35.05 10.27 
2043 3277.7 1.000 3277.7 135.7  36.57 10.71 
2044 3411.3 1.000 3411.3 133.6  38.06 11.15 
2045 3542.1 1.000 3542.1 130.8  39.52 11.57 
2046 3669.5 1.000 3669.5 127.4  40.94 11.99 
2047 3793.0 1.000 3793.0 123.5  42.32 12.39 
2048 3912.2 1.000 3912.2 119.2  43.65 12.78 
2049 4026.8 1.000 4026.8 114.5  44.92 13.16 
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Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Density of 
invasion 
(maximum 
= 1) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
Annual 
expansion 
of total area 
(ha) 
Cost to clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
Reduction in 
mean annual 
runoff (MAR) 
(Million m
3
) 
2050 4136.4 1.000 4136.4 109.6  46.15 13.51 
2051 4240.7 1.000 4240.7 104.4  47.31 13.86 
2052 4339.7 1.000 4339.7 99.0  48.41 14.18 
2053 4433.2 1.000 4433.2 93.5  49.46 14.49 
       Assumptions 
 Time step formula used to calculate growth in total area invaded 
 
       Nt = Nt-1+r(1-Nt-1/K)Nt-1  
    Nt is area invaded at time t 
    Nt-1 is area at previous time step 
    
       Rate of spread (r) 
   
10% 
 Maximum invadable area in ha (K) 
  
5532.0 
 Mean initial density 
   
1% 
 
       Density increase per year 
  
5% 
 
       Total mean annual runoff (MAR) (Middleton & Bailey, 2008): 
  Total MAR (million m3/yr)  
  
80.32 
 Total MAR (m3/yr) assuming dryland vol. = 90% of MAR        72,286,474  
 
       Total costs to clear per condensed ha in 2013 rands (Wannenburgh, 2014) 
 Non-sprouting tree spp. 
  
R 11,156 
 
       Estimated optimal dryland reduction in MAR (Le Maitre et al., 2013): 
 Pinus species (m3/ha/yr) 
  
3268 
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1.c Inyaka - combined calculation summary using a densification rate of 1% 
Summary table of combined riparian and dryland calculation. Densification = 1% 
Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction of 
MAR 
(million m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
% cost 
increase* 
2008 0 0 0% 0 0% 0 - 
2023     2,652          442  5.77%   2.43 3.02%   6.67  3084% 
2038     4,624         1,479  19.29%   7.05  8.77%  20.42  9442% 
2053     6,547         2,946  38.42%  12.95  16.12%  38.75 17919% 
* Per cent cost increase calculations are based on the 2009 cost to clear because 2008 = 0. 
        Riparian summary table: 6761 m3/ha/yr riparian Euc reduction. Densification rate = 1% 
Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction of 
MAR (million 
m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008 0 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 - 
2023     1,722          281  13.15   1.90  23.64   4.87  2627 
2038     2,033          633  29.65   4.28  53.30  10.98  5924 
2053     2,113          951  44.54   6.43  80.06  16.49  8897 
        Dryland summary table: 3268/m3/ha/yr dryland pine reduction. Densification rate = 1% 
Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction of 
MAR (million 
m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008 0 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 - 
2023       931          161  2.92     0.53  0.73   1.80  5832 
2038     2,591          846  15.29   2.76  3.82   9.44  30578 
2053     4,433         1,995  36.06   6.52  9.02  22.26  72124 
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1.d Inyaka - combined riparian and dryland summary. Densification rate = 5% 
Summary table of combined riparian and dryland calculation. Densification = 5% 
Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction of 
MAR 
(million m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
% cost 
increase* 
2008 0 0 0% 0 0% 0 - 
2023      2,652         2,100  27.39%  11,52  14.34%  31,68  14650% 
2038      4,624         4,771  62.22%  22,73  28.30%  65,87  30457% 
2053      6,547         6,547  85.38%  28,78  35.83%  86,11  39819% 
* Per cent cost increase calculations are based on the 2009 cost to clear because 2008 = 0. 
        Riparian summary table: 6761 m3/ha/yr riparian Euc reduction. Densification rate = 5% 
Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction of 
MAR (million 
m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008 0 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 - 
2023      1,722         1,334  62.46   9,02  112.27  23,13  12477 
2038      2,033         2,043  95.66  13,81  171.95  35,43  19109 
2053      2,113         2,113  98.97  14,29  177.90  36,66  19771 
        Dryland summary table: 3268/m3/ha/yr dryland pine reduction. Densification rate = 5% 
Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction of 
MAR (million 
m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008 0 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 - 
2023       931          766  13.85   2,50  3.46   8,55  27704 
2038      2,591         2,728  49.32   8,92  12.33  30,44  98637 
2053      4,433         4,433  80.14  14,49  20.04  49,46  160276 
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2. Nandoni Dam - calculation 
Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Density of 
invasion 
(maximum 
= 1) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
Annual 
expansion 
of total 
area (ha) 
Cost to clear 
invasion in 2013 
rands (Million 
ZAR) 
Reduction in 
mean annual 
runoff (MAR) 
(Million m
3
) 
2008 11037.5 0.056 620.6    10.76 0.27 
2009 11961.5 0.106 1270.6 924.0  22.04 0.55 
2010 12946.6 0.156 2022.6 985.1  35.08 0.87 
2011 13994.1 0.206 2885.9 1047.4  50.05 1.24 
2012 15104.6 0.256 3870.2 1110.5  67.12 1.67 
2013 16278.5 0.306 4984.9 1173.9  86.46 2.15 
2014 17515.5 0.356 6239.4 1237.0  108.21 2.69 
2015 18814.5 0.406 7642.9 1299.0  132.56 3.29 
2016 20173.8 0.456 9203.8 1359.3  159.63 3.97 
2017 21590.8 0.506 10929.8 1417.0  189.56 4.71 
2018 23062.2 0.556 12827.8 1471.4  222.48 5.53 
2019 24583.9 0.606 14903.4 1521.7  258.49 6.42 
2020 26150.8 0.656 17160.8 1566.9  297.63 7.40 
2021 27757.1 0.706 19602.7 1606.3  339.98 8.45 
2022 29396.3 0.756 22230.2 1639.2  385.55 9.58 
2023 31061.2 0.806 25042.3 1664.9  434.32 10.79 
2024 32744.2 0.856 28036.4 1682.9  486.25 12.08 
2025 34437.0 0.906 31207.7 1692.8  541.25 13.45 
2026 36131.4 0.956 34549.7 1694.4  599.22 14.89 
2027 37818.8 1.000 37818.8 1687.4  655.92 16.30 
2028 39490.9 1.000 39490.9 1672.1  684.92 17.02 
2029 41139.6 1.000 41139.6 1648.6  713.51 17.73 
2030 42757.0 1.000 42757.0 1617.4  741.56 18.43 
2031 44335.9 1.000 44335.9 1579.0  768.95 19.11 
2032 45870.0 1.000 45870.0 1534.0  795.55 19.77 
2033 47353.3 1.000 47353.3 1483.3  821.28 20.41 
2034 48780.9 1.000 48780.9 1427.7  846.04 21.02 
2035 50148.9 1.000 50148.9 1368.0  869.76 21.61 
2036 51454.0 1.000 51454.0 1305.1  892.40 22.18 
2037 52694.1 1.000 52694.1 1240.0  913.91 22.71 
2038 53867.6 1.000 53867.6 1173.5  934.26 23.22 
2039 54974.1 1.000 54974.1 1106.4  953.45 23.69 
2040 56013.5 1.000 56013.5 1039.4  971.48 24.14 
2041 56986.7 1.000 56986.7 973.2  988.36 24.56 
2042 57895.0 1.000 57895.0 908.3  1,004.11 24.95 
2043 58740.2 1.000 58740.2 845.2  1,018.79 25.32 
2044 59524.5 1.000 59524.5 784.3  1,032.37 25.66 
2045 60250.5 1.000 60250.5 725.9  1,044.96 25.97 
2046 60920.7 1.000 60920.7 670.3  1,056.59 26.26 
2047 61538.2 1.000 61538.2 617.5  1,067.30 26.52 
2048 62105.9 1.000 62105.9 567.7  1,077.14 26.77 
2049 62626.8 1.000 62626.8 520.9  1,086.18 26.99 
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Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Density of 
invasion 
(maximum 
= 1) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
Annual 
expansion 
of total 
area (ha) 
Cost to clear 
invasion in 2013 
rands (Million 
ZAR) 
Reduction in 
mean annual 
runoff (MAR) 
(Million m
3
) 
2050 63104.0 1.000 63104.0 477.2  1,094.45 27.20 
2051 63540.4 1.000 63540.4 436.4  1,102.02 27.39 
2052 63938.9 1.000 63938.9 398.5  1,108.93 27.56 
2053 64302.3 1.000 64302.3 363.4  1,115.23 27.71 
       Assumptions 
 Time step formula used to calculate growth in total area invaded 
 
       Nt = Nt-1+r(1-Nt-1/K)Nt-1  
    Nt is area invaded at time t 
    Nt-1 is area at previous time step 
    
       Rate of spread (r) 
   
10% 
 Maximum invadable area in ha (K) 
  
67792.0 
 Mean initial density 
   
5.6% 
 
       Density increase per year 
  
5% 
 
       Total mean annual runoff (MAR) (Middleton & Bailey, 2008): 
  Total MAR (million m3/yr)  
  
199.66 
 Total MAR (m3/yr)  
   
      199,662,839  
 
       Total costs to clear per condensed ha in 2013 rands (Wannenburgh, 2014) 
 Sprouting tree spp. 
   
R 17,344 
 
       Estimated optimal reduction in MAR (Le Maitre et al., 2013): 
  Eucalyptus species (m3/ha/yr) 
  
431 
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3. Berg River Dam – calculation 
Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Density of 
invasion 
(maximum 
= 1) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
Annual 
expansion 
of total area 
(ha) 
Cost to clear 
invasion in 2013 
rands (Million 
ZAR) 
Reduction in 
mean 
annual 
runoff 
(MAR) 
(Million m
3
) 
2008 1175.0 0.315 370.1    4.13 1.90 
2009 1334.5 0.325 433.7 159.5  4.84 2.23 
2010 1513.2 0.335 506.9 178.6  5.66 2.60 
2011 1712.4 0.345 590.8 199.3  6.59 3.03 
2012 1933.8 0.355 686.5 221.4  7.66 3.52 
2013 2178.6 0.365 795.2 244.8  8.87 4.08 
2014 2448.0 0.375 918.0 269.4  10.24 4.71 
2015 2742.7 0.385 1055.9 294.7  11.78 5.42 
2016 3063.0 0.395 1209.9 320.4  13.50 6.21 
2017 3408.9 0.405 1380.6 345.9  15.40 7.09 
2018 3779.6 0.415 1568.6 370.7  17.50 8.05 
2019 4173.7 0.425 1773.8 394.1  19.79 9.10 
2020 4589.0 0.435 1996.2 415.2  22.27 10.24 
2021 5022.4 0.445 2235.0 433.5  24.93 11.47 
2022 5470.5 0.455 2489.1 448.1  27.77 12.77 
2023 5929.0 0.637 3776.7 458.4  42.13 19.38 
2024 6392.9 0.647 4136.2 463.9  46.14 21.23 
2025 6857.2 0.657 4505.2 464.3  50.26 23.12 
2026 7316.8 0.667 4880.3 459.5  54.45 25.04 
2027 7766.4 0.677 5257.9 449.6  58.66 26.98 
2028 8201.4 0.687 5634.4 435.0  62.86 28.91 
2029 8617.6 0.697 6006.5 416.2  67.01 30.82 
2030 9011.5 0.707 6371.2 393.9  71.08 32.70 
2031 9380.5 0.717 6725.8 369.0  75.03 34.52 
2032 9722.7 0.727 7068.4 342.2  78.86 36.27 
2033 10037.1 0.737 7397.3 314.4  82.53 37.96 
2034 10323.5 0.747 7711.6 286.4  86.03 39.58 
2035 10582.3 0.757 8010.8 258.8  89.37 41.11 
2036 10814.4 0.767 8294.6 232.1  92.54 42.57 
2037 11021.2 0.777 8563.5 206.8  95.54 43.95 
2038 11204.4 1.000 11204.4 183.2  125.00 57.50 
2039 11365.8 1.000 11365.8 161.4  126.80 58.33 
2040 11507.4 1.000 11507.4 141.5  128.38 59.05 
2041 11630.9 1.000 11630.9 123.6  129.76 59.69 
2042 11738.5 1.000 11738.5 107.5  130.96 60.24 
2043 11831.7 1.000 11831.7 93.2  132.00 60.72 
2044 11912.3 1.000 11912.3 80.6  132.90 61.13 
2045 11981.9 1.000 11981.9 69.6  133.67 61.49 
2046 12041.8 1.000 12041.8 59.9  134.34 61.80 
2047 12093.2 1.000 12093.2 51.4  134.91 62.06 
2048 12137.3 1.000 12137.3 44.1  135.41 62.29 
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Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Density of 
invasion 
(maximum 
= 1) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
Annual 
expansion 
of total area 
(ha) 
Cost to clear 
invasion in 2013 
rands (Million 
ZAR) 
Reduction in 
mean 
annual 
runoff 
(MAR) 
(Million m
3
) 
2049 12175.2 1.000 12175.2 37.8  135.83 62.48 
2050 12207.5 1.000 12207.5 32.4  136.19 62.65 
2051 12235.2 1.000 12235.2 27.7  136.50 62.79 
2052 12258.8 1.000 12258.8 23.6  136.76 62.91 
2053 12279.0 1.000 12279.0 20.2  136.99 63.01 
       Assumptions         
 Time step formula used to calculate growth in total area invaded 
 
       Nt = Nt-1+r(1-Nt-1/K)Nt-1  
 Nt is area invaded at time t 
    Nt-1 is area at previous time step 
    
       Rate of spread (r) 
   
15.0% 
 Maximum invadable area in ha (K) 
  
        12,394.8  
 Mean initial density 
   
31.5% 
 
       Density increase per year 
  
1.0% 
 Episodical density increase (in 2023, 2038 and 2053) 40.0% 
 
       Total mean annual runoff (MAR) (Middleton & Bailey, 2008): 
 Total MAR (million m3/yr)  
  
136.34 
 Total MAR (m3/yr)  
   
136,341,786  
 
       Total costs to clear per condensed ha in 2013 rands (Wannenburgh, 2014) 
 Non-sprouting tree spp. 
  
R 11,156 
 
       Estimated optimal reduction in MAR (Le Maitre et al., 2013): 
 Pinus species (m3/ha/yr) 
  
           5,132  
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4a. De Hoop Dam – riparian calculation 
Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Density of 
invasion 
(maximum 
= 1) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
Annual 
expansion 
of total 
area (ha) 
Cost to clear 
invasion in 2013 
rands (Million 
ZAR) 
Reduction in 
mean annual 
runoff (MAR) 
(Million m
3
) 
2008 21270.1 0.100 2118.6    36,74 1,79 
2009 21817.9 0.150 3264.0 547.8  56,61 2,75 
2010 22338.1 0.200 4458.8 520.2  77,33 3,76 
2011 22830.2 0.250 5698.5 492.1  98,83 4,81 
2012 23293.9 0.300 6978.9 463.7  121,04 5,89 
2013 23729.3 0.350 8295.8 435.4  143,88 7,00 
2014 24136.8 0.400 9645.1 407.5  167,28 8,14 
2015 24516.9 0.450 11022.9 380.1  191,18 9,30 
2016 24870.5 0.500 12425.4 353.6  215,50 10,49 
2017 25198.5 0.550 13849.2 328.0  240,20 11,69 
2018 25502.0 0.600 15291.1 303.5  265,20 12,91 
2019 25782.1 0.650 16748.2 280.1  290,47 14,14 
2020 26040.1 0.700 18217.8 258.0  315,96 15,38 
2021 26277.2 0.750 19697.5 237.1  341,63 16,62 
2022 26494.8 0.800 21185.3 217.5  367,43 17,88 
2023 26694.0 0.850 22679.3 199.2  393,34 19,14 
2024 26876.1 0.900 24177.9 182.2  419,33 20,41 
2025 27042.4 0.950 25679.6 166.3  445,38 21,67 
2026 27194.1 1.000 27183.3 151.6  471,46 22,94 
2027 27332.2 1.000 27332.2 138.1  474,04 23,07 
2028 27457.8 1.000 27457.8 125.6  476,22 23,17 
2029 27572.0 1.000 27572.0 114.2  478,20 23,27 
2030 27675.6 1.000 27675.6 103.6  479,99 23,36 
2031 27769.6 1.000 27769.6 94.0  481,63 23,44 
2032 27854.9 1.000 27854.9 85.2  483,10 23,51 
2033 27932.1 1.000 27932.1 77.2  484,44 23,57 
2034 28001.9 1.000 28001.9 69.9  485,66 23,63 
2035 28065.2 1.000 28065.2 63.2  486,75 23,69 
2036 28122.4 1.000 28122.4 57.2  487,74 23,74 
2037 28174.1 1.000 28174.1 51.7  488,64 23,78 
2038 28220.7 1.000 28220.7 46.7  489,45 23,82 
2039 28262.9 1.000 28262.9 42.2  490,18 23,85 
2040 28301.0 1.000 28301.0 38.1  490,84 23,89 
2041 28335.4 1.000 28335.4 34.4  491,44 23,92 
2042 28366.4 1.000 28366.4 31.0  491,98 23,94 
2043 28394.4 1.000 28394.4 28.0  492,46 23,96 
2044 28419.6 1.000 28419.6 25.2  492,90 23,99 
2045 28442.3 1.000 28442.3 22.7  493,29 24,01 
2046 28462.8 1.000 28462.8 20.5  493,65 24,02 
2047 28481.3 1.000 28481.3 18.5  493,97 24,04 
2048 28498.0 1.000 28498.0 16.7  494,26 24,05 
2049 28513.0 1.000 28513.0 15.0  494,52 24,06 
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Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Density of 
invasion 
(maximum 
= 1) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
Annual 
expansion 
of total 
area (ha) 
Cost to clear 
invasion in 2013 
rands (Million 
ZAR) 
Reduction in 
mean annual 
runoff (MAR) 
(Million m
3
) 
2050 28526.5 1.000 28526.5 13.5  494,75 24,08 
2051 28538.7 1.000 28538.7 12.2  494,96 24,09 
2052 28549.7 1.000 28549.7 11.0  495,15 24,10 
2053 28559.6 1.000 28559.6 9.9  495,33 24,10 
       Assumptions 
 Time step formula used to calculate growth in total area invaded 
 
       Nt = Nt-1+r(1-Nt-1/K)Nt-1  
    Nt is area invaded at time t 
    Nt-1 is area at previous time step 
    
       Rate of spread (r) 
   
10% 
 Maximum invadable area in ha (K) 
  
           28,649  
 Mean initial density 
   
10.0% 
 
       Density increase per year 
  
5% 
 
       Total mean annual runoff (MAR) (Middleton & Bailey, 2008): 
  Total MAR (million m3/yr)  
  
134.33 
 Total MAR (m3/yr) assuming riparian vol. = 10% of MAR         13,433,199  
 
       Total costs to clear per condensed ha in 2013 rands (Wannenburgh, 2014): 
 Sprouting tree spp. 
   
R 17,344 
 
       Estimated optimal riparian reduction in MAR (Le Maitre et al., 2013): 
 Eucalyptus species (m3/ha/yr) 
  
844 
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4b. De Hoop Dam – dryland calculation 
Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Density of 
invasion 
(maximum = 
1) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
Annual 
expansion 
of total area 
(ha) 
Cost to clear 
invasion in 2013 
rands (Million 
ZAR) 
Reduction 
in mean 
annual 
runoff 
(MAR) 
(Million m
3
) 
2008 152367.9 0.100 15176.4    169.31 6.19 
2009 156292.3 0.150 23381.9 3924.4  260.85 9.54 
2010 160018.9 0.200 31940.4 3726.6  356.33 13.03 
2011 163543.8 0.250 40821.1 3524.9  455.41 16.66 
2012 166865.4 0.300 49993.5 3321.6  557.7 20.40 
2013 169984.5 0.350 59427.2 3119.0  662.98 24.25 
2014 172903.4 0.400 69092.9 2919.0  770.82 28.19 
2015 175626.6 0.450 78962.4 2723.2  880.92 32.22 
2016 178159.7 0.500 89009.2 2533.0  993.01 36.32 
2017 180509.3 0.550 99208.6 2349.7  1,106.80 40.48 
2018 182683.3 0.600 109537.6 2174.0  1,222.03 44.69 
2019 184690.0 0.650 119975.3 2006.7  1,338.47 48.95 
2020 186538.1 0.700 130502.8 1848.1  1,455.92 53.25 
2021 188236.7 0.750 141103.0 1698.6  1,574.18 57.57 
2022 189795.0 0.800 151760.8 1558.3  1,693.08 61.92 
2023 191222.1 0.850 162463.0 1427.1  1,812.48 66.28 
2024 192527.0 0.900 173198.0 1304.8  1,932.24 70.66 
2025 193718.3 0.950 183955.6 1191.3  2,052.25 75.05 
2026 194804.5 1.000 194727.4 1086.3  2,172.43 79.45 
2027 195793.8 1.000 195793.8 989.2  2,184.32 79.88 
2028 196693.7 1.000 196693.7 899.9  2,194.36 80.25 
2029 197511.4 1.000 197511.4 817.8  2,203.49 80.58 
2030 198253.9 1.000 198253.9 742.5  2,211.77 80.89 
2031 198927.4 1.000 198927.4 673.5  2,219.28 81.16 
2032 199538.0 1.000 199538.0 610.5  2,226.10 81.41 
2033 200091.0 1.000 200091.0 553.0  2,232.27 81.64 
2034 200591.7 1.000 200591.7 500.7  2,237.85 81.84 
2035 201044.6 1.000 201044.6 453.0  2,242.90 82.03 
2036 201454.3 1.000 201454.3 409.6  2,247.47 82.19 
2037 201824.5 1.000 201824.5 370.3  2,251.60 82.34 
2038 202159.0 1.000 202159.0 334.5  2,255.34 82.48 
2039 202461.2 1.000 202461.2 302.1  2,258.71 82.60 
2040 202733.9 1.000 202733.9 272.8  2,261.75 82.72 
2041 202980.1 1.000 202980.1 246.2  2,264.50 82.82 
2042 203202.3 1.000 203202.3 222.1  2,266.98 82.91 
2043 203402.7 1.000 203402.7 200.4  2,269.21 82.99 
2044 203583.4 1.000 203583.4 180.7  2,271.23 83.06 
2045 203746.3 1.000 203746.3 163.0  2,273.05 83.13 
2046 203893.2 1.000 203893.2 146.9  2,274.68 83.19 
2047 204025.7 1.000 204025.7 132.4  2,276.16 83.24 
2048 204145.0 1.000 204145.0 119.3  2,277.49 83.29 
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Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Density of 
invasion 
(maximum = 
1) 
Condensed 
area invaded 
(ha) 
Annual 
expansion 
of total area 
(ha) 
Cost to clear 
invasion in 2013 
rands (Million 
ZAR) 
Reduction 
in mean 
annual 
runoff 
(MAR) 
(Million m
3
) 
2049 204252.5 1.000 204252.5 107.5  2,278.69 83.34 
2050 204349.4 1.000 204349.4 96.9  2,279.77 83.37 
2051 204436.7 1.000 204436.7 87.3  2,280.75 83.41 
2052 204515.4 1.000 204515.4 78.6  2,281.62 83.44 
2053 204586.2 1.000 204586.2 70.8  2,282.41 83.47 
       Assumptions 
 Time step formula used to calculate growth in total area invaded 
 
       Nt = Nt-1+r(1-Nt-1/K)Nt-1  
    Nt is area invaded at time t 
    Nt-1 is area at previous time step 
   
       Rate of spread (r) 
   
10% 
 Maximum invadable area in ha (K) 
 
        205,226  
 Mean initial density 
   
10% 
 
       Density increase per year 
  
5% 
 
       Total mean annual runoff (MAR) (Middleton & Bailey, 2008): 
 Total MAR (million m3/yr)  
  
134.33 
 Total MAR (m3/yr) assuming dryland vol. = 90% of MAR    1,208,988,859  
 
       Total costs to clear per condensed ha in 2013 rands (Wannenburgh, 2014) 
Non-sprouting tree spp. 
  
R 11,156 
 
       Estimated optimal dryland reduction in MAR (Le Maitre et al., 2013): 
 Pinus species (m3/ha/yr) 
  
408 
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4.c De Hoop - combined calculation summary using a densification rate of 1% 
Summary table of combined riparian and dryland calculation. Densification = 1% 
Year 
Total 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
area 
invaded (ha) 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction 
of MAR 
(million m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 2013 
rands (Million 
ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008   173,638       17,295  7.39%   7.98 5.94%    206.06  - 
2023   217,916       54,393  23.26%  25.10  18.68%    648.04  314% 
2038   230,380       92,061  39.36%  42.48  31.62%  1,096.83  532% 
2053   233,146      128,138  54.79%  59.12  44.01%  1,526.66  741% 
        Riperian summary table: 844/m3/ha/yr riperian Euc reduction. Densification rate = 1% 
Year 
Total 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
invaded ha 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction of 
MAR 
(million m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 2013 
rands (Million 
ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008    21,270        2,119  7.39   1.79  13.31     36.74  - 
2023    26,694        6,663  23.26   5.62  41.86    115.56  314 
2038    28,221       11,277  39.36   9.52  70.85    195.59  532 
2053    28,560       15,696  54.79  13.25  98.62    272.23  741 
        Dryland summary table: 408/m3/ha/yr dryland pine reduction. Densification rate = 1% 
Year 
Total 
area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
invaded ha 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction of 
MAR 
(million m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 2013 
rands (Million 
ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008   152,368       15,176  7.39   6.19  5.12    169.31  - 
2023   191,222       47,730  23.26  19.47  16.11    532.49  314 
2038   202,159       80,784  39.36  32.96  27.26    901.24  532 
2053   204,586      112,441  54.79  45.88  37.95  1,254.42  741 
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4.d De Hoop - combined calculation summary using a densification rate of 5% 
Summary table of combined riparian and dryland calculation. Densification = 5% 
 
Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
area 
invaded (ha) 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction of 
MAR (million 
m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 
2013 rands 
(Million ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008   173,638       17,295  7.39%    7.98  5.94%    206.06  - 
2023   217,916       54,393  23.26%   85.43  63.59%  2,205.82  1070% 
2038   230,380       92,061  39.36%  106.30  79.13%  2,744.79  1332% 
2053   233,146      233,146  99.69%  107.58  80.08%  2,777.74  1348% 
        Riperian summary table: 844/m3/ha/yr riperian Euc reduction. Densification rate = 5% 
Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
invaded ha 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction of 
MAR (million 
m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 2013 
rands (Million 
ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008     21,270        2,119  7.39    1.79  13.31     36.74  - 
2023     26,694       22,679  79.16   19.14  142    393.34  1070 
2038     28,221       28,221  98.51   23.82  177    489.45  1332 
2053     28,560       28,560  99.69   24.10  179    495.33  1348 
        Dryland summary table: 408/m3/ha/yr dryland pine reduction. Densification rate = 5% 
Year 
Total area 
invaded 
(ha) 
Condensed 
invaded ha 
% of 
invadable 
ha 
Reduction of 
MAR (million 
m3) 
% 
reduction 
of MAR  
Cost to Clear 
invasion in 2013 
rands (Million 
ZAR) 
% cost 
increase 
2008   152,368       15,176  7.39    6.19  5.12    169.31  - 
2023   191,222      162,463  79.16   66.28  54.83  1,812.48  1070 
2038   202,159      202,159  98.51   82.48  68.22  2,255.34  1332 
2053   204,586      204,586  99.69   83.47  69.04  2,282.41 1348 
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APPENDIX E 
1. Interview cover letter 
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2. Interview guide 
 
1. Please can you explain how the need for additional water yield in the Steelpoort 
Catchment, was identified? 
a. Which directorate and/or position in the DWA were responsible for identifying 
this need? 
b. When was a supply side measure selected? 
c. How was the extent of the need for additional yield assessed? 
d. How has risk and uncertainty been mitigated? 
 
2. Which directorate and/or position in the DWA recommended the decision to build the 
De Hoop Dam? 
a. Who would have been consulted when the recommendation went to the 
minister? 
b. When was the decision to build De Hoop Dam made? 
c. What was the role of uncertainty in making the decision to build De Hoop Dam? 
 
3. In considering alternative solutions: 
a. Were other infrastructure-based alternatives (such as other dams or inter-
basin transfers) considered?  
b. If so, what were they? 
c. Why, in your opinion, where these alternative infrastructure-based solutions not 
selected? 
d. Were other non-infrastructure-based alternatives (such as demand-side or 
catchment management) considered? 
e. If so, what were they? 
f. Why, in your opinion, where these non- infrastructure-based solutions not 
selected? 
 
4. How where the alternative infrastructure based and non-infrastructure based solutions 
compared and evaluated? 
 
5. How was the De Hoop Dam chosen from among all the alternative solutions? 
a. What processes where used in choosing a solution to fulfil the need for 
additional yield? 
b. How were risk and uncertainty mitigated in choosing to build De Hoop Dam? 
c. In the decision to build the DHD were any decisions made to mitigate the risks to 
catchment management? 
d. If so, what were these decisions? 
 
6. What were the strengths and possible weaknesses in the decision-making during the 
building of the De Hoop Dam? 
a. Which directorate and/or position in the DWA have been responsible for making 
decisions during the building of the dam? 
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Interview guide continued… 
b. In your opinion, which model of decision-making best fits the decision-making 
that has occurred during the building of De Hoop Dam: 
 
i. Rational Decision-Making Model (RDMM) 
ii. Bounded Rationality Decision-Making Model (BRDMM) 
iii. Political Decision-Making Model (PDMM) 
(The models are shown in full at the end of the guide) 
 
7. Have any decision-making processes been evaluated? 
a. To date, has the building of De Hoop Dam been on course to achieve all the 
goals that were planned, in their specified time frames?  
b. If not, then which goals were not on course to be achieved as planned and why 
not? 
c. What goals were achieved and how? 
d. Have any decisions been retrospectively analysed? 
 
8. My understanding is that Phase 2A (building De Hoop Dam) was forecast to cost 
approximately R1.744 Billion (in 2012 Rands), to date it has cost R3.035 Billion. How 
can this difference be explained in terms of the Decision-making process? 
a. Do you think a different decision-making process would have been followed if 
the cost to date (the actual cost) had been projected as the estimated cost? 
b. Do you think a different decision would then have been made? 
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Interview guide continued… 
For Question 6B: decision-making models (Zindiye, 2012) 
i. Rational Decision-Making Model 
 
 
ii. Bounded Rationality Decision-Making Model 
 
 
iii. Political Decision-Making Model 
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3. Example of informed consent form 
 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
Department of Management 
 
Research Project Title:  
 
Water supply development decision-making in South Africa 
 
Principal 
Investigator(s): 
Ian Preston 
 
 
Participation Information 
 
 I understand that participation in this study is done on a voluntary basis 
 I understand the purpose of the research study and my involvement in it 
 I understand the risks of participating in this research study 
 I understand the benefits of participating in this research study 
 I understand that I may withdraw from the research study at any stage without any penalty  
 I understand that while information gained during the study may be published, I will not be 
identified and my personal results will remain confidential 
 I understand that I will receive no payment for participating in this study 
 I understand that my answers will in no way be inferred into a political context 
 I understand that once the research has been conducted the data will be handed to the 
research supervisor, Professor L. Louw, for private storage. 
 I understand that this consent explicitly excludes minors and other vulnerable populations 
that need bystanders 
 I understand that the interviewer will email me his notes so that I can check that what he 
wrote is accurate.  
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Informed consent form continued… 
 
Information Explanation 
The above information was explained to me by: Ian Preston 
 
The above information was explained to me in: □English □Afrikaans □isiXhosa □isiZulu 
                      □Other:  
and I am in command of this language 
 
OR, it was comprehensibly translated to me by:  
 
 
Voluntary Consent 
 
I,            hereby voluntarily consent to participate in the above-mentioned research. 
 
 
Signature: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   OR, right hand thumb print 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Witness signature: 
 
 
 
Date:   /    /  
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Informed consent form continued… 
 
Investigator Declaration 
I, Ian Preston, declare that I have explained all the participant information to the participant and 
have truthfully answered all questions ask me by the participant.  
 
 
Signature: 
 
Date:   /    /  
 
 
Translator Declaration 
I,           , declare that I translated a factually correct version of:  
1. all the contents of this document 
2. all questions posed by the participant 
3. all answers given by the investigator  
 
In addition, I declare that all information acquired by me regarding this research will be kept 
confidential. 
 
 
Signature 
 
 
Date:   /    /  
 
 
